People v. Gutierrez

Regarding the record search for Gutierrez, Longwith explained: "I went solely off of [the automated system]. I did not [manually] double check it through CJIS. Had I double checked it through CJIS, I would have seen what you saw and knew that [Gutierrez] was no longer on PRCS." Longwith knew of another dispatcher who had encountered the same problem, in that the dispatch system had generated inaccurate information regarding an individual's PRCS status and the dispatcher had not double checked it through CJIS.

Testimony of Probation Officer Artemio Pineda

Kern County Probation Officer Artemio Pineda testified that he had supervised Gutierrez while Gutierrez was on PRCS. Pineda confirmed that Gutierrez was not on PRCS on June 4, 2015; his PRCS was dismissed in September 2013. Pineda clarified that any changes to a supervisee's PRCS status were entered by the probation department directly into the CJIS system, the system used by the probation department to maintain its records.

Pineda was aware of mistakes made by dispatch in ascertaining people's probationary or PRCS status. For example, Pineda had another former supervisee (not Gutierrez) who was also incorrectly identified by dispatch as being on probation when he was not; like Gutierrez, that former supervisee was searched on the basis of the inaccurate information provided by dispatch as well. Pineda stated the wrongful search of his other supervisee had occurred in the 2013-2014 period. Pineda promptly alerted his supervisor

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures." ( People v. Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612 , 622, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 375 .) For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, "police 'contacts' or 'interactions' with individuals" include consensual encounters, detentions, and arrests, with consensual encounters being the least intrusive, and arrests the most intrusive, of these

The Glaser court balanced "the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it, looking in the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and objective facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular detention." ( Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 365, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) In assessing the character of the detention, the court noted that its extreme brevity and out-of-the-way location at "the back gate of a private residence" diminished the level of intrusiveness, while the officer's use of a gun exacerbated it. ( Id . at pp. 366-367, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) The court also noted that because the detention was incidental to the execution of a search warrant, and "there was no evidence of an independent investigatory purpose," it was "not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information" beyond that expected to be obtained through the search. ( Id . at p. 367, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .)

As for the government interests potentially justifying the intrusion, they arose from the fact that there was probable cause to believe that criminal drug activity was occurring at the residence, as reflected in the issuance of the search warrant. Specifically, the government interests were: (1) determining whether Glaser, "who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual visitor," was connected to the criminal activity suspected to be occurring at the residence and, (2) ensuring officer safety "at the site of a search for narcotics." ( Glaser , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 365, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) Regarding the issue of officer safety, Glaser observed that when police execute a search warrant at a suspected drug dealer's home, it is reasonable to assume that dealers often have access to firearms. ( Id . at pp. 367-368, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) Thus, the police have a legitimate interest in "determining the identity of a person entering premises being searched" and his connection to the premises, so as to evaluate the level of risk to officer safety. Determining the identity of such a person and his connection to the premises also assists the police in ascertaining whether "there is reason to suspect the person of involvement in criminal activities on the premises" and whether he can be of assistance in facilitating the search of the premises, as authorized by the search warrant. ( Id. at pp. 367-368, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .)

Glaser , however, expressly declined to adopt "a general rule" that when police have a warrant to search a home, " 'the mere arrival or presence of someone at the warranted premises, by itself,' justifies a detention for the purpose of determining identity and connection to the searched premises." ( Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 373-374, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) Glaser noted that "[s]uch a blanket approval of detentions in the course of searches would present too great a danger 'of slippage into a guilt by association pattern whereby anyone seen near prospective drug activity becomes fair game for a stop and frisk.' " ( Id . at p. 374, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .)

People v. Hannah (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 806 ( Hannah ) applied Summers and Glaser to a situation where police arrived at an apartment to execute an arrest warrant (not a search warrant), for a minor. The woman who answered the door consented to the police entering to check whether the minor was present. The defendant and another man were seated in the living room at the time. The officers directed the men to remain seated while they attempted to locate the minor. One of the officers noticed that the defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs and arrested him.

Furthermore, evidence of an independent investigatory purpose is apparent, in that Simmons had obtained identifying information from Gutierrez and after, or at least well into, the probation search, asked dispatch to check whether Gutierrez was subject to search terms himself. The detention appears to have been unduly prolonged for this purpose, which was unrelated to the probation search of Beltran. Indeed, given that the police were there simply

Longwith noted she had no reason to manually check the CJIS database because, at the time, the dispatch system was set up do to that automatically. She testified: "In our computer system, they tried to streamline things so that you're not checking five and six different [databases] for the information. So they have the computers communicate together and they bring it up into one screen. I was always able to depend on that information." Longwith acknowledged that the system broke down at some point, although she did not specify when that occurred. Specifically, "computer support ... determined that the [relevant] systems were no longer communicating with each other." In particular, at that point, the dispatch system was not communicating with CJIS, the database used by the probation department to maintain probation and PRCS records. Dispatchers were subsequently instructed-for purposes of improving accuracy

DISCUSSION

Gutierrez a

rgues his detention from the inception of Beltran's probation search until the point dispatch told the deputies Gutierrez was on PRCS, was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution. He contends the subsequent searches of his person and his car were, in turn, illegal. He argues the evidence obtained as a result of those searches must be suppressed as the product of his unconstitutional detention. We agree with Gutierrez and will reverse the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress this evidence.

In deciding whether relevant evidence must be suppressed, we look exclusively to the requirements of the United States Constitution. ( People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354 , 363, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 ( Glaser ).) In reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, we "defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence." ( Id. at p. 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) "In determining whether, on the facts so found [and/or facts that are undisputed], the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." ( Ibid. ; see People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917 , 922, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785 [reviewing court independently decides, as a matter of law, the constitutionality of the challenged search or seizure].) The prosecution always bears the burden of justifying, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a warrantless search or seizure falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. (

In the instant matter, both parties agree that Gutierrez was detained at the inception of the probation search concerning Beltran and remained so for the duration of the search. Indeed, Deputy Simmons expressly acknowledged that Gutierrez was "detained," explaining that Gutierrez was ordered out of the house, subjected to a patdown search on the front porch or in the front yard, and directed to sit on the front porch for the duration of Beltran's probation search. Simmons testified he stood guard over Gutierrez and Beltran, while other deputies conducted the search.

The exact duration of the detention is unclear. Deputies arrived at Beltran's house at approximately 7:00 p.m. The sheriff's dispatcher testified that she started a log related to the incident at 7:15 p.m., when she was informed the deputies had "stopped" someone. At 7:48 p.m., Simmons asked the dispatcher to run a record check on Gutierrez and, a couple of minutes later, she advised Simmons, albeit wrongly, that Gutierrez was on PRCS. Thus, although the length of the detention is not precisely ascertainable, it appears to be longer than 30 minutes but no more than 50 minutes.

In terms of assessing the legality of Gutierrez's detention, our analysis starts with the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 , 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ( Terry ). In Terry , the federal high court considered "when police may constitutionally 'stop and frisk' individuals in public places without probable cause to arrest or search." ( Glaser , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 363, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 ; In re Tony C ., supra , 21 Cal.3d at p. 892, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 [ Terry established that "circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest

In Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 ( Summers ), the federal high court applied the principles enunciated in Terry to a detention at a private residence, where police had come to execute a search warrant for narcotics. In Summers , when the police arrived, they saw Summers (the defendant in that case) exit the front door of the house and walk down its front steps. They requested his assistance in obtaining entry, but Summers said he had left his keys inside. The police then detained him while they searched the house. After police found drugs in the house and learned Summers owned the house, they arrested and searched him, discovering more drugs on his person. ( Summers , supra , at pp. 692-693, fn. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2587 .) Extrapolating Terry 's holding, Summers explained that, when the probable cause standard is inapplicable, the reasonableness of a seizure depends on the "character of the official intrusion and its justification." ( Summers , supra , at p. 701, 101 S.Ct. 2587 .) The Summers court proceeded to evaluate the nature of the intrusion at issue there and its justification, and to consider whether the detention was supported by articulable and individualized suspicion of criminal activity. ( Id . at pp. 703-704, 101 S.Ct. 2587 .)

In evaluating the nature of the intrusion, the Summers court observed that it was of "prime importance ... that the police had obtained a warrant to search [Summers's] house for contraband." ( Summers , supra , 452 U.S. at p. 701, 101 S.Ct. 2587 .) Summers's statement to police that he had left the house keys inside-indicating that he was in fact a resident or occupant of the house-was also a critical fact in this context. The court explained: "A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself." ( Ibid . )

The court also found it significant that "the type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention." ( Summers, supra, 452 U.S. at pp. 701-702, 101 S.Ct. 2587 .) Finally, the court noted that because Summers was detained inside his own residence, the detention "could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve neither

Glaser emphasized that "[u]nder Terry the touchstone of reasonableness for search or seizure without probable cause is the presence of 'specific and articulable facts' that reasonably warrant the intrusion on personal liberty and privacy." ( Glaser , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 374, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 .) Glaser concluded

In People v. Matelski (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837 , 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 ( Matelski ), the court applied Summers , Glaser , and Hannah to the same situation as presented in the instant case, i.e., a detention in the context of a probation search of a third party. In Matelski , the police went to a probationer's house to conduct a probation search because the probationer had failed a drug test and was suspected of using drugs. ( Matelski , supra , at p. 841, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 .) The defendants, who were not targets of the search, were walking out of the front door as the police arrived. One of the officers asked the defendants to approach and explained that the probationer was prohibited from associating with convicted felons. The officer then asked the defendants for identifying

Turning to the instant case, Terry , Summers , and Glaser make clear that our task is to balance "the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it," and to consider whether the detention was supported by " 'articulable and individualized suspicion.' " ( Glaser , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 365, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 ; see Summers , supra , 452 U.S. at pp. 703-704, 101 S.Ct. 2587 .) Here, Gutierrez's detention appears to be moderately intrusive, even if not greatly so. There is no evidence that officers had

We are mindful that central to the notion of reasonableness under Terry is the requirement of "specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated." ( Terry , supra , 392 U.S. at p. 21, fn. 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; see Glaser , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 369, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 , 902 P.2d 729 ["We look, that is, to 'the nature of the articulable and individualized suspicion' justifying the detention."].) Here, however, the detention was not related to a search warrant for the premises; nor is there any evidence that police had reason to suspect that either Beltran or Gutierrez were dangerous, or that a violation of the law had occurred or criminal activity of any kind was afoot, including the use or dealing of drugs. Simmons in fact candidly admitted that the deputies did not suspect Gutierrez of any wrongdoing.

As for the probation search itself, there is no evidence that Beltran had ever violated his probation or that the instant probation search was anything more than a routine or random probation compliance search. In this regard, this case is distinguishable from Matelski and Rios , both of which also involved detentions that took place in the context of probation searches of third parties. In those cases, the probationers had violated the terms of their probation shortly before the searches at issue took place. ( Matelski , supra , 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 841, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 [search at issue "prompted" by fact that probationer had failed drug test]; Rios , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 589, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 [probationer had admitted to being under the influence of methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia and gang tagging was found in house].) Furthermore, the detentions in those cases were found to be reasonable because the police needed information from the detained persons regarding whether they were felons ( Matelski ) or a gang member ( Rios ), in order to determine whether the respective probationers had violated specific probationary terms prohibiting such contacts. Unlike Matelski and Rios , here there is no evidence that police detained Gutierrez in order to verify Beltran's compliance with a specific probationary term.

Finally, we turn to the potential justification of officer safety. Even were we to assume, without deciding, that the need to ensure officer safety justified a limited detention

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to: (1) vacate its order denying Gutierrez's suppression motion and enter a new order granting the motion; (2) permit Gutierrez to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas; (3) determine whether the People intend to retry the case; and (4) make such other orders as are necessary and appropriate.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P.J.

Meehan, J.