Abbott Labs. v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty.

In this writ proceeding, petitioners ask us to resolve a single issue: whether section 17204 of the UCL "permit[s] a county district attorney to bring a claim that seeks relief for alleged injuries to residents of California counties whom he or she does not represent, based on conduct occurring outside the county he or she serves ...." Petitioners argue district attorneys have no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative authorization, and neither the Government Code, nor

We grant the petition. The California Constitution designates the Attorney General the "chief law officer of the State" ( Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 ), and consistent with this constitutional provision, the Attorney General "has charge, as attorney, of all legal matters in which the State is interested" ( Gov. Code, § 12511 ) and also "shall ... prosecute or defend all causes to which the State ... is a party in his or her official capacity." ( Gov. Code, § 12512.) The District Attorney, on the other hand, is a county officer whose territorial jurisdiction and power is limited accordingly. Though section 17204 confers standing on

B. Advisory Opinion

The District Attorney next contends the petition seeks an improper advisory opinion on an abstract proposition of law, assertedly because the issue is "not tethered to the facts in this case" or to "any order that is now properly justiciable." The contention is not further explained, and we reject it. Petitioners challenge the trial court's ruling denying their motion to strike allegations seeking to recover restitution and civil penalties for each sale of Niaspan in the State of California, which rejected the argument that the District Attorney was geographically limited to the County of Orange in seeking such relief. The court's ruling presents a concrete legal dispute over the scope of recovery that a district attorney may seek under the UCL, which is properly the subject of a motion to strike. (Accord, Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211 , 213-215, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 649 P.2d 912 [considering petition for writ of mandate filed after superior court denied motion to strike portions of complaint, and deciding legal recoverability of punitive damages in a suit for job discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act]; Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253 , 1255, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 [deciding whether plaintiffs could seek at the pleading stage punitive damages and statutory penalties for unlawful wiretapping].) Our review of the legal question presented here is not an abstract proposition, and an early resolution of the issue will streamline both discovery and any trial on the matter. (Accord, Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033 , 1037, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 [extraordinary relief was warranted where court denied motion to strike emotional distress and punitive damage allegations; "[i]f forced to proceed to trial on the amended complaint as it stands, petitioners will be required to conduct further discovery on

C. Ripeness

Similarly, the District Attorney contends the petition must be dismissed

The District Attorney next contends petitioners have not established irreparable harm to support extraordinary writ review of the "amount of penalties to be awarded in this case." (Some capitalization omitted.) We reject the premise of this argument, namely that the petition at hand challenges merely the "amount" or sum of the award, as opposed to the District Attorney's power to collect penalties from sales or reimbursements occurring outside the limits of Orange County. We also reject the District Attorney's argument that because the pleading of civil penalties is legally authorized by the UCL, the remedies are not "irrelevant, false, or improper matter" subject to a motion to strike. The first amended complaint did not simply plead entitlement to civil penalties, a legally proper remedy in the abstract, but specifically sought such penalties for sales, purchases and reimbursements-alleged to constitute violations of "federal, state, statutory and/or common laws"-occurring throughout California. As stated, a motion to strike is proper where petitioners challenge

II. The District Attorney's Authority to Recover Restitution and Civil Penalties Is Limited to Violations Occurring in the County in Which He Was Elected

A. Standard of Review

The issue presented by Petitioners' motion to strike-the scope of the District Attorney's authority to seek restitution and civil penalties under the UCL-is one of law that we review de novo. (Accord, Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304 , 309, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 911 [though a court's ruling on a motion to strike generally is reviewed for abuse of discretion, review is de novo where the issue involves the proper interpretation of a statute and its application to undisputed facts]; see, e.g., Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340 , 345, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 , 949 P.2d 920 [whether district attorney acts on behalf of the state or county is a question of law].) We independently determine the proper interpretation of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of statutes including the UCL, and are not bound by the lower court's ruling. ( California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 , 933, 934, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 401 P.3d 49 ; Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556 , 562, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 , 828 P.2d 672 ;

We also consider the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, under which "a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution ' " 'if any other possible construction remains available.' " ' " ( People v. Garcia , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 804, 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 75 , 391 P.3d 1153 .) "The theory underlying the canon rests not only on a preference for avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions, but also on the presumption that the Legislature (whose members have sworn to uphold the Constitution) did not 'intend[ ] to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.' " ( Ibid . ) " '[W]hatever the Legislature's intent may have been, "the ultimate constitutional interpretation must rest, of course, with the judiciary." ' " ( City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation District (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191 , 1209, fn. 6, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 , 406 P.3d 733 .)

B. Powers of the Attorney General and District Attorneys

The California Constitution defines the powers and responsibilities of the executive branch and its principal officers, and appoints the Attorney General as "the chief law officer of the State ...." ( Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 ; see Steen v. Appellate Div., Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045 , 1053, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 760 , 331 P.3d 136 .) The California Supreme Court has summarized the Attorney General's function and powers as follows: "The Attorney General ... is the chief law officer of the state ( Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 ). As such he possesses not only extensive statutory powers but also broad powers derived from the common law relative to the protection of the public interest. [Citations.] '[H]e represents the interest of the people in a matter of public concern.' [Citation.] Thus, 'in the absence of any legislative restriction, [he] has the power to file any civil action or proceeding directly involving the rights and interests of the state, or which he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights and interest.' [Citation.] Conversely, he has the duty to defend all cases in which the state ... is a party. ( Gov. Code, § 12512.)" ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 , 14-15, 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 , disapproved on other grounds in

Section 17204 is the UCL's standing provision. ( Korea Supply , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 1143, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 29 , 63 P.3d 937 [referring to section 17204 as conferring standing]; Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 , 315, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 ;

The Attorney General (on behalf of himself and other district attorneys in other counties where the defendant had facilities) and the California Department of Health (the department) intervened to set aside the judgment. ( Hy-Lond , supra , 93 Cal.App.3d at pp. 739, 743, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 .) After the court declined to do so, they then appealed, contending the judgment was void as it precluded them from performing their statutory duties. ( Id . at p. 739, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 .) On appeal, the defendant took the position that the Attorney General and department lacked standing to bring the challenge, but were barred in any event by the judgment because the district attorney had statutory authority to enter into it. ( Id . at p. 739, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 .) Pointing out the Attorney General's motion challenged the district attorney's authority to stipulate away the rights and duties reserved to the Attorney General and the department ( id . at p. 745, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 ), the Court of Appeal stated it was to decide whether section 17204's grant of authority on the district attorney embraced the right to restrain the powers of other public officials and agencies. ( Id . at p. 752, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 .)

The Hy-Lond court held it did not; the district attorney had no right "to surrender the powers of the Attorney General and his fellow district attorneys to commence, when appropriate, actions in other counties" under the UCL (the former provisions of 17200 to 17204, 17206, and 17207). ( Hy-Lond , supra , 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 753, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 .) The court rejected the notion that the authority to restrain the Attorney General and other public agencies was conferred by the mere fact the district attorney was authorized to prosecute state law violations on behalf of the people: Government Code section 100, providing that "[t]he style of all process shall be 'The People of the State of California,' " and that all prosecutions shall be conducted in their name, did not "tell us who is authorized to represent the [People] in any particular action, or the limits to which such authority extends." ( Hy-Lond , supra , 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 751, 155 Cal.Rptr. 880 , citing Gov. Code, §§ 100, 26500.)

Hy-Lond explained that though "in conducting the prosecution of violations of state law on behalf of the people, the district

We have no difficulty applying Hy-Lond 's principles to bar a district attorney's unilateral effort to seek restitution and civil penalties for UCL violations occurring outside his or her own county jurisdiction. To be sure, the UCL's scope is broad; it reaches any unlawful business act or practice committed in California. (See § 17200 ["As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice"]; People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772 , 783, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 626 , 329 P.3d 180 ; Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191 , 1208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 254 P.3d 237 .) And the law, as stated above, expressly confers standing on district attorneys to bring civil law enforcement actions in the People's name when prosecuting UCL violations. But that grant of standing, as in criminal actions, cannot reasonably or constitutionally be interpreted as conferring statewide authority or jurisdiction to recover such monetary remedies beyond the county the district attorney serves, or restricting the Attorney General's constitutional power to obtain relief on behalf of the entire state. (Accord, Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310 , 336, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 , 246 P.3d 877 [refusing to "conflate[ ] the issue of standing with the issue of the remedies to which a party may be entitled"].) Thus, the law does not grant the District Attorney in this case authority to unilaterally pursue statewide monetary relief in the name of the state, as such a grant would permit the Legislature to usurp the Attorney

We reject the District Attorney's assertion that he has a broad "legislative mandate" to seek restitution on behalf of individuals throughout the state. The District Attorney cites

We cannot agree with the District Attorney and other amici that the UCL's policy objectives counter the result we reach. The District Attorney argues that to prevent a district attorney from seeking statewide relief "would arbitrarily shield Defendants from liability for the full extent of their illegal misconduct and/or require district attorney suits in all California counties in order to secure any form of statewide relief ...." He asserts that private parties may secure statewide relief, and there is "no logical reason" why public prosecutors may not, since prosecutors do not stand in the victims' shoes and relief is awarded to consumers, not to the prosecutor. But a private plaintiff suing under the UCL is not entitled to seek civil penalties, and after Proposition 64, such a plaintiff must not only show he or she has " 'suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property

Finally, the construction urged by the District Attorney would incentivize public prosecutors, acting in their respective county's financial self-interest, to withhold pertinent information from their sister agencies as to the scope of violations, then "race[ ] [their colleagues] to the courthouse" ( State ex rel. Harris v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP , supra , 39 Cal.4th at p. 1232, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 144 , 141 P.3d 256 ) in hopes of obtaining all of the civil penalties that would otherwise be deposited in those other county treasuries. The Legislature reasonably could decide to avoid such a scheme, and there is no indication it intended this result.

Our foregoing conclusions are not broad policy pronouncements; we simply interpret the UCL in the light of constitutional and statutory jurisdictional limitations so as to avoid doubts concerning the UCL's validity.

DISPOSITION

Let a writ issue directing the respondent court to vacate its order denying the motion to strike of petitioners Abbott Laboratories, AbbVie Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Duramed Pharmaceuticals Sales Corp., and to enter a new and different order striking the allegations by which the Orange County District Attorney seeks statewide monetary relief under the UCL. The stay issued will be vacated when the opinion is final as to this court.

I CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

As an intermediate appellate court, our primary role is to review

B

It is well settled that an appellate court will review rulings on pleadings by writ only "rarely" ( Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 , 894, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 598 P.2d 854 ) and "with extreme reluctance" ( Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841 , 851, 92 Cal.Rptr. 179 , 479 P.2d 379 ). While "writs are occasionally used to provide expedited interlocutory review of pleading issues, some extraordinary reason for this kind of priority treatment must appear." ( Burrus v. Municipal Court (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 233 , 236, 111 Cal.Rptr. 539 , italics added.) These words of caution are particularly applicable to a motion to strike that does not challenge the plaintiff's ability to plead a valid claim, but merely seeks to edit the language of the

As justification for reaching out at the pleading stage to prematurely decide a major public policy issue not squarely presented or addressed by the trial court, the majority allude to vague notions of interference with the Attorney General's constitutional authority. They suggest that if a local district attorney can seek restitution on behalf of residents of other counties, or civil penalties attributable to violations in other counties, this would allow the district attorney "to impermissibly compromise and bind the Attorney General and the district attorneys of other counties," preventing them "from seeking further relief for violations occurring in their own communities." (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 747.) They then purport to interpret the relevant sections of the UCL to avoid a constitutional issue. (Maj. opn., ante , at p. 747-48.) Respectfully, the majority rely on a phantom constitutional concern to craft a cure that is worse than even the perceived disease.

The UCL is an exceedingly broad remedial statute designed to encourage multiple avenues of enforcement. (See Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939 , 949-950, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 .) Indeed, a district attorney can prosecute a UCL claim based even on alleged violations of a statute that provides a different government agency with the sole authority to bring enforcement actions. ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 , 632-633, 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 .) And as the majority recognize, "the civil remedies of the [UCL] were enacted because criminal

C

The resounding theme so far is that we should not be deciding anything about a local district attorney's authority to request restitution and civil penalties attributable to victims and conduct outside the county. The issues the defendants seek to frame by means of their motion to strike are not squarely-or even unsquarely-presented. And certainly, there are no exceptional circumstances that warrant a departure from the general rule that we do not review undeveloped legal issues at the pleading stage of a lawsuit.

But even if the issues were properly presented in a procedural context that demanded their resolution, the majority opinion reaches the wrong result. If the Orange County District Attorney succeeds in proving his case, there is nothing inherently problematic about the court awarding restitution to statewide victims of defendants' unlawful business practice. As already noted, even absent a request by the District Attorney the court is empowered by section 17203 to award restitution to "to any person " adversely affected by the defendants' unlawful conduct. This includes, potentially, residents of counties other than Orange. And it is well established that the District Attorney's action will have no res judicata effect on a private party's restitution claim, except to the extent that the party signs a release. ( Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037 , 1047, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ["traditional res judicata principles have no application to a judgment resulting from an unlawful competition law lawsuit filed by the Attorney General or another public prosecutor in a subsequent lawsuit

D

Well-tested principles underlie the traditional reticence of intermediate appellate courts to engage in interlocutory writ review of trial court procedural rulings such as the one at issue in this case. (See Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 , 1273, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66 .) Rarely do those principles so uniformly counsel against issuance of writ relief as they do here. In choosing to ignore these sound prudential considerations, the majority

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioners are companies or wholly-owned subsidiaries involved in the manufacture, distribution or sale of pharmaceuticals or generic prescription drugs, including the prescription drug Niaspan. In October 2016, the Orange County District Attorney, representing "the People of the State of California" in association with private counsel, filed a complaint for violations of the UCL, alleging that petitioners either entered into agreements or otherwise engaged in conduct that prevented other generic manufacturers from launching their own Niaspan equivalent, causing purchasers and others in California to overpay for the drug. The District Attorney filed a first amended complaint, the operative pleading, in December 2016. In part, the operative complaint alleges that "[e]ach sale of Niaspan in violation of Section 17200 constitutes a separate violation," and purchasers in California sustained substantial losses in the form of overcharges on each sale based on the petitioners' unlawful and unfair business practices, which violated federal, state, and/or common

During arguments on the motion, the trial court stated its view that the appellate court in Hy-Lond did not address the Napa County district attorney's ability in that case to recover statewide civil penalties; in its opinion, Hy-Lond addressed only whether the district attorney could bind the Attorney General in a settlement relating to misconduct spanning more counties than just Napa County. The court explained that if a settlement occurred in the present case, the Attorney General would be permitted to appear and be heard. The court also questioned Hy-Lond 's reliance on Singh v. Superior Court (1919) 44 Cal.App. 64 , 185 P. 985 in which the Court of Appeal

The District Attorney fails to point out that on September 11, 2017, before we issued the order to show cause in this matter, petitioners submitted their

E. Important Question of Law

Finally, the District Attorney argues that this matter does not present, and petitioners have not identified, conflicting lower court decisions or an important issue of law that that should be settled by a ruling on their petition. The District Attorney argues that the proper remedy is "fact specific," and "[s]uch matters cannot be determined in one broad sweeping statement of the law ...."

The arguments are without merit. We have already determined by issuing an alternative writ that there is no adequate legal remedy in this case. (Accord, Smith v. Superior Court , supra , 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1037, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 , citing Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199 , 205, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398 , 695 P.2d 695 .) And this court has granted petitioner's request that we judicially notice the existence of conflicting superior court decisions on the issue. (See Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Tecolote Investors, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 166 , 185, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 [judicial notice is properly taken of existence of court orders to establish the legal effect of the results reached]; Shersher v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1491 , 1501, fn. 5, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 .) Whether a district attorney acting in the name of the People of the State of California may obtain restitution and civil penalties for UCL violations occurring outside his or her county is in our view an important legal issue, and one that implicates constitutional principles. (See Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 , 1273, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66 [general criteria for

In construing a statute or constitutional provision, we give the language used its ordinary meaning, and " '[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature ....' [Citation.] To that end, we generally must 'accord [ ] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose,' and have warned that '[a] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.' [Citation.] [¶] But '[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent

When specifying a county district attorney's duties with respect to civil matters, the Legislature recognizes the aforementioned jurisdictional limitations. In Government Code section 26507 (entitled "Joint prosecution in other jurisdictions"), the Legislature authorizes a county district attorney to enter into agreements to "act jointly" with other district attorneys "in prosecuting a civil cause of action of benefit to his own county in the court of another jurisdiction" as long as there is an agreement with the district attorney of the other county. ( Gov. Code, § 26507.) A district attorney of one county may provide legal or investigative services to a district attorney of another county "pertaining to the prosecution of a civil cause of action in the other county," but only "with the concurrence of the district attorney of [the other] county and the boards of supervisors of both affected counties ...." ( Gov. Code, § 26508.)

The foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions demonstrate that in civil matters, as in criminal matters, a district attorney lacks authority to function outside his or her county jurisdiction absent the consent of the district attorney of the other county. Even when a district attorney acts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the superior court, he or she is subject to oversight and direct supervision by the Attorney General, the state's chief law enforcement officer obligated to ensure the uniform and adequate enforcement of state law.

C. Relevant Provisions of the Unfair Competition Law

The UCL addresses unfair competition, and "proscrib[es] 'any unlawful' business act or practice ...." (

An action seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties filed by a public prosecutor on behalf of the People is not primarily concerned with restoring property or benefitting private parties; it is fundamentally a law enforcement action with a public, penal objective. ( State v. Altus Finance, S.A. , supra , 36 Cal.4th at p. 1308, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 498 , 116 P.3d 1175 ; People v. Pacific Land Research Co. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 10 , 17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 569 P.2d 125 [action seeking civil penalties under the UCL "is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties"]; accord, People ex rel. Harris v. Aguayo , supra , 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 221 .) Civil penalties paid to the government " 'are designed to penalize a defendant for past illegal conduct.' " ( State v. Altus Finance, S.A. , at p. 1308, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 498 , 116 P.3d 1175 ; People v. Pacific Land Research Co. , at p. 17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 569 P.2d 125 .) Likewise, in an action filed by the People "[r]estitution is not intended to benefit the [recipient] by the return of money, but instead is designed to penalize a defendant for past unlawful conduct and thereby deter future violations." ( People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1 , 26, 203 Cal.Rptr. 642 , citing Pacific Land Research Co. , at p. 17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 569 P.2d 125 .) "While restitution would benefit the [recipient] by the return of the money illegally obtained, such repayment is not the primary object of the

Nor can we draw a different conclusion, as the amici city attorneys would have us do, from the Legislature's use of limiting language in other statutes such as Code of Civil Procedure section 731 allowing a district attorney, county counsel or city attorney to abate nuisances "of any

The propriety of extraordinary writ review aside, the decision to prematurely intervene in this case has unnecessarily placed this court in the middle of a jurisdictional turf spat between public prosecutors. In doing so the majority attempt to construct a solution in search of a problem. The alleged "problem" here is an overzealous district attorney who seeks to recover (1) restitution on behalf of residents of other counties, and (2) civil penalties based on business practices that have no connection to the district attorney's local jurisdiction. Apparently, this bothers the Attorney General, who wishes to limit and control all litigation involving statewide unlawful business practices, and perhaps other district attorneys in other counties, who may view the actions of the Orange County District Attorney as "poaching" on their ability to recover civil penalties that would otherwise flow into their own county's treasury.

Business and Professions Code section 17204 broadly permits UCL enforcement actions to be "prosecuted ... by the Attorney General or a district attorney ...." Either way, the action is pursued "in the name of the people of the State of California," just as in criminal cases. ( § 17204.) Section 17203 permits the court, ancillary to its injunctive power, "to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of" the unlawful or unfair practice. ( § 17203, italics added.) Section 17206 similarly authorizes the court to award a civil penalty for each UCL violation, "recover[able] in a civil action brought ... by the Attorney General [or] by any district attorney ...." ( § 17206, subd. (a).) Nothing in any of these

Moreover, the concern about a local district attorney binding other prosecutors to an improper or inadequate settlement is as fanciful as it is premature. Where, as here, a district attorney brings a UCL enforcement action alleging a statewide unlawful business practice, the Attorney General as the state's chief law enforcement officer always has the authority to intervene and take over the case. As a prominent treatise explains:

[T]he Attorney General and the 58 district attorney offices have entered into an arrangement to coordinate

I would deny the petition.