Satele v. Superior Court

The Court of Appeal summarily denied Satele's petition for writ of mandate. We denied his petition for review, which framed the issue in terms of whether physical evidence must be released for a defense expert's examination when scientific or technological developments have undermined a prosecution's expert's opinion. Instead, we granted review on our own motion and directed the People to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted "on the ground that the superior court abused its discretion by applying Penal Code section 1054.9 [former] subdivision (c) [now subdivision (d) ] to a motion for access to trial evidence that is in the possession of the superior court." We treat this review proceeding as one in mandate and resolve it under our original jurisdiction. ( People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 , 340-341, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 , 226 P.3d 348 ; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.)

The question is whether section 1054.9's provisions apply to evidence held by the court. The statute partially abrogated the general rule that a person seeking habeas corpus relief from a judgment of death is not entitled to postconviction discovery until a court issues an order to show cause. ( People v. Superior Court ( Morales ) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523 , 528, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 , 388 P.3d 811 ( Morales ); see generally People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179 , 1255-1261, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 800 P.2d 1159 .) It authorizes discovery of materials, including physical evidence, to facilitate the prosecution of a habeas petition or motion to vacate the judgment. ( Morales , at p. 528, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 , 388 P.3d 811 .)^[2] It vests jurisdiction in the trial court to grant discovery and order the preservation of evidence within the statute's scope. ( Morales , at pp. 531, 533, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 , 388 P.3d 811 .)

that access to physical evidence is reasonably necessary to the defendant's efforts to obtain relief." ( § 1054.9, subd. (d), italics added ( § 1054.9(d) ); see id ., subd. (a) [containing the qualifier, "except as provided in subdivision (b) or (d)"].)^[3] We have not yet interpreted whether the good cause requirement applies only to evidence possessed by prosecution and law enforcement authorities, or whether it also applies to physical evidence held by a court clerk. We now conclude it does not.

"It is well settled that the proper goal of statutory construction 'is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, giving the words of the statute their usual and ordinary meaning. When the statutory language is clear, we need go no further.' " ( People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980 , 987, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 586 , 201 P.3d 466 .) We consider the language in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part ( Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23 , 32, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 , 939 P.2d 760 ), harmonizing provisions relating to the same subject matter, to the extent

all have addressed requests for materials possessed by the prosecution or law enforcement authorities. (See, e.g., In re Steele , supra , 32 Cal.4th at p. 689, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536 , 85 P.3d 444 ; Davis v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 881 , 884-885, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 193 ; Hurd v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1100 , 1107-1108, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 893 .) Moreover, although the issue was not squarely presented, we emphasized in Morales that the provisions of section 1054.9 "[do] not extend to judicial or other non-law-enforcement agencies, such as jury commissioners or indigent defense programs." ( Morales , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 534, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 , 388 P.3d 811 , italics added.)

In short, section 1054.9 requires a defendant to show good cause to access "discovery materials" ( § 1054.9(a) ), i.e., "materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities ..." ( § 1054.9(c) ). Based on the statute's plain language, the good cause requirement does not apply to evidence possessed by the court clerk.

A question remains: If section 1054.9 does not govern here, what standards control access to physical evidence retained by the court as a trial exhibit? Section 1417 provides that "[a]ll exhibits which have been introduced or filed in any criminal action or proceeding shall be retained by the clerk of the court who shall establish a procedure to account for the exhibits properly ... until final determination of the action or proceedings ...."^[4] In capital cases, the final determination of the action is "30 days after the date of execution of sentence" or "one year after the date of the defendant's death" if the defendant dies while awaiting execution. (§ 1417.1, subds. (d)(1), (2).)

Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized a "general right" under the common law "to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." ( Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978) 435 U.S. 589 , 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306 , 55 L.Ed.2d 570 , fn. omitted; accord, Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300 , 313-314, 322-323, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 250 , 314 P.3d 488 ; Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471 , 483, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 .) "The right of access

murders. ( Pen. Code,^[1] §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(3) ; People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1 , 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 , 302 P.3d 981 ( Nunez and Satele ).) Briefly, the facts are these: Satele and codefendant Daniel Nunez shot the victims from a car while they stood in front of Robinson's home. Robinson was shot three or four times; Fuller was shot twice. ( Nunez and Satele , at pp. 5-6, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 , 302 P.3d 981 .) About an hour later Satele was heard to say, " 'We were out looking for niggers,' " and either he or Nunez said, " 'I think we hit one of 'em.' " ( Id . at p. 6, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 , 302 P.3d 981 .) The prosecution introduced evidence that Nunez and Satele were members of the West Side Wilmas gang and that murdering a Black couple with no gang ties, like the victims in this case, would enhance their gang status. ( Id . at pp. 6, 9, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 , 302 P.3d 981 .) Also connecting Satele to the crime was a semiautomatic gun recovered from a car he was driving hours after the shooting. A ballistics comparison identified it as the murder weapon. ( Id . at pp. 6-7, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 , 302 P.3d 981 .)

Satele's death judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. ( Nunez and Satele , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 63, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 , 302 P.3d 981 .) In January 2017, Satele's habeas counsel informally asked the prosecutor for discovery under section 1054.9. As relevant here, counsel requested "[a]ll materials concerning the testing and examination of ballistics evidence, including, but not limited to reports, bench notes and photographs." In October 2017, Satele sought an order requiring the prosecutor to produce the evidence for testing by an expert, again citing section 1054.9.

At the hearing on the motion, habeas counsel explained that he had been unable to obtain ballistics bench notes or photographs from the prosecutor. Counsel asked the court to release various items, including bullets, shell casings, and the weapon, for expert testing. The items were trial exhibits held by the court clerk.

The trial court found Satele had failed to meet the good cause requirement of section 1054.9. It observed that two prosecution experts and one defense expert had all agreed that the ballistics evidence matched the weapon seized from Satele's car. According to the court, "sometimes that is just what it is. It is just painfully obvious that they're a match, and it sort of sounds like that's what we have here. Unless we're paying for yet another person to come in to look at the bullets or look at the evidence and say, 'It's a match.' " In the court's view, the statute's good cause requirement was meant to preclude such fishing expeditions, which could go on "ad infinitum."

Habeas counsel interjected that there may be some "confusion here." He clarified that, despite his reliance on section 1054.9 in his moving

document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed or lodged with the court ...." ( Id ., rule 2.550(b)(1).)^[5] The definition encompasses trial exhibits.

The court's jurisdiction to entertain a request for access to court exhibits derives from its inherent supervisory power over its own records and files. ( Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc ., supra , 435 U.S. at p. 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 ; cf. People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183 , 1258, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 842 P.2d 1 .) Specifically, the California Rules of Court authorize the court to permit an exhibit's release for examination outside of a court facility. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.400(c).) In fashioning such an order, the court retains inherent authority to consider such factors as the need for testing, the administrative burden attendant to testing, any conditions necessary to maintain the integrity of the exhibit and chain of custody, as well as other equitable factors.

Here, the court denied access to the ballistics evidence based solely on Satele's failure to establish "good cause to believe that access to physical evidence is reasonably necessary to the defendant's effort to obtain relief." ( § 1054.9(d).) The court erred because section 1054.9(d) does not apply to a request