p. 314at the time of the election, and on the first day of January i823) Was a freeholder. But whether, &c.
S. W. Jones, for the plaintiffs.
Unless the defendant shows a clear right, he cannot hold. The 8th section of the 4th article of the new constitution provides, “that sheriffs, &c. shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties, once in every three years.To make a choice of the defendant within this provision, there should be a majority of legal votes; whereas the verdict finds a majority the other way; and falsifies the certificate of the board of canvassers, which is indeed untrue upon its face.The board proceeded under the notion that an appointment of a president was necessary for the town board, and that this should be certified to the county board. This was not necessary. The secretary of state was mistaken in his construction of the 10th section of the act for regulating elections, (sess. 46, ch. 250, s. 10.) The words are, “ that one of the said inspectors, who" shall actually preside at such election in each of the towns and wards of this state, to be appointed for that purpose by the major part of the inspectors who so preside, shall, on, &c. attend at the clerk’s office, &c.” In the 9th section or any previous sections, there is no allusion to a presiding inspector; and it is plain from the several provisions in relation to the proceedings of the town board, that all and each of them are to be considered and treated as presidents within the meaning of the 10th section. Either of them may be appointed after the poll has closed; and no particular form of appointment is necessary. The secretary directs, in his note, that the appointment should be made before the opening of the poll. Suppose the one then appointed should be sick, die, or otherwise incapable of attending, must the votes be lost?[Woodworth, J. I think there is nothing in the act that requires this proceeding.]There are several cases in which certificates are made necessary by the town board, but a president, as such, is not
p. 315once mentioned. The inspectors are treated as having the same equal authority throughout, and in every respect.[The Court told Mr. Jones that he need not pursue this point any further for the present; but they would hear the other side upon it]Jones, then cited the following authorities to show that an information in nature of a quo warranto was the proper remedy in this case:
The King v. Godwin, (Dougl. 398,) Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, (3 Burr. 1647,) The People v. Sweeting, ( 2 John. Rep. 184 ,) The People v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, (3 John. Cas. 79.) 1 R. L. 107. The granting of a mandamus and an information in nature of a quo warranto, he said, depend much upon the same principles; the one being to admit an officer improperly excluded; the other to oust one who has usurped an office illegally, in order to make way for the rightful candidate. (2 Esp. Dig. 343, Gould’s ed. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 26, s. 9.)A. C. Paige, and M. T. Reynolds, for the defendant.
If the canvass were an original proceeding in this Court, there might be no difficulty in saying that the defendant should no^hold his place as sheriff; but there is an insuperable impediment to their interference at this stage, and in this manner. The certificate of determination of the board of canvassers is conclusive evidence of the legal election of the defendant. It can neither be impeached nor contradicted. The only guard against misconduct is provided by the 19th section of the act. If the canvassers wilfully violate their oath, they are subject to the penalty of 500 dollars. This Court might, for the reason relied on in this case, review every canvass of an election, not excepting that of governor, lieut. governor, &c. by the state canvassers. Upon the same ground, an information would lie against a member of either house of the legislature; for if this Court have jurisdiction, it can be taken away only by express provision. When organized pursuant to the 10th section, a majority of the county board are, by the same section, to determine, &c. upon the person or persons duly
p. 317follow that it will lie against a sheriff. There is no board, as in this case, vested with judicial powers. The Justices of the town are to preside, with authority to say who shall vote, but not who is elected. The canvass is a ministerial act. (2 R L. 127, s. 2, 3.) The case of Rex v. The Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, cited from Burrow, 1647, was a proceeding by mandamus. But admitting the principle to be the same, it will be found, on examining that case, that the power of the canvassers was not judicial. The statute (1 R. L. 418, 19, s. 1) requires that the county should be assigned to the new sheriff This is done. Suppose the defendant to be ousted of his office, to whom shall he assign 1 The statute requires that he should assign to his successor. Here he has none. It requires that the assignment should be by the sheriff. Being ousted of his office, no one is left to perform that duty. The Court will look to the interests of the public. The King’s Bench have denied a certiorari to remove an assessment of the land tax. (Rex v. King et al. 2 T. R 234.) So of a poor rate, on the ground of general inconvenience. (2 Str. 932, 975.) And they will act upon the same principle in this case. The defendant has prisoners in custody, whom he cannot hold; perhaps both himself and bail will be left without accountability to creditors. At any rate, he is regularly in; and the hazard and loss of an ouster should not be visited upon his head, who is found to be in regular possession of the office, by the act of a board of canvassers.Suppose an inspector had not attended from the town of Niskayuna, would the Court interfere, because the constitu-' tion requires a majority ? Where is the Court to stop ? Will they descend to the towns and look to their proceedings ? Because an improper vote may have been received, will they examine and deduct it ? Is this practicable ? Beside, the ceremony of a canvass is indeed an idle one, if liable to be thus overturned. It has no binding force, and might as, Well have been omitted altogether by the act.If this Court have jurisdiction to review the determination of the board of canvassers, them reviewing power can. only be exercised through the medium of a certiorari^
p. 318and until reversed in this form, it remains valid and eon-elusive, and cannot be questioned by an information in nature of a quo warranto. A certiorari is necessary to reverse an improper appointment of a constable by two Justices. (Wood v. Peake, 8 John. Rep. 69 .) The reason is, because the 2 R. L. 127; s. 5, conferring this power of appointment, creates a judicial, authority, from the exercise of which a certiorari lies.- ( Wilde v. Washburn, 16 John. Rep. 49 .) And the power conveyed by. the stab ute in question is as plainly so as-that, given by the .earlier, statute in relation to the appointment of a constable. For, the cases in which a certiorari will, in. general; lie, and is necessary, the Court are referred to Smith. v. Lewis, ( 3 John. Rep. 168 -9, per Kent, Ch. J.) Lawton v. The Comrs. of H. W. of Cambridge, ( 2 Caines’ Rep. 179 ,) Learned v. Duval, (3 John. Cas. 141,) The People v. Runkel, ( 6 John. Rep. 334 ,) Rex v. Inhabitants of---in Glammorganshire, (I Ld. Raym. 580,) Cross v. Smith, (1 Salk. 146,) 1 Bac. Abr. Certiorari, (B), Rex v. The Inhabitants of Great Marlow East, 244.) The certificate of determination was a record, the history of a judicial decision, unimpeachable for defect or-illegality; and no averment is admissible against it. (1 Chit. Pl. 353-4, 480-1. 1 Phil. Ev. 218, 219, ed. 1820, and the, cases there cited. M’Lean v. Hugarin, 13 John. Rep. 184 ;) The writ of certiorari :is the only known and acknowledged process-to reverse the judicial decision of an inferior-tribunal. A quo warranto is inapplicable, except when the power to be-reviewed is ministerial.But the board of canvassers decided correctly in refusing the inspector from Niskayuna his seat; and in refusing to canvass the votes from that town. The, attending, inspector should have been appointed on the- first day- of-the election ; and that appointment should have been made in writing .and signed by a majority of the inspectors. The forms of instruments and proceeding, promulgated-by the secretary of state, were sanctioned by the-statute, (sess. 45, ch. 25, s. 30,) by which it was made -his-duty-to furnish them. There should be a written appointment in the hands of. the
p. 319attending inspector, to inform the board of his authority. The act of appointment should be written ; and, at any rate, made out during, or immediately after the election, not at any distance of time. These successive certificates were a mere recital of what was previously done.An information in the nature of a quo warranto against a sheriff cannot be brought on the relation of an individual. Van Voast has no interest in the question, because this Court have no power to restore him ; and where an individual" has no interest, he cannot be received as relator. (Rex v. Williams, 1 Burr. 402, 407. 3 Bl. Com. 262, 263, 264, note 1. Rex v. Wallis, 5 T. R. 375. Rex v. Marsden, 3 Burr. 1812,1816,1817. Rex v. Hall, 1 Barnwell & Creswell, 237. Commonwealth v. The Tin. Fire and Mar. Ins. Co. in Newburyport, 5 Mass. Rep. 230 .) The proceeding should be in the name of the People, without a relator.The defendant was bound to take the office or be indicted and punished. (Rex v. Wallis, 5 T. R. 375, 381, per Buffer, J. 5 Jac. L. Dict. 377, 8, ed. 1811, tit. Quo Warranto. 1 Bl. Com. 341. 2 Chit. C. L. 267, note (x). The Attorney General v. Read, 2 Mod. 300, arg. for the plaintiff. 6 Com. Dig. Viscount, (A. 2.) And there is a difference made in several of the cases just cited between one compelled to take a burthensome office, and one claiming and coming in as a volunteer. The defendant was made sheriff by the act of others.
If judgment be rendered against the defendant, the fine should be mere nominal. The information in nature of a quo warranto is for the purpose of trying a civil right; and the treatment of it as a criminal proceeding is formal merely. (The People v. Utica Ins. Co. per Spencer J. 15 John. Rep. 387 . 3 Bac. Ab. Informations, (A), p. 636, ed. 1813. Rex v. Shepherd, 4 T. R. 385. 3 Bl. Com. 262, 264, note (1).) This is the first proceeding of the kind against a sheriff. The town certificate of appointment was signed by two only of the inspectors, one of whom was the carrier of the votes ; and the supplemental certificates were entirely unavailing; The secretary’s directions were taken as the guide ; and all proceeded if ycod faith. The rea
p. 320sons fully appear for every step that was taken. The fme goes to the people, and is no benefit to the relator. Under these circumstances, there is nothing to take the case out of the general rule, that the fine should be nominal only.A. Van Vechten, in reply.
The question is, whether the defendant was elected, or canvassed, into office. If the lah ter, he is not sheriff. It is admitted that the election was regular. The work was well done, so far as that was concerned. We deny that the act of the county board was judicial. It was merely ministerial. They are required to cast up the votes' as returned ; and any one who understands arithmetic can do this. They have power to do nothing more. The addition gives the result. They are not to say who are or who are not competent voters ; or whether the votes were to be received and counted ; but merely to fix the majority from the return made ; and declare the result, upon the certificate of the town inspectors, who are required to certify the votes at full length. Is this a judicial act ? t Then every schoolmaster in the state becomes á judge, if he happens to be chosen an inspector. Some degree of judgment must be exercised, to be sure but not that sort of judicial discretion, we trust, which is to control the constitution. Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, (3 Burr. 1647.) is decisive that the election, not the decision of the canvassers, confers the right.The votes are to be certified by the town inspectors, two copies made.; one to be deposited in the town clerk’s office before the canvass commences ; and another to be delivered to the county clerk by the inspector appointed to attend the county board ; this also before the canvass commences. The mere possession of this copy by the inspector is, at least, prima facie evidence of his appointment. No new officer is to be elected. The inspectors of the town, are all and each of them presidents .; and the right to deliver the votes and act as a member of the county board is inci-. dent to the office of inspector. Tymesen had a statement, of votes duly canvassed. This informed the board of all it was requisite .they should know. If there was fraud, or any thing surreptitious on the part of the inspector, it then lay with the board to show it.
p. 321The secretary could impose no form not required by the election law. The member of the county board is to be appointed by his fellow inspectors. This is all which the act requires. No writing is necessary. No particular time is required; and are we gravely to be told, that the power given to the secretary, to prescribe'the forms of proceeding, enables him to do away or neutralize the act ? The secretary thought it a good thing to have a president; and it might be well enough ; but the inspectors have indulged in a bolder fancy, and have made the omission avoid all the proceedings.I have said a certificate is to be filed in the town clerk’s office. Is not this a judicial act as well as that of the county canvassers ? If so, here would be record against record, an estoppel by which the county board should have been governed. This alone would answer the notion of conclusiveness. Because the Court examine the county canvass, it is a non sequitur that they may go back to the town poll. Every thing there has been regularly done. The maxim of law is, that there is no wrong without a remedy. The right to interfere with wrongful elections by mandamus or quo warranto existed at common law; and is recognized and regulated by statute, (1 R. L. 107.) The former is to compel admission when the office is vacant; the latter to oust when it is improperly filled. The statute extends to any office or franchise in the state; being much broader than the English. An information has repeatedly been allowed in relation to public elective offices. (The People v. The Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 John. Cas. 79. The People v. Sweeting, 2 John. Rep. 184 .) The last case was that of a supervisor; and it was not questioned that the information would have lain, had not the term of office nearly elapsed before it was applied for. Yet no substantial distinction exists between the powers of the inspectors at town meeting, in reference to the supervisor, and those of the county board as to the sheriff. It is merely counting and estimating the votes in either case.It is not necessary to reconvene the county board in order to restore Van Voast. The verdict of the jury, and the judgment of this Court, will answer every requisite purpose.
p. 322This Hourt have nothing to do with the consequences. if the defendant he. an usurper,he .must be ousted. 'The Court have no ’dispensing power; .and if the facts .found warrant-it, they áre in duty-bound-to pronoúnce judgment of ouster. It is asked, how do you get Van Voast in ? It might as well be asked how you get .the defendant .out’? If-the-Court have the means of executing their judgment by‘.the proper officer, then- there is no .difficulty in either. All Yan Yoast has-.to do on . ouster of the defendant, is .to give security, and ¡take .the oath of office. The-custody of the county devolves, in the mean time, to the jailer defacto,, who must give over the jail to the sheriff de jure. Gentlemen need be under no,concern as to the modus operandi. We will see to-it.; -and endeavor tohe sufficiently advised of-the-manner in which our rights are" to he • enforced and maintained.Yan Yoast was -the proper relator. In the view we have taken, .he has the highest interest, and is receivable upon gentlemen’s own principles. He has the right, and is the only one who would come in and assume the responsibility for costs.A certiorari ,is inapplicable. It would be no remedy. We are ¡necessarily here by .information in order to show the falsity .of the decision. -A certiorari would presuppose the truth of the record. We aver its "falsity. To whom" can a certiorari issue ? Gentlemen say the -board is dissolved ; and it cannot go to "them. : On quo warranto the facts are'tried by a jury, the Court give judgment of ouster.; the rightful claimant comes in; and the‘Court will either.give judgmenttothis effect,-or-grant a mandamus to theproper authority, compelling them-to receive-him.-It is, .perhaps, difficult to determine, whether an information lies to -try the title of the Governor and state officers. The Governor is the representative, of the state; andan appeal from the state 'canvassers -may not exist. It is a case, perhaps, to which neither the common or statute law extends. But it by no means follows, that the Court have not power in this instance. Because a case may be put a little puzzling, it-does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. The con stitution gives the right to congress, senate- and assembly to
p. 323determine all questions upon the election of their-member; and impliedly excludes the. jurisdiction of the Court in those cases..: Curia, per
This is an information in nature of a quo warranto, filed against the defendant, who, as is alleged, intruded into, and unlawfully holds the office of sheriff of the county of Schenectady.
The remedy by information is adapted to this case. The statute is comprehensive in its terms. It extends to all persons who shall usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold and execute any office or franchise within this state. The jurisdiction of the Court cannot well be doubted, when the question relates to a public office. The decision of officers acting ministerially is sought to be reviewed. In The People v. The Mayor of New York, (3 John. Cas. 79,) and The same v. Sweeting, ( 2 John. Rep. 184 ,) the Court entertained jurisdiction; in one case wheretherelator claimed to have been elected to the office of alderman; in the other, to that of supervisor; and considered an information as the proper remedy to try the rights of the parties.
It was contended on the argument, that the decision of the board of canvassers was conclusive, until reversed; and could only be reviewed by certiorari. This objection cannot prevail. The duties of the canvassers are ministerial. They are required by the act to attend at the cleric’s office, and calculate and ascertain the whole number of votes given at any election; and certify the same to be a true canvass. This is not a judicial act, but merely ministerial. They have no power to controvert the votes of the electors. If they deviate from the directions of the statute, and certify in favor of a sheriff not duly elected, he is liable to be ousted by information. The trial is had upon the right of .the party holding the office. The certificate is not conclusive. The Court will decide upon an examination of all the facts.
The question then is, have the canvassers complied with the duties enjoined on them by law 1 -I am clearly of opin•ion they have not.
A certificate of the election in Niskayuna was signed by
p. 324all the inspectors, and one of their number appointed to deliver it to the clerk of the county. This was done within the time limited by law. When the board met to calculate the votes, the inspector from Niskayuna was excluded, on the ground that he did not produce written evidence of his appointment. The statute declares that one of the inspectors of election, who shall actually preside at such election, to be appointed by a major part of the inspectors who shall so preside, shall, in person, deliver to the clerk a copy of the statement of votes. It is then made the duty of the inspectors, who attend at the clerk’s office, to ascertain the whole number of votes given for the respective candidates at the election.
The 10th section of the act does not require that one of the inspectors be appointed to preside at the election. All the inspectors attending equally preside, and have equal powers. The meaning of the act is, that some one of the inspectors, who have attended the election, shall bo appointed to deliver the certificate, and attend at thé clerk’s office of the county. It is not necessary to make this appointment until the votes of the town are canvassed.
Although an appointment by writing is to be preferred, it is not indispensible. The statute is silent as to a written appointment. If an objection is taken when an inspector presents himself at the board of canvassers, the evidence of his appointment may be either by writing or parol. If the statement of the votes of the town are delivered to the clerk by an inspector, and the fact of his being an inspector is not questioned by the canvassers, he ought not to be excluded ; for the delivery of the statement, and attendance to perform the duty of a canvasser, is prima facie evidence of an appointment for that purpose. The canvassers, therefore, erred in excluding the inspector from Niskayuna on his first application.
But if this were not sufficient, the certificate produced, before the hour of 4 o’clock on the 12th of November, was evidence that the person producing it had been regularly appointed. The act gives the power of appointment to the major part of the inspectors who shall preside. The per
p. 325son appointed is not excluded from participation ; and consequently he may constitute one of the majority who confef on him the appointment. A second certificate signed by all the inspectors was produced the next day, before the canvass was finished. The inspectors from Niskayuna attended personally ; and offered to make oath. The board then decided not to receive any evidence ; because not offered previous to 4 o’clock P. M. of the day preceding. The votes of Niskayuna were not calculated. Ex-eluding that town, the defendant had a majority of votes, and was declared duly elected. If the votes of Niskayuna had been canvassed, the relator would have been found to be elected.
The several decisions of the board of canvassers arc manifestly erroneous ; and call for the interposition of this Court. The defendant was not duly elected sheriff; but unlawfully holds that office. It is the opinion of the Court that judgment of ouster be entered ; and that the relator recover his costs of prosecution.
Judgment of ouster.