p. 356stantly associating with the plaintiff as a member of the famjiy; an¿ from an attentive observance of her whole deportment during the courtship, ¡arid at the time of the defendant’s deserting her, it was their opinion or not that the plaintiff was sincerely attached to. the defendant. To this question, the counsel for the defendant objected: but the Judge overruled the objection, observing, that, whether the plaintiff’s affection was sincere or not, could only be gathered ¿copa. an attentive observation of her conduct, and was not susceptible of any other proof, than what had been already given, and was then offered by the plaintiff.
To this decision the counsel for the defendant excepted.
The counsel for the defendant proposed to interrogate the father of the defendant, whether he and the defendant’s mother did not, after the promise had been made, and before its breach, remonstrate with the defendant against his marrying the plaintiff; and whether they assigned to the defendant any, and what reasons why he ought not to marry the plaintiff. To this question, the plaintiff’s counsel objected. The Judge decided that the question might be put whether the father and mother did not strenuously remonstrate with the defendant against the marriage; -b„ut not as to the reasons of .the remonstrance, i. e., as to any particular facts stated on which the remonstrance was grounded, which might affect the moral character of the plaintiff, .unless the witness had a personal knowledge, of the truth of those facts. To this decision the plaintiff ’s counsel also-.excepted; .and a bill of .exceptions, including bo.th points, haying been sealed, and a verdict found for the plaintiff,
D. Graham, for the plaintiff, now moved to bring it to a healing as frivolous.
G. Griffin, contra.
We think the Judge’s decision founded in good sense, and-in the nature of tilings. We do not see how the various facts upon which an opinion of the plaintiff’s attach- • ment must be grounded are capable of specification,, so as to leave it, like ordinary facts, as a matter of inference, to the jury. It is true, as a general rule, that witnesses are not al
p. 357lowed to give their opinions to a jury; but there are exceptions, and we think this one of them. There are a thousand nameless things, indicating the existence and degree of the tender passion, which language cannot specify. The opinion of witnesses on this subject must be derived from a series of instances, passing under their observation, which yet they never could detail to a jury. Were there nothing more in the case, therefore, vve think there is no ground for the bill.
But we are not left to this ground; The objection came too late. It was certainly waived. The same opinion had been repeatedly expressed, in the same manner, in the course of the trial, by different witnesses, without any sort of objection. Just as the trial is drawing to a close, on these questions being put, the objection is made for the first time. The answer would have been a mere iteration of what had passed without objection, at intervals, during the whole previous course of the trial. At least, under the circumstances, it was altogether immaterial. It could not change the complexion of the case.
"The answer of the father aS to particular facts was also clearly inadmissible. Want of chastity, or immoral conduct, may be shown; but it is matter of proof. . The' effect of allowing the father to answer as to particulars might have been, by a side wind, to get that in which was untrue, resting merely in conjecture; and thus to work a prejudice in the mind of the jury. This cannot be tolerated. A new trial must be denied.
Rule accordingly.