Warner v. Press Publishing Co.

The first ground for a reversal assigned by the learned counsel for appellant I do not regard as well taken. Undoubtedly it has been held, in certain classes of actions for libel, that it is competent to show, in disproof of malice, facts and information known to or believed by the person who wrote the alleged libel, which induced him to believe it was true. This rule may lead at times to the introduction of declarations by strangers to the action,

I do not think this rule of evidence has any relevancy or force in the case at bar. The alleged libel here is in a public newspaper. It consists of what purports to be an account of a judicial proceeding in a police court; and, if the defendant published a fair and true account of such proceeding, the question of actual truth or falsity of the charges made by either side would be immaterial. The learned judge, therefore, did not err in excluding the conversations between the reporter and plaintiff’s husband upon which said reporter claimed to rely, as to the truth and genuineness of the “love ” letters embodied in the article in question.

The learned counsel for the appellant further claims that the trial judge erred in submitting to the jury the question, whether or not the account published in the newspaper was a fair and true report of the proceeding before the magistrate, and in not passing upon such question himself as matter of law. The cases of Ackerman v. Jones ( 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 42 ), and Matthews v. Beach ( 5 Sandf. 256 ), are cited on this point. A sufficient answer to such contention, as far as this appeal is concerned, is that the court was not requested on the trial to pass upon such question as matter of law, and that no exception was taken to the sending of the question to the jury. On the contrary, counsel for defendant submitted one or two requests to charge, which would seem to presuppose an intention on his part, that the general inquiry as to the fairness and truth of the newspaper notice should be left to the jury for determination. The exception at folio 232 will not avail.

If anything, the charge was too favorable to the defendant. The court instructed the jury that, although letters were not read or permitted to be read, yet, being offered in evidence, they would be a part of the proceedings, and the newspapers would have the right to spread them before the public, provided they were accompanied by a statement that they were not received by the court. Probably the learned trial judge did not intend to lay this down as á general proposition, and he would have ruled otherwise, if it had appeared that the letters were examined by the magistrate, and excluded because not germane to the subject of inquiry. If letters containing defamatory matter are offered in evidence and rejected because the magistrate considers them irrelevant or incompetent, I do not think that they thereby become a part of the proceeding before him, in such manner as to entitle a newspaper that publishes them to the protection of the statute. They may be utterly foreign to every question raised before the police justice. If the newspaper may nevertheless print them in full, it would afford a most convenient subterfuge for publishing libels with impunity on any subject that can be imagined. Suppose, for instance, a magistrate on the hearing of a proceeding for abandonment should refuse to admit or consider letters accusing the husband of forgery or arson. Probably under no pretext would it be claimed that a fair and true report of such proceeding could include the publication of such excluded letters.

We have examined the record, and considered all the ex

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Bischoff J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.