Majority
Headnote
Defendant, a corporation organized under the act for the incorporation of telegraph companies, furnished messengers to carry parcels for those desiring to employ them. One of its messengers, intrusted by tailors with a parcel of clothes to be delivered to a customer, was instructed to bring back the goods if they were not paid for. The customer kept part of the clothes, but sent back the rest with a letter[Present, Van Hoesen and Bookstaver, JJ.]—Though the defendant was organized under the act of 1848, entitled “ An act to provide for the incorporation and regulation of telegraph companies,” it had in its service messengers whose business it was to carry parcels for those who desired to employ them in that work. It is a necessary incident to that business that the messengers shall receive and carry out the instructions of the senders of the parcels respecting the delivey. If the sender instruct the messenger not to deliver a parcel except on the happening of a certain event, the messenger has no right to disregard that direction. It matters not whether the defendant be a common carrier or not, it is bound to obey the instructions of its employer respecting the delivery of packages that it undertakes to carry (Tooker v. Gorman, 2 Hilt. 71).
In this case, the defendant undertook to carry for Jacobs
That view is not correct. Upon the theory that the defendant is liable for the loss that was occasioned by a violation of Jacobs’ instructions, our duty is to inquire, what was the extent of that loss ? If the instructions had been literally carried out, all the clothes would have been returned to Jacobs Brothers. The grievance is that the trousers and the overcoat were not brought back as well as the vest and coat. Jacobs Brothers have no right to make any claim for the vest and the coat, for these articles were returned to them. For the trousers and the overcoat Duckworth paid or tendered what he considered the value, and there is nothing in the evidence to show that he undervalued them, or that Jacobs Brothers would have sustained any loss whatever if they had accepted the thirty dollars in payment for those garments. The plaintiff failed to offer any proof as to the value of any of the articles, his theory of the case being that he was entitled, without reference to the actual value of the goods, to recover the sum that Duckworth would have been bound to pay if he had accepted the entire lot of clothing. The case is, therefore, barren of evidence to show that Jacobs Brothers sus
If Duckworth ought to accept the coat and the vest, Jacobs Brothers can sue him for the price. If the coat and vest do not fit reasonably well, Duckworth is not bound to take them, nor ought Jacobs Brothers to be permitted to evade the question that Duckworth has raised as to the fit of the garments by the technical claim that goods that were returned to them have been wrongfully converted by the defendant.
We must not be understood as intimating that the defendant would have been liable if the messenger had collected the money from Duckworth, and then lost or misappropriated it. There is no such question in this case.
Our decision goes no further than to hold that if a messenger be instructed not to deliver goods except upon certain conditions, he is liable if he makes a delivery in violation of those conditions.
Judgment affirmed.
Upon motion by plaintiff for a re-argument, the following opinion was delivered, April 1st, 1889 :—
[Present, J. F. Daly and Van Hoesen, JJ.] —The brief of the defendant, used on the first argument of the appeal, disposes of the suggestion that the question of damages was not before the court. Even if the plaintiff were misled by the statement of Justice Steckler that, in his view, the controlling question in the case was is or is not the defendant a common carrier ? we should not feel called on to reverse the judgment. Notwithstanding the expression of an opinion by the justice, it was in the power of the plaintiff to offer proof of the damages he had sustained, and if he refrained from offering such proof because he thought that on the question of law he was almost certain to succeed, he has no right to ask that his error of judgment shall entail the consequences of a second trial upon the defendant.
We are satisfied that the judgment of affirmance is correct.
Motion for reargument denied, with costs.
Cases cited
- Tooker v. Gormer 2 Hilt. 71 p. 63