Majority
p. 95John Gray v. Charles Redfield.
Headnote
The provisions of 3 Rev. Stat. 270, § 72 (6th ed.), which provide that no injunction shall issue to stay proceedings at law in a personal action after judgment, unless a sum of money shall be deposited, and a bond given as therein directed, apply to a suit brought in this court to restrain the collection of a personal judgment rendered in one of the District Courts; and a compliance with the statute is necessary to give the court jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction.Appeal by defendant from, an order of the special term, made April 13th, 1869, denying the defendant’s motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction restraining the collection of a judgment for §57, entered February 19th, 1869, in the Seventh District Court of Hew York city, in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff.
C. Patterson, for appellant.
S. B. N oble, for respondent.
—Upon applying for the preliminary injunction in this action, the plaintiff did not deposit the amount of the judgment and costs, nor give the bond,5 as required by the Revised Statutes (R. S. part 3, chap. 1, tit. 2, art. 5, § 140).
A compliance with this statute was necessary to give this court jurisdiction. This has been held in the Superior Court and in this court, where it is settled that the provisions of the statute in that regard are not abrogated by the Code (Cook v. Dickerson, 2 Sandf. 691 ; Carpenter v. Keating, decided at December, 1870, general term of this court, not reported).
The order appealed from must, therefore, be reversed.
Order reversed.
Footnotes
- * Present, Robinson, Larremore, and J. F. Daly, JJ.
Cases cited
- Cook v. Dickerson 2 Sandf. 691 p. 95