p. 506The defendant moved to vacate the order of arrest on his own affidavit, in which he did not deny that he had made the representations charged, but alleged that they were true, and that be had a good title to the Missouri lands, which he had purchased February 1st, 1870, for a valuable consideration, from one John Wood. He also produced the affidavit of Wood, who deposed that he (Wood) had purchased the lands in 1867 from one Case, and had caused the title to the land to be examined, and had found it to be perfect, except that it was encumbered by said taxes, and that on February 1st, 1870, he had deeded it to defendant for a valuable consideration.
The affidavit of one Yan Derzee was also produced, who deposed that he had examined the records in Missouri as to the • title of Wood, and believed that it was good.
In opposition to this the plaintiff* produced the affidavit of one Cushing, who deposed that he was the the deputy clerk of Stone county, Missouri, in which the lands were situated. That the title of Wood and Whitney was founded on what was known as the “ Old Spanish Grant,” which had never been recognized by the United States Government, and according to the expressed opinion of the ablest lawyers, in Missouri, was worthless, and in that part of the county was regarded as a fraud. That in 1866, the land in question had been donated by the United States Government to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company. That in the spring of 1870, defendant was in Stone county, and was told by Cushing that his title to the lands was worthless.
On these affidavits and the pleadings, the court at special term denied the motion to vacate the order of arrest.
Richard Marvin, for appellant.
Walsh, Halbert c& Eckerson, for respondent.
The covenant of seizin contained in defendant’s deed created such an obligation on his part as to render him liable, for fraud or misrepresentation therein, to action and arrest.
p. 507Where, as in this case, the cause of action and the ground of arrest are identical, a bare denial of the facts constituting the alleged fraud, will not authorize a discharge of the arrest, unless it is evident that the action cannot be sustained
(Ely v. Mumford, 47 Barb. 629 ;
Stuyvesant v.
Bowran, 3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 270 ;
Royal Ins. Co. v. Noble, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 54).
The defendant has not denied the representations, but on the contrary avers their truth.
As to mere matters of opinion, he should not he made responsible, but for a voluntary misstatement of any material fact upon which the plaintiff relied, and by which he was misled, the defendant should be held liable.
It is admitted that he represented to plaintiff that no one else had any interest in the property; yet Cushing’s affidavit shows that defendant previously knew of the claim of the Atlantic and Pacific B. B. Co., which fact he failed to disclose. Had he done so, plaintiff might have declined to purchase a litigation with the land.
Fraud consisting as well in the suppression of truth, as'in the assertion of falsehood, it should be left for a jury to decide whether the representations in question were made with intent to deceive.
The order appealed from should be affirmed.
Daly, Ch. J., and J. F. Daly, J., concurred.
Order affirmed.