Majority
Headnote
In a suit to foreclose a mortgage which had been assigned to the plaintiff, the defendant K., who was the owner of the mortgage, swore that he had paid 15000 on account thereof ; that he had made this payment at the time of the purchase of the mortgage by the plaintiffs, and had paid it to one L., the 'president of the plaintiff, upon the agreement that it should be credited on account of the mortgage. This testimony was contradicted by the oath of L., who swore that the $5000 was paid him for procuring the plaintiff to purchase the mortgage from the then holders of it. The documentary evidence showed that on the purchase the plaintiff had given checks for. $45,000, the amount due on the mortgage, to the order of IC., who had endorsed them over to the assignors of the mortgage, and that K. had then given to L. his own check for $5000; that K. had at the same time given his own bond to the plaintiff to secure the payment of $45,000 on the mortgage, and that he had for several years paid the interest on $45,000. The court at special term held the testimony of K. could not overthrow the testimony of L., supported by this documentary evidence, and that the claim of payment was not established, and the court at general term refused to disturb that decision.The following opinion was written at special term :
All the documentary evidence in this case is entirely inconsistent with the theory that Mr. Koehler paid the $5000 on the mortgages in suit at the time the plaintiffs took the assignment of them. If he made the payment on account of the principal of these mortgages, why did he execute a bond to pay $45,000 when the mortgages should become due ? Why did the bank give its checks for $45,000
Kaufmann, Tunstall Wagner, for appellant.
A. 0. Anderson £ Albert Cardozo, for respondent.
The only other question necessary to consider is that of consolidation. If the motion to consolidate had been made promptly, I think it would have been the duty of the court, to have granted it; but in a case where such motion is delayed until causes are called for trial, it seems to me that the defendant has been guilty of such laches as to deprive him of his claim for this relief.”
Justice.—The first question raised in this case, a question of fact, was, whether the $5000 was paid upon the mortgage or to Loew in consideration of his getting the plaintiffs to take the mortgage. Upon that question, Koehler and Loew were in direct conflict; and although the conduct- of Loew, as the president of a savings bank and one of the finance committee of the institution, in advocating in the committee and getting the bank to take a mortgage of $45,000, for which service Koehler was to pay, and did pay him $5000, was extraordinary in the chief officer of such an institution, yet we cannot say, as between the witnesses, who directly contradicted each other, that the judge below decided erroneously, as he put his decision upon the ground that Koehler at the time gave his bond for $45,000,
These contemporaneous documentary facts, and the continuous. payment afterwards to the bank by Koehler of interest on $45,000, were circumstances strongly against his version of the transaction, and we cannot say that the judge was wrong in attaching to them the weight which he did.
As respects the second question of fact, Loew testified that Koehler gave the $1000 as a bonus to the insurance company to secure the transfer of the other mortgage to the plaintiff, and that he, Loew, when he received it, paid it over to the insurance company, and Koehler’s statement in respect to this transaction was so loose and unsatisfactory as to justify the judge in finding against him.
If the defendant wished to have the suits consolidated, he should have moved before they were brought on for trial. The usual course is to move before trial, that the other party may have an opportunity to read affidavits and be heard as upon an ordinary motion before trial. It was a matter of discretion with the judge, and as he put his denial of the motion upon the ground of the defendant’s laches, there is no reason why an appellate tribunal should now order the suits to be consolidated (Wait’s Pr. vol. 2, pp. 557, 558).
The motion for a new trial, therefore, should be denied.
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed with costs ($10 costs and disbursements of affirmance of order).
Joseph F. Daly and Van Hoesen, JJ., concurred.
Judgment and order appealed from affirmed with costs.[1]
* The judgment entered on this decision was affirmed by the Court oí Appeals, April 16th, 1878. (See 73 N. Y. 609 .)