p. 294Lore, C. J., and Spruance and Boyce, J. J., sitting.Robert H. Van Dyke and F. O. Gooden (of the Rochester, N. Y., Bar) for the plaintiffs.
George M. Jones and William M. Hope for the defendant.
Superior Court, Kent County,policy of insurance (made out to the said Schilanskys to the amount of $1,500) for a loss sustained in the total destruction of a saloon belonging to the Schilanskys, also the fixtures of the said saloon and stock of liquors.
The pleas were non assumpsit and three special pleas—-first, that the plaintiffs had an additional policy of insurance without the knowledge of the defendant; second, that the assignment of the policy to the Bartholomay Brewing Company was without the knowledge or consent of the insurance company, and, third, that the plaintiffs furnished no proof of loss or notice within thirty days, such as required by the policy. It was in evidence that the property was destroyed on the twelfth day of November, 1901, after midnight, and that the following proof of loss was received by the President of the company, at Dover, on December 11,1901, and by him forwarded to the Chicago office of the company, viz:
“ Policy No. 30367- Proof of Loss. Amount of Policy.
“ Renewal No.- to $1500.00.
“Merchants and Manufacturers Fire Insurance Company of Dover, Delaware.
“By your policy of Insurance No. 30,367, issued at your Chicago Agency, dated the 10 day of June 1901, and expiring the 10 day of June 1902, at 12 o’clock noon, you insured Sarah
p. 303sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to ownership at the time the policy was taken out and at the time of the fire. If you look at the proof of loss which has been admitted in evidence by your consent, you will find set forth that “ at the time said insurance was effected, the property described by said policy belonged to Sarah Schilansky and J. Schilansky, and that no other person or persons had any interest therein; ” * * * “ and the said fire did not originate by any act, design or procurement on the part oí the assured.” We overrule your first two grounds.We have already passed upon number three, as to assignment. Part of number four remains—failure of proof of loss to conform to requirement of policy. You may discuss such of the points relating to that as the court have not ruled upon.(After further discussion the Court ruled as follows.)Spruance, J.:—The Court are unanimously of the opinion that you have not stated sufficient grounds to sustain a nonsuit, and we, therefore, decline to grant a nonsuit.(The defendant then offered in evidence the second proof of loss—above referred to as not being relied upon by the plaintiff— and the same was admitted without objection, and the defendant rested.)(The plaintiff called Bernard Schilansky in rebuttal, and? after explaining the circumstances under which the second proof of loss was prepared, and also the ownership of the property alleged to have been destroyed, both sides closed their testimony.)The plaintiff prayed the Court to instruct the jury as follows:1. That the sufficiency of the preliminary notice and proofs is a question for the Court and is not to be considered by the jury.2. That the proof of plaintiff’s claim before the jury being
p. 304unimpeached and no defense thereto being offered by the defendant, their verdict should be for the plaintiff, for the value of the property lost, not exceeding the amount specified under the policy, together with interest from the day that suit was brought.
3. That where the loss is total, including all books and accounts, it is not necessary for the insured to guess at the items destroyed, but a general statement alleging the total loss is sufficient-4. That if the company received the proofs of loss and deemed it insufficient, they were bound to return it promptly, pointing out the defect therein, and upon their failure to do this the insured had a right to presume that such proof was sufficient.5. That the return of the said proof forty-two days after it was filed with said company is not in time to permit it to take advantage of the insufficiency thereof.The defendant prayed the Court, inter alla, to instruct the jury as follows:1. That it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove the ownership of the property at the time of the issuance of the policy of insurance, upon which the action is brought.
2. That it is necessary for the plaintiffs to prove the ownership of the property destroyed at the time of the fire.
3. That it is necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that a proof of loss or statement conforming with all the terms contained in limes 78 to 181 inclusive of said policy of insurance was duly filed with the defendant company within thirty days after the fire.
4. That it is necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that a proof of loss or statement conforming to all the requirements contained in lines 72 to 121 inclusive of said policy of insurance was filed with the defendant company at least ninety days before the bringing of this suit.
5. That it is necessary for the proof of loss or statement
p. 305required by the terms of said policy of insurance to set out each of the following facts:(a) A complete inventory, stating the quantity and cost of each article destroyed or damaged, and the amount claimed thereon.(5) The knowledge and belief of the insured as to the time and origin of the fire.(c) The interest of the insured and all others in the property.(d) Whether any and all incumbrance thereon.(e) Whether any and all other insurance and a copy of all policies pertaining to any of said property.(/) Whether any and, if so, what change in the title, use, occupation, location, possession or exposures of said property and of any property within a hundred feet thereof.6. That the proof of loss admitted in evidence in this case cannot be taken as proof of the ownership of the property described in said policy of insurance at the time of the issuance thereof or of the alleged loss, for the purposes of this trial.7. That it is necessary for the plaintiffs to prove an assignment (or use) indorsed upon said policy as absolute and complete and of the same nature as that alleged in the declaration.
8. That all the evidence as to ownership of the property destroyed either at the time of the fire or at the time of the issuance of the policy, which was introduced by the plaintiff in rebuttal was inadmissible, and should not be considered by the jury.charging the jury:
Gentlemen of the jury:—This action is brought in the names of Joseph Schilansky and Sarah Schilansky for the use of Bartholomay Brewing Company, and is brought by the proper parties; the Shilanskys being the persons with whom the contract of insurance was made; and they having the legal right to sue upon it notwithstanding the fact that the defendant company marked the policy for the use of said brewing company.
p. 306It is not controverted that the paper admitted in evidence dated December 9, 1901, purporting to be the preliminary proof of the total loss by fire of the insured property, was made by the plaintiffs on the day of its date and was received by the president of the defendant company on the eleventh day of the same month; which was within thirty days from the date of the alleged loss and more than ninety days before the commencement of this action.
It is contended by the defendant company that this paper was not such a detailed proof of loss as was required by the policy of insurance to entitle the plaintiff to maintain this action.
In considering the provisions of policies of insurance relating to matters required to be done by the insured, subsequent to the loss, which do not alter the risk of the insurer or increase the liability, it is the prevailing practice of the courts to give to such provisions a construction favorable to the insured so far as the same can be reasonably done.
It is the duty of the Court to construe written papers which have been admitted in evidence, and to instruct the jury as to the meaning and effect of the same.
We have carefully examined and considered the provisions of the policy of insurance sued upon in respect to the proof of loss required to be made before suit and also the said paper of December 9, 1901, purporting to be the preliminary proof of loss, and we are of the opinion, and now instruct you that the requirements of the policy as to preliminary proof of loss have been substantially and sufficiently complied with.
This is especially so in view of the uncontroverted testimony in the case that there was a total destruction of the insured property and that all of the books, accounts and papers of the plaintiffs were also at the same time destroyed.
This paper which we have determined to be a sufficient preliminary proof of loss to meet the requirements of the policy in that regard, is not to be considered by you as proving or tending to prove the ownership of the property at the time of the execution
p. 307of the policy or at the time of the loss, or the fact of the loss, or the amount of the loss, or any other material fact in issue in this case.
These latter questions, vía, as to the ownership of the property, the loss, the amount thereof, and the other material facts, are to be determined by you from the testimony of the witnesses examined before you in this case.
If you find a verdict for the plaintiff, it should be for the value of the property destroyed, not exceeding $500 for each of the three classes of property described in the policy, and not exceeding $1500 for the whole, with interest thereon from a date ninety days after the delivery of the proof of loss to the defendant company.
Verdict for plaintiff for $1602.75.