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Pleasanton v. Pleasanton

30 Del. 292 7 Boyce 292 Court Superior Court for Kent County, Decision date 1919-03-05 Docket Action for Divorce, No. 8 English

Delivered by *293 Pennewill, C. J.,

Contents

Majority

p. 292
Mary A. Pleasanton vs. Louis U. Pleasanton.

Headnote

Divorce—Maintenance of Children—Petition.
Rev. Code 1915, § 3031, authorizing order for maintenance of children pending divorce, furnishes a defendant husband sufficient notice that plaintiff may apply for an order reqiring him to pay her a reasonable sum for maintenance of children, and it is not necessary that the petition for divorce request it.
(March 5, 1919.)
Pennewill, C. J., and Rice and Heisel, J. J., sitting.
W. Watson Harrington for plaintiff.
Arley B. Magee for defendant.
Superior Court for Kent County,
February Term, 1919.
Action for Divorce, No. 8,
Action by Mary A. Pleasanton against Louis U. Pleasanton for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. Request by plaintiff for an order on defendant for maintenance of children.
Order granted.
At the trial plaintiff asked the court, in case a decree nisi should be granted and the children awarded to her, to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff a reasonable sum for their maintenance.
The defendant objected because the plaintiff’s petition did not contain any such request, although custody of the children was asked for, and he had, therefore, no notice that an order for their maintenance would be applied for.

delivering the opinion of the court:

Our statute respecting divorce contains the following provision:

“ The Superior Court within any of the counties of this state is authorized and empowered in its discretion, in any cause of annulment of marriage or divorce brought before said court, and in which a decree nisi for annulment of marriage or for divorce from the bonds of matrimony or a decree for separation is entered by said court, to make such order for the distribution, care and maintenance of the children bom during the continuance pf the marriage sought to be affected by such proceeding, as is just and reasonable; and said court may from time to time revise and change such order as occasion may require.” Rev. Code 1915, § 3031.

Because of the broad powers and large discretion conferred by the statute the court are of the opinion that the order asked for by the plaintiff may be granted. The statute, of which the defendant is presumed to have knowledge, furnishes sufficient notice that such an order may be applied for.