p. 186own child? Mary Robinson survived her husband the trustees gave the estate up to her; she occupied it for ten years and died leaving no issue; having devised it. Ruth, the child of Thos. Rodney claims, and the question is whether T. R., meant to'give the land to his brothers, in preference to his own child.The trustees ought not to recover because they, having surrendered to M. Robinson, a conveyance of the legal estate to her will be presumed. A court of equity would have compelled them to do it, and they will be presumed to have done it. (1 Cruise Dig. 332-3, 48-9; 13 Johns. Rep. 513 ; 4 T. Rep. 682; 2 Ibid 684.)The purposes of the trust being answered at the death of the husband of Mary Robinson; or at furthest, on her death without issue; the trust ceased, and the legal estate became vested in the only child of the testator under the devise to children. (Fletcher on Trustees’ estates 19, 50.)Houston, in reply.
—1. Marriage and birth of a child revokes only in cases where no provision is made for such child. Our act of assembly provides for the wife and subsequent child.2. The intention of the testator was, that the share left to M. R., ■should, on the failure of her issue, go to his brothers, the trustees; <tnd not to the testator’s other children, if he should have any.3. The doctrine of disinheriting the heir by implication does not apply, for these trustees, if they take at all, take by the express words ■of the will4. As -to the estate which trustees will take: the claim here is not in character of trustees, for the purposes of a trust; but as devisees, clear of any trust.5. No presumption of a surrender of the estate can be made in this case. ' That principle applies only to cases of actions by the cestuis -que trust against third persons, who set up the legal estate to defeat the action. It does not apply to actions between the trustee and cestui que trust. There is no proof th.at the defendant came into .¡possession under Mary Robinson, and he did not take possession until after her estate ceased.The case was now turned into a special verdict finding the facts before mentioned; upon which the Court gave judgment for the defendant, resting their judgment mainly upon the intention manifested on the will. It shows that the main object of the testator was to prevent his son in law, Wm. Robinson, from having any portion or share of his estate. For this purpose he placed it in trust, and provided for several contingencies in reference to the trust, and for
p. 187one final contingency upon which- it was to be- so determined' as to give the- trustees the estate free and clear from the trust, and make them beneficially interested in-- it. That contingency was- the death of
all the testator’s
children and
grand children, without issue, which did not happen. The settled rule is, that the intention must prevail; and the court thought the intention was here manifest, that the testator did not mean to give any portion of his estate- to the trustees whilst he- had children or grand children, ortheir issue living. There was good reason for continuing the legal estate 'in the trustees on the failure of issue- of Mary Robinson, for that might have happened in the lifetime of Wm. Robinson, which would have given him a life estate without such- provision,and this would have defeated the main-, if not the sole-, object of the will.
Houston, for plaintiff.
Cullen, for defendant.
The case was afterwards taken to the Court of Appeals where this- judgment was,-after argument, affirmed, by that court,on.the same- grounds.