Majority
Headnote
A merely formal party defendant to a bill in equity, may be examined as a witness by special order.admitted the deposition.
A party who is a merely formal party may be examined as a witness by special order of the Chancellor. In the English practice, notice of this order is served on the solicitor of the opposite party. Then the party files interrogatories with reference to the witnesses named, a list of whom is furnished; but here a party always files them in ignorance of what witnesses are to be examined. It is true that a party could not reasonably presume that a co-defendant would be examined as a witness; but after notice that application would be made for an order for that purpose, he has at least as much notice to shape his interrogatories as in our practice he can have with reference to the witnesses. Notice of this application was served on the respondent’s counsel before the cross interrogatories were filed, viz: on the 24th of February. The commission issued on the 1st of March, and on the same day an order of the Chancellor was docketed for examining the defendant Hastings. This was notice to the respondent’s solicitor; and the commission issued, according to the entry on the record, on the same day by reference to date.
The case was argued in chief by Mr. Cullen, for the appellants, and Messrs. Layton and Saulsbury, for respondents.
The Chancellor assigned the reasons for his decree.
In this case the complainants signed and sealed as sureties a printed form of a single bill, with warrant of attorney to confess judgment, without filling up the blanks, either as to obligee, sum to be paid or time of payment, or date, and delivered the same to Richard F. Hastings, to borrow a sum of money from James Bishop, of Sussex county. The application having been made by Richard F. Hastings to Bishop, and he not having any money to lend, the object contemplated by the verbal agreement of the parties failed, and the blanks were not filled up. Hastings retained the printed form, with the blanks not filled up, and in that condition took the paper to Philadelphia, and there offered it to Nathaniel Hickman, informing him of the purpose for which it had ' been given, and stating his authority to fill up the blanks, and agreeing to fill them up in favor of Hickman, provided he would advance him a sum beyond the amount of his indebtedness. This Hickman declined, and stated that he could not take the security offered, inasmuch as the blanks had not been filled up at the time when it was signed and sealed by the parties. Richard F. Hastings being also indebted on his individual account, and as a partner of Dunning, to Clendaniel & Neall, afterwards made a similar offer to to them, and they also refused to loan or advance any money on the security of the instrument; but agreed to take the same in dis
After full consideration of this case, I can discover no analogy to the decisions of cases referred to under the rule which protects purchasers without notice and for a valuable consideration. Nor does it appear that the parties complainants, by signing the blank printed form, intended to commit a fraud. They admit the signatures were made by them as sureties to enable Hastings to obtain the loan of money from Bishop, and this they had a right to do ; and from the nature of the blanks and the signature being under seal, it was not incumbent on them to give notice to protect third persons from such a a paper, when it was not negotiable. There was enough appearing on the face of it, independent of its want of negotiability, to guard against deception and induce any person to whom application might be made, to inquire into and be satisfied as to the legality and authority of the party offering it as a security,
In the case of Baring vs. Shippen, 2 Burr. Rep., 116,Tilghman, Chief Justice remarks: “who can say that the answer' of Cutting is not material to prove fraud ? It tends to prove that a bond which was given by Mrs. Shippen to Cutting, for the sole purpose of raising money for her use, was applied by him to the purpose not of, raising money at all, but of paying a debt of his own. If Mr. Baring had applied to Mrs. Shippen before he took the assignment, (which in prudence he ought to have done) he would have found at once that Cutting was acting a fraudulent part, and the mischief would have been prevented; not having done so, he took the assignment at his peril, and has no right to complain of the defence set up against him.” In the same case Yates, J., says: “ the general matter contained in the answer or depositions of Jno. Brown Cutting (the assignor) might well be given in evidence. They tended to avoid the bond, by showing it was made use of for a very different purpose, from that for which the deed was executed by the defendant. It is clearly settled that an obligation in the hands of an assignee, is subject to all the equity which could have prevailed against the original obligee.” If then a bond executed by A. to B., for the purpose of raising money on it by B., as the agent of A., being assigned by B., in payment of the debt of B., cannot be valid against A., by the assignee; because applied to a purpose different from what was intended by the obligor. It would appear conclusively to
The complainants are properly in this court, on the ground of fraud. The allegation of the bill is not merely a denial of the bond, as the deed of complainants, but it charges fraud and collusion between Richard F. Hastings and the other respondents, in filling up and using the bond for other purposes than those for which it was executed. Their case is, that they executed the bond in blank form, for the purpose of enabling R.
Mr. Cullen, for appellants.
Messrs. Layton and Saulsbury, for respondents.
Without particular reference to the proof to examine how far this case is sustained in reference to the fraud, it may be decided on a general principle which avoids this bond as to the sureties. When a person takes a bond executed in blank, he is bound to inquire of the authority to fill up and deliver it. Such a paper is not a negociable instrument; it is a deed which has effect only on delivery, and no delivery could be without the express assent and authority of the obligor. That authority must be proved or the bond is a nullity. The execution of the bond in blank does not import an authority in the holder to fill it up and deliver it at pleasure; on the contrary, this circumstance is enough to put every one on his guard against taking it, without express reference to the obligors. If filled up at the execution, the slightest alteration by a party interested, without such reference, and consent of the obligor, would avoid the bond;, and, a fortiori, when the entire filling up and delivery are without such reference and consent.
Whether Richard F. Hastings misrepresented his authority to Clendaniel & Neall or not, they were bound to know that this deed of the sureties could not be filled up and delivered to them upon terms differing, even by the admissions of the answer, from what they knew was its original object, without the express authority of the sureties. And that they, as well as Mr. Hickman, did know this, is apparent from their refusal to advance any thing upon it as security. They took it merely to secure old debts, and were placed in no worse condition as to them, whether the bond is good against the sureties or not. It secured them a judgment against R. F. Hastings, for their back debt.
It is the unanimous opinion of the court that the decree of the Chancellor be affirmed, with costs.