p. 32H. H. Ward, for complainant.
The questions presented by the bill of complaint in the above-stated case, arise out of the third section of the last will and testament, and the third section of the codicil to the last will and testament of Philip Reybold, deceased. These sections read as follows:“ Third, I give and bequeath to my son, John Reybold, in trust for his three blind children, George U. Reybold, Elizabeth Reybold and John Reybold, one hundred shares of the capital stock of the Delaware City Bank, standing in my name upon the books of the said bank, and do direct the accruing dividends shall, from time to time, be invested for the said children during the lifetime of my said son, John Reybold, and that if either of the said children should die under age and unmarried, the share of the stock of such child shall belong to the survivors or survivor.”“ 3. In regard to the bequest to the three blind children of John Reybold, mentioned in the third clause of my will, I make this further disposition, that if all the said children should die under age and without issue, that the said one hundred shares of stock shall be divided among all my children, or the representatives of such as are deceased, in equal shares, the income of the seized fund to be applied to my said son John, in the education of the said children, if he thinks fit.”
p. 33The questions presented by these sections of this will and codicil seem to be as follows:I. Is the estate of the three blind children of John Reybold the elder in the 100 shares of bank stock a vested estate, and if so, when did it become so?II. Under what conditions that estate, if vested, can, under the limitations of the said will, b© devested, and whether the gift over of said stock can now ever take effect?III. In whom now, the beneficial interest in said property is vested?IV. Whether this court should now determine the trust and order an assignment of said stock and property, by said present trustee, to the person or persona now beneficially interested?I.° The words of the will give the blind children an .immediate fixed right of present enjoyment. This is a perfect description of an estate vested in possession. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, word “Vest;” Fearne on Contingent Remainders, 1; 1 Roper on Legacies, 375, etc. (ed. of 1829).This legacy was vested immediately upon the death of Philip Reybold, Sr., the testator, subject only to be devested upon the happening of the two contingencies mentioned in said will. The limitation over to the survivors or survivor, or to the children of the testator, or their representatives, in the event of either of said legatees dying under age and unmarried, or in the event of all of said legatees dying under age and without issue,
p. 34does not prevent the vesting of said legacy on the death of the testator. The legacy would vest at once, but be subject to be devested, upon the happening of the events mentioned. 1 Roper on Legacies, 403, etc. (ed. 1829); Davidson v. Dallas, 14 Ves. Jr. 576; Deane v. Test, 9 id. 147, 152; Shepherd v. Ingram, Ambler, 448.Speaking generally, the incidents of ownership and rules of law applicable to legal estates, apply with equal force to the estates of cestuis que trust, in a private trust; therefore, the fact that the personal property in question was originally left to “ John Reybold, in trust for his three blind children,” etc., does not affect the question of the vesting of said estate, at any stage of this argument. Bispham’s Equity, 89, §§ 59, 60 (4th ed.).II. Under what conditions are the estates of said three blind children devested under the limitations of said will, and will the gift over of said stock, now ever take effect?The provisions of the toill, if construed in their natural sense, contemplate a survivorship among the three blind children, only upon the happening of both of two events, i. e. (1) If either of the said children should die under age, and (2) if either of the said children should die unmarried. Both John and Elizabeth are dead, and both died without having been married; but neither of them died “under age.” One of the events not having happened, the inevitable conclusion from the natural construction of the will is that the gifts over to the survivors or survivor never took effect, and that, therefore, the estates of John and Elizabeth in said stock
p. 35were never devested under the provisions of the will considered by itself, in favor of the survivors or survivor.In the codicil of the will, the testator has expressed certain other contingencies for the devesting of the estates of said primary legatees, and has further provided that “ if all the said children should die under age and without issue then the stock shall go to the testator’s children, or their representatives.” Taking these provisions of the will and codicil together, the intention of the testator to provide for these three blind children, and the survivor of them, in exclusion of all other persons, is plain. In the will proper, the testator has provided that unless these children shall each reach the age of maturity, when they would be likely to intelligently dispose of their interests, or shall be married, and so have a wife or a husband to take the benefit of their estates, the interests of any of said legatees dying, shall go to and vest in the survivors or survivor. And in the codicil itself, the testator has provided that the estates of these primary legatees shall not be operated upon by the gift over, except upon the death of all such legatees under age and without issue. Taking the natural reading of the will and codicil, the gift over to the children of the testator takes effect only upon the happening of both of two events: (1) The death of all the said primary legatees under age, and (2) the death of all of them without issue. As a matter of fact, none of the said legatees had, or so far have had, issue, but all of them passed the age of maturity, and one still lives at the age of fifty years. One of the two contingencies,
p. 38Harris v. Taylor, 2 South (N. J.) 413; Fairfield v. Morgan, 2 B. & P. (N. R.) 38; Eastman v. Baker, 1 Taunt. 174; Right v. Day, 16 East, 67.III. In whom is the beneficial interest in said bank stock now vested?Granting that at the times of the deaths of John and Elizabeth, their interests in said stock and note were indefeasibly vested in them, according to the conclusions heretofore reached, the present entire beneficial ownership of this stock and note is certain. By the will of John, his entire interest is vested in George H. Reybold, the complainant. The share of Elizabeth, upon her decease intestate, descended to her two brothers, of the whole blood, and next of kin, the said George H. Reybold, and the said Clayton B. Reybold. At present, therefore, George H. Reybold owns a five-sixths interest, and Clayton B. Reybold a one-sixth interest in said stock and note.IV. Should this court now terminate the trust of this property, and order the present trustee to assign said stock and note to the persons now beneficially interested?Two reasons are apparent on the face of the will for the creation of the trust of this stock: (1) To secure the safety of the property, and the maintenance and education of the blind children during their minority; (2) to protect the gifts over to the survivors or survivor of the blind children, or to the children and their representatives of the testator. Both of said reasons were fulfilled and failed when the youngest blind child became of age.
p. 39No ulterior facts and no reasons for the continuance of the trust are suggested in the answer of any respondent in this case.
The reasons for the continuance of the trust having failed, it should regularly be brought to an end. 3 Jarman on Wills, 70, 71, 52, note; Bispham’s Equity, 80-82; Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen, 339 ; Culbertson’s Appeal, 26 P. F. Smith (76 Penn. St.) 148; Hill on Trustees, *236, note 2.Upon the termination of a trust of personalty, the absolute estate therein is in the persons entitled to the use, and delivery or assignment should be made by the trustee to those beneficially interested. Bispham’s Equity, 82; Hill on Trustees, *236, note 2.Bradford & Vandegrift, Thomas Davis and William S. Hilles, for respondents.
Let the decree be entered as follows:
And now, to-wit, this 9th day of Hay, A. D. 1893, the above cause having come on to be heard before the Chancellor, upon argument of counsel and upon a, mature consideration thereof, it appearing to the Chancellor that of the three blind children of John Beybold, Sr., John Beybold, Jr., died at the age of twenty-four years, unmarried and without issue, having willed his entire estate to George H. Beybold, said complainant, and that Elizabeth Beybold died at the age of forty-seven years, unmarried, without issue and intestate, leaving as her only heirs-at-law George H. Beybold and Clayton B. Beybold, and that George H. Beybold hath
p. 40attained the age of fifty years, and is the only survivor of said three blind children; that the estates of said three blind children in said bank stocks became, immediately upon the death of Philip Reybold, Sr., a vested estate, subject to be devested in favor of the survivors or survivor of said blind children, upon the death of any of them, under age and unmarried, or in favor of the children, or their representatives, of the said Philip Reybold, Sr., deceased, upon the death of all of said blind children under age and without issue; and that ah of said blind children, having survived to the age of twenty-one years and upwards, the said gifts over of said stock, upon the happening of said events, can now never take effect; and that at the time of the deaths of John Reybold and Elizabeth Reybold, they owned their respective shares of stock by an absolute and indefeasible title; and that by virtue of the premises, the said George IT. Reybold is now entitled to have five-sixths of said bank stock and note, and said Clayton B. Reybold is entitled to have one-sixth of said bank stock and note.
And it further appearing that the said Clayton B. Reybold is administrator of the estates of John Reybold, Jr., and Elizabeth Reybold, and as such is primarily entitled to have and to hold for distribution the shares of said bank stock and note to which the said John and Elizabeth died entitled.
And it further appearing to the Chancellor that the reasons for the creation of said trust, by said testator, and for the further continuance of the same, have been now fully fulfilled, and have now failed, and that no ulterior facts and no reasons for the continuance of the
p. 41said trust are suggested in the answer of any respondent in this case, and no such facts or reasons now appearing to the Chancellor.
And it further appearing that all persons and estates interested in the question proposed by said bill are before the court and have filed answers fully admitting the facts set forth in said bill, and submitting themselves to the decree of the Chancellor.
Row, therefore, It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the said trust originally created of said Delaware City Bank stock be and the same is hereby terminated and brought to an end; that the said Edwin C. Reybold, trustee, is ordered to file his account in this court within ten days from the date hereof, and thereupon to assign, transfer and set over unto the said George D. Reybold an equal one-third of the said stock and note, in his own right, and to the said Clayton B. Reybold, administrator of Elizabeth Reybold, deceased, an equal one-third of said stock and note, as administrator as aforesaid.
And upon the assignment of said interests in said bank stock and note to the parties aforesaid, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said Edwin C. Reybold, trustee aforesaid, together with the sureties upon his bond, • be fully discharged from all responsibility and liability under said trust; and it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the costs of said bill, answers and proceedings in this court, thereunder, be paid by said trustee before the filing of his account, as aforesaid, out of the income of said stock and note, now in his hands, and the said costs are hereby taxed at the sum of $101.17.