Majority
Headnote
After the plaintiff had executed a writ of inquiry, the defendant’s attorney agreed to waive a motion he was about making to set aside the proceedings, and gave a cognovit for the same amount at which the damages had been assessed: whereupou the plaintiff’s attorney stipulated not to perfect judgment until a specified period thereafter, but delivered the stipulation upon an express parol condition, that the defendant should pay all the disbursements attending the execution of the writ of inquiry, which the latter neglected to do, though repeatedly requested :—Held, that the 63d rule did not apply to the case, and that the plaintiff was regular in perfecting judgment on the inquisition in disregard of the terms of his stipulation.The 63d rule does not apply to a case like this. We cannot allow an attorney to disregard his verbal agreement and thus set aside a judgment where there is no pretence of a defence on the merits. As the defendant refused to perform the condition on which the cognovit was received, the plaintiff was at liberty to treat the arrangement as at an end and proceed to judgment on the inquisition.
It has been said that writs of inquiry of damages are not process within the statute relating to the testes and return of process. (Cook v. Tuttle, 2 Wendell, 289.) Still, according to the former practice, such writs have always been tested and made returnable in term time, and judgment could not be entered until the return day of the writ. The theory was, that the judgment was actually pronoun-, ced by the court on the coming in of the writ and- inquisition. But this fiction has been entirely overthrown by the statute which provides that judgments may be entered and
Motion denied.