p. 47inhabitants of the school district, to be held at a time and place therein mentioned, for the purpose of talcing into consideration the propriety of building a school house, &c. It was then shown that a meeting was held hr pursuance of said order, and that the following resolutions were adopted, viz. 1. That the trustees be authorized to build a new school house, wood-shed and back-house ; 2. That $400 be raised by a tax to defray the expense of the erections; and 3. That the trustees be authorized to sell the old school house and appropriate the avails to the erection of the new buildings—the balance to be raised by a tax on the district. The defendants then offered in evidence a tax list, made out by them as trustees in pursuance of said resolutions, by which the taxable inhabitants of the district were assessed the sum of $373,28, (the balance of $400 after deducting the price for which the old school house was sold,) of which sum the plaintiff was taxed $42,28. The defendants then offered to prove that a warrant for the collection of said tax list was issued by them as trustees, and delivered to James, the district collector, who seized the property in question in virtue thereof. The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the admission of the evidence, on the ground that the sum directed to be raised by the district meeting was indefinite in amount, and the trustees therefore not authorized to make the assessment. The court sustained the objection, and the defendants’ counsel excepted. The jury rendered a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor for $43,50; and, after judgment, the defendants sued out a writ of error.
C. F. Ingalls, for the plaintiffs in error.
E. D. Culver, for the defendant in error.
I am of opinion that the court below erred. No doubt the act in relation to common schools, contemplates that the inhabitants, at their annual or special meeting, shall specify in their resolutions authorizing the levy of a tax for the purposes mentioned, some definite amount to be raised, and not leave that to be determined by the trustees at
p. 48their discretion. This was held in
Robinson v.
Dodge, (18
John. R. 351.) In that case the meeting directed the erection of the school house, and authorized the trustees to levy a tax &c.
“to defray the expenses of the same.” But here, the amount was specified at four hundred dollars, with a direction to the trustees to sell the old building, and treat the avails, after sale, as so much of the fund already in hand to be expended on the new erections. This delegation of authority is not questioned, nor can it be ; and it is the only act of discretion involved in the case that has any connection with the question of amount. The aggregate sum named in the resolutions was not to be exceeded, but might be
reduced by the application of the avails of the old building.
It seems to me impossible to say, therefore, upon this state of the case, that any discretionary power was committed to the trustees in respect to the amount of the tax, beyond what the law clearly confers upon them. It might with as much propriety be said, if the building had been already sold, and the avails in the hands of the trustees when the vote was taken, and they directed to deduct the amount from the $400, that the proceeding would have been void for not fixing a definite sum. The power to sell and realize the price is as perfect as it would be to make the mathematical deduction of the amount.
Judgment reversed.