the defendant may challenge any scrutiny into his conductor qualifications.
. The contact is then reasonable.
It is also binding. A corporation may act by a committee and may be bound by an instrument not under seal. 7 Cranch, 297 . 12 John. 227 . 14 John. 119 . 1 Fonb.Esq. 295. n. 2 Atk. 212. 10 Mass. 397 .
• The want of an answer and the reading of an affidavit can not here be objected to, in the way such objections might be urged if the motion came from the defendant’s part. We have yet time to answer, and it is the other party who now moves.
The injunction will be an irreparable loss to the defendant, whether the right is finally decided for or against him. It will break up the institution and scatter the scholars ; and in any case, his remedy will be very uncertain.
A committee may bind a corporation permanently, though their own powers are of short duration: there is no necessary connection between the duration of one and the other.
Mr. Van Vechten remarked in reply, that the defendant ought not to be allowed to oppose the motion upon affidavits which may be made more or less precise and full at his pleasure, and are not the subject of exception.
If the corporation gave authority for this contract that authority must be precise, and must be strictly pursued. If they fixed no limitation of time that omission is fatal.
The committee were themselves appointed but for one year; and they attempt to bind their constituents for ten years.
Such a contract is destructive of all the objects of the law. It divests the trustees of all control. They can neither prescribe rules nor make an annual report to the regents of the university, nor correct abuses. If they could contract for ten years why not for life ?
The trustees have given up their visitatorial powers and exchanged them for a contract at law. But in case of misbehavior and of an attempt to coerce the defendant at law, he might answer that the contract contains no provision for that purpose,
said, that the resolution of the trustees seemed to contemplate a temporary arrangement. It is brief, general and vague. Connected with all the attendant circumstances, it could hardly have been intended to embrace an arrangement for ten years.
But there is another view of the subject, which is more satisfactory. The power of the trustees depends on the statute. By the 12th section of the act relative to the university, it is expressly provided, that the trustees of academies, at their regular meetings “ may appoint teach- “ ers and other officers and remove or displace them at pleasure.” It seems then, by the very terms of this section, that the trustees could not themselves make such a contract as this; and therefore, that they could not delegate such apower to others. They can not bind themselves or their successors, not to remove a teacher.
I could wish that this view of the subject had been considered at the bar. It seems to me like other public trusts for the appointment of officers at pleasure, which trusts can neither be divested nor delegated ; like the powers of the president or a governor to appoint during pleasure and the transfer of such powers is inconsistent with their nature.
The question then arises, what is the jurisdiction of this court in this case ? It has no power of visitation ; but it has power to cause contracts to be cancelled; and on that ground, it has cognizance of this cause.
Injunction granted.