p. 218had nothing to do with the estimate and assessment, then the assessors did not act. An estimate should he made beforehand, and involves an exercise of judgment. Did the assessors ever meet and agree upon the principles of the assessment 1 If they met and so agreed, the time when done is immaterial.
As to the redemption notice, it must be published for six weeks, twice a week, and which publication must end prior to the commencement of the last six months of the two years after the sale. If the jury think that it has not been so published, their verdict must be for the defendant. This involves, of course, the instruction that the certificate of the street commissioner which renders the sale absolute is not conclusive evidence of thg regularity of the redemption notice.
To all, each, and every part of which charge the plaintiff’s counsel then and there excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the defendant.
The supreme court (Bronson, J., delivering the opinion) affirmed the judgment rendered at the circuit. Reported 3 De nio, 598 .
A. Thompson, Attorney and Counsel for plaintiff in error.
First. The circuit judge erred in refusing to charge the jury as matter of law, that the confirmation of the report of estimate and assessment in this case by the common council was binding and conclusive on the owner and occupant of the premises in question, and a lien and charge thereon; and it was wholly immaterial to inquire whether any irregularities had occurred in the proceedings of the assessors in making said estimate and assessment; or whether any error had taken place in the proceedings thus confirmed; and the judge also erred in charging the jury, that the first question for them to pass upon was, was the action of the assessors in making the estimate of the expenses, .and assessment thereof, correct or not; and also in charging, that the confirmation by the common council of the report of the assessors is not so final and conclusive as to preclude the defendant from inquiring into the report. The supreme court also erred in sanctioning such refusal
p. 221publication must end prior to the commencement of the last six months of the two years after the sale. (26th page ; 2 R. L. p. 442, § 259; L. of 1816, p. 114, §2; L. of 1840, p. 274, § 10.)The judge also erred in refusing to charge, that the publication of said redemption notice having commenced on the 13th December, 1841, and previous to the last six months of the two years after the sale of the premises, the statute was sufficiently complied with. (25thpage; 1 R. S. 2d ed. p. 399, §§ 76-80; L. of 1823, pp. 405, 406, § 43; 10 Wend. 397 ; 9 D. and R. 772 ; 3 Clark and Fin. 354.)The judge also erred in refusing to charge, that the statutes of 1816 and 1840 were directory. (25th page; 7 Wend. 83 , and cases cited ; 6" Hill, 646; 1 Burr, 447; 1 Burr, 330; 5 Cow. 469 ; 2 Mass. 230 ; Dwarris on Stat. 713-716; 2 Binney, 227; 11 Wend. 604 ; 2 Denio, 160 ; 17 Johns. 167 .)The case of 18 Johns, 441 , is provided for by laws of 1816, pp. 12 and 13.Sixth. The judge also erred in refusing to charge, that upon the giving of the street commissioner’s certificate, pursuant to the act of 1841, the lease to the plaintiff became absolute, and the defendant, and all others interested in the premises, were debarred from all right and title thereto, during the term of years for which the premises were conveyed to the plaintiff; and thatotherefore the defendant could not avail himself of any defect in the redemption notice. (25thpage; 1 R. S. 400, 2d ed. § 84^90; Laws of 184=1, p. 211, § 7.)
Seventh. The supreme court erred in confirming all the proceedings at the trial, and refusing a new trial.3 Denio, 167 —Statute says, shall be final and conclu sive—that distinguishes from authorities on which court relied— Differs from Brooklyn and Williamsburgh charters.$!§“* Reply. First, jurisdiction—then statute—judgment as to all intermediate matters conclusive—those things must be done, but confirmation conclusive—4 Hill right—but not applied to New-York.Richard Mott, Attorney and Counsel for defendant in error.
The evidence in the case shows, that three persons were ap
p. 222pointed by the common council to make an estimate of the expense of the improvement, and to assess the same among the owners, &c.The evidence of Warner shows, that no estimate whatever of the expense was -ever made by the assessors, or any or either of them.That the assessors never had any meeting, nor were they ever together for the purpose of making a distribution or assessment of the expense among the owners or occupants of the houses and lots benefited by the improvement.That the whole was done by a surveyor and a clerk in the street commissioner’s office.That only two of the assessors signed the assessment, and that without ever examining it.The evidence also is, that the sale was on the 20th day of June, 1840, and the first publication of the redemption notice required by the statute of 1816, p. 114, § 2, and the statute of 1840, p. 274, § 10, was on the 13th day of December, 1841, and the last was on the 21st day of January, 1842.First. The statute of 1813 (2 R. Laws, 407, § 175) requires the assessors to ipake an estimate of the probable costs and expense of the improvement, directed by the ordinance of the common council, before the contract is made or the work done ; and that to be confirmed by the common council. -And not being done in this matter, the assessment, and all subsequent proceedings, are void. (Elmendorf v. The Mayor, &c., 25 Wend. 696 .)Second. The assessment and all subsequent proceedings are void, for the reason that the assessment was not made by the three assessors. And also, that the assessors had never met or conferred together upon the subject. (2 R. S. 555, § 27; Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cowen, 526; Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cowen, 238; Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 211 .)The contract was made by the street committee, and that amount -was distributed among the owners of the adjoining property by a clerk in the street commissioner’s office without consulting the assessors, and the confirmation of the report did
p. 223not preclude the defendant from going behind it. (1 East, 70,71; 4 Hill, 599 .)Third. The redemption notice was not published according to the statutes, the sale, being on the 20th day of June, 1840. The first publication should have been on or before the 7th day of November, 1841, and to continue once a week for six weeks successively. This would have brought the whole publication within the first eighteen months, as the statutes require. The statute of 1816, (114, § 2,) and the statute of 1840, (274, § 10,) declare that the “ mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New-York,
shall, at least six months before the expiration of two years after any such sale,
cause an advertisement to be published in one daily newspaper, printed and published in the city of New-York, at
least twice in each week for six weeks successively.” The last six months of the two years after the sale in this case commenced on the 20th day of December, 1841, and the first publication of the redemption notice being on the 13th day of December, 1841, it was published only seven days previous to the commencement of the six months before the expiration of two years after the sale, instead of forty-two days, as it should have been; (
1 Wend. 90 ;) and for this reason the plaintiff’s title failed.
(Striker v.
Kelley, 7 Hill, 1 .)
Fourth. The above statutes are in derogation of common right, and should be construed strictly. ( 7 Wheat. 119 ; 7 Wend. 151 ; 4 Hill, 86 ; 7 id. 1; 13 Serg. & Rawl. 208 ; 2 Hammond, 231; id. 365; Striker v. Kelley, 2 Denio, 330 .). Fifth. The circuit judge was right in his direction to the jury, and the questions of fact were fairly submitted to the jury, and they having passed upon those facts in favor of the defendant, their verdict is conclusive.Sixth. The lease of the corporation to the plaintiff is void for the above reasons, and conveys no title to the premises in question to the plaintiff.
R. Mott, Attorney and Counsel for Defendant.
Decision.—Judgment affirmed, adopting the opinion of the supreme court as reported 3 Denio, 598 .
Gardiner, J., dissenting.
p. 224Note.—Held, that under the statute (2
R. L. 407, § 175) it is not the
ratification by the common council which is binding and conclusive, but the
estimate and
assessment when ratified. And it is only when an assessment has
been first duly made, that the common council has the
power of ratification. Void things are as
no things.
But if that act was good so far as it goes, it would only be one of several necessary links in the plaintiff’s claims of title, and it is a well-established rule in relation to these statute powers to transfer the title to land without the consent of the owner, that the authority must be strictly pursued from beginning to end; if any material link in the chain be wanting, the whole proceeding will fall to the ground.
The prima facie presumption in this case was, that all of the assessors met and consulted, although only two of them signed the estimate and assessment. But the defendant "was at liberty to rebut that presumption by showing that in point of fact the third assessor did nothing beyond talcing the oath of office.
And the fact that the third assessor did not act might as well be proved by one who did act as by one who did not.
The jury having found that only two of the assessors acted, and that the third was not consulted, and there being nothing to obviate this difficulty, it is fatal to the proceedings.
The ratification by the common council has not the force of ajudgment of a court of record..
Also, held, that the circuit judge was right in holding that the six weeks’ publication (redemption notice) should have been completed "before the commencement of the last six months of the two years after the sale, which is allowed for redeeming.
Reported 1 Comstock, 79.