p. 236Mills & Beckwith, Attorneys and
A. C. Bradley, Counsel for plaintiff in error.
First. It is unnecessary to aver in pleading how agent’s authority to seal was conferred. Affixation of seal by agent in presence of principal is good. (Story, Agency, § 51, and authorities cited, n. 2.) Even if authority were by instrument under seal, it is not necessary to be averred. (Bailiffs of Ipswich v. Marston, Cro. Ja. 411; Dean v. Grover, 2 Sand. 302, 305, a. b. n. 13; 1 Chit. Pl. 253, 7th Amer. from 6th London ed. a. authorities cited in n. g.; 6 Com. Dig. Pleader e. 9.)Second. It is unnecessary to aver in pleading how ratification was made. {The authorities above cited, except the first.)Third. Plea not double. The real fact averred is the agency of defendant and his authority. (Story on Agency, §§ 244,251; McLean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.) Several facts may be pleaded amounting to one result. (1 Chit. Pl. 564.) Averment of authority is a general term, embracing both previous power and subsequent ratification. Averment therefore of subsequent ratification may be tautology, but is not duplicity.Fourth. True, the declaration alleges that defendant signed and sealed the charter party as and for his own deed. But the plea denies this, but admits a signing, and avoids the effect which the plaintiff seeks to give it, by averring agency and authority. (White v. Skinner, 13 J. R. 307; Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 J. R. 60; Stone v. Wood, 7 Cole, 453.)Fifth. The declaration is insufficient. {Fols. 16, IT.) Charter has never commenced.II.-AS TO BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.First. Charter party should have been excluded, because of the variance. The phrase “ parties of the second part,” in the charter party, by just construction, means the Stevensons. But the declaration alleges it to mean the defendant. The contract is not set forth according to its true meaning and effect. (Corning v. Townsend, 23 Wend. 409 ; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 77 .) If liable at all, Platt is only liable for the performance of the du
p. 237ties assigned to them in the contract. (Principle of construction, 2 K. Com. 554-5; Code Napoleon, §§ 1156,1164; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 391; Leery v. Goodson, 4 T. R. 689.) Evidence of an agreement to deliver goods to defendant is a fatal variance from a count on an agreement to deliver them to a third person.— Id. (Churchill v. Wilkins, 1 T. R. 447; Samuel v. Parch, 2 Stark. C. 60; Wyvill v. Shepard, 1 H. Bl. 162.)Second. Deposition of Lynch should have been rejected.The deposition of Lynch in no way shows any act done by or on behalf of the defendant. It is wholly res inter alios. If the phrase “ parties of the second part ” means nobody but Platt, then the'Stevensons were wholly unconnected with him, and their acts could not make him responsible.Third. Plaintiff should have been non-suited. Non-suit should have been granted,2. Because, in addition to the facts in the charter party itself to show that it was Stevensons’ contract, the plaintiff had him-' self put a construction on it to that effect.Fourth. The court below erred in charging the jury that the charter party was, in judgment of law, under the circumstances in evidence, the deed of the defendant. The question of agency and authority should have been submitted to the jury; whereas the whole case was taken from them but the amount of damages. Platt had done enough to make his principals liable. A charter party may be without seal. (3 Chit. Com. Law, 388.) It is only when the act of agency is required to be done under seal that the authority by seal is necessary. (Story Ag. §§ 49,154; Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. 324 , 339, 340-1, Verplanck, senator.) The use of a seal where none was necessary will not vitiate an act which without the ceremony would have been valid. (Everitt v. Strong, 5 Hill, 163 ; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock, C. C. 456; White v. Cuyler, 6 T. R. 176.)Mills & Beckwith, Attorneys for plaintiff in error.
A. C. Bradley, of Counsel.
p. 238D. D. Lord, Attorney and
Daniel Lord, Counsel for defendant in error.
First. The declaration counts on a deed of charter party, inter partes, sealed with the seal of the defendant b.elow, as party thereto, of which deed profert is made.1. It is not competent for the defendant below, in a plea, not traversing the execution of the deed as alleged, to aver a different effect, or different description of party in the deed. He must either call for oyer of the deed, and demur, or rest on excluding the deed for variance on the trial. The deed must speak for itself, and can not be varied by averment. For this reason the second plea was bad.
2. The second plea, not denying the execution of the deed as averred in the declaration, could not vary its effect by alleging that he was an agent and executed ft in that character; for an agent may bind himself personally for his principal in an instrument in which he is also named as agent. The second plea was bad also, for this cause.3. The deed? as set out in the declaration, being under seal of the defendant, he was bound to show legal authority to bind his principal: this required authority by deed, and oyer of such authority, in order that the plaintiff might see on what ground he could pursue the principal. The second plea was also bad, for want of profert of such supposed authority. (Bender v. Sampson, 11 Mass. Rep. 44 .)' 4. The second plea was in like manner bad, for not showing ratification of the covenant by a deed of the principals, and for not containing profert of that deed. (Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. R. 68 ; Story on Agency, §§ 49, 275, 273, 161, 155, 278.)5. The second plea was also bad, for duplicity. Either previous authority or subsequent ratification, properly alleged, would be a good answer, if an answer at all. It was therefore double to tender issue on both. (Stephen on Pleading, 258, § 3, rule 1.) The plaintiff could, in replying, only tender issue on one of the answers, and therefore would be compelled to confess the other.The demurrer therefore was rightly adjudged for the plaintiffs.
p. 239Second. The charter party given in evidence was sealed with the seal of the defendant only: he calls himself party in the attestation ; he is the only party of the second part executing the deed, and alone was bound by it as a deed.The defendant has shown no authority under seal to execute a deed. He has shown no ratification by deed. He has not shown any communication to the plaintiff, either of his authority or of the ratification before suit brought.On every principle, therefore, the defendant was the party of the second part, and bound as such. (Talbot v. Godbolt, Yel verton, 137; Stone v. Wood, 7 Cow. R. 453; Spencer v. Field, 10 Wend. 87 ; Pentz v. Stanton, id. 276; Stone v. Gordon, 3 Maule & Sel. 322; Townsend v. Corning, 23 Wend. R. 439; S. C. 4 Hill’s R. 357; Com. Dig. Fait, C. 2, D. 2, l. n.; Abbot on Shipping, 163, part 3, ch. 1, § 2, old ed.; new ed. 244, part 4, ch. 1, § 1.)Third. The charter party, while it showed that the defendant, by the form of the instrument, its attestation and execution, was the party contracting personally, also showed his representative position, so that,1. The defendant covenanting personally for the Messrs. Stevenson, all acts in carrying out the adventure done to or by them, are, in judgment of law, done to or by the defendant as covenanting for their benefit; the averments, therefore, of the declaration are legally and substantially true.2. The defendant directed the plaintiff to obey the orders of Stevensons; consequently all acts in carrying out the charter, done to or by them, were for this reason also, in judgment of law, done to or by the defendant.
Fourth. The question, what the defendant said as to the effect of the deed which he was signing is clearly inadmissible, as an attempt to vary the effect of a deed by an oral qualification. (.Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. R. 338.)Fifth. Both parties to the deed were acting for absent persons ; the plaintiff engaged to go to Newbern before lie was to obtain any performance of the charter, any cargo or freight from the charterers; both parties, in fact, from the character of the covenants, must have relied on each other’s personal covenants.
p. 240Again, both parties having entered into a deed inter partes, and executed it in their own names, and not having executed it in the names of their principals, ought not to be allowed to withdraw from its well known and long established legal effect.D. D. Lord, Attorney of defendant in error.
D. Lord, of Counsel.
SüP* 19 J. 60 is overruled by 4 II., or if not is put upon the ground contract by public agents. (Delaware Canal v. Dubois, 4 W.; Story Ag. § 278.) Comments on these cases. Doubtful authority at best, though distinguishable.Decision.—Judgment affirmed. Unanimous.
Note.—It was held by the supreme court, Beardsley, J., delivering the opinion, that it was no answer to the cause of action to say, as the plea demurred to did, that the. Stevensons made and executed the said charter party by the defendant as their agent. The defendant being named in the covenant as the party of the second part, and having duly executed it, by affixing his own seal, he was personally bound, whatever his authority or his intention might have been.
As to the exceptions taken at the trial, they could not be sustained, because, in law, the charter party given in evidence was the defendant’s deed, and not that of the Stevensons. The Stevensons were not bound by it, but the defendant was.
JVoi reported, in this court.