p. 279erty which was bequeathed to the widow, and which the defendant, as executor, should obtain and distribute.
The defendant appealed to the chancellor, and on the 24th of April, 1846, the chancellor made a decree, by which the decree of the vice chancellor was reversed, and the complainants’ bill dismissed with costs.
From that decree the complainants appealed to this court.
Miller and Hogeboom, Attorneys and
Henry Hogeboom, Counsel for appellants.
First. The testator, Matthew Van Hoesen, not having disposed of his personal property, (except his farming utensils and stock on his farm,) by his last will and testament, the same passed by the laws of intestacy to his widow and next of kin. The female complainants being two of the six children of the’ testator, are, with their husbands, therefore entitled to their proper proportion thereof.The respondent, John M. Van Hoesen, being the sole surviving executor of said will, and having possessed himself of that property, and ,used and enjoyed it for his sole benefit, is answerable for it, and liable to account in this suit to the complainants for their proper proportion thereof. ( 1 Barb. 396 , opinion of chancellor; 6 Ves. 571; 19 id. 494 , general rules.)No residuary clause—and with exception of stock on farm, and interest of widow, no disposition of personal property—bill filed for account of personal distributive shares. Dorothy in the will means Mary. Bill of two, claims two-sixths, being two of six children—so V. C. decided—that chancellor reversed. Held, if on construction right, still only entitled to two-thirds of two-sixths, as one-third went to the widow—that we think was correct. And we only ask now a modification so as to give us two-thirds of two-sixths.Widow died in 1834—bill filed in 1839—Jane died in 1838 —five children then-left. Testator died Sept. 1817—widow proved will—also George and John—brother George died in 1822—bill against John, surviving executor.Defence, that personal estate should be applied to the pay
p. 280ment of the legacies—and no more than enough to pay—we say there would be a surplus.Another answer—that Mary, (Maria or Dorothy,) prior to her marriage, released her legacy, and all claim on the estate—and so she and her husband were barred—also that Adam Hager, after marriage, released all the right of his wife—bill charges releases void, except as to the legacies.Bill charges and answer admits only $700 paid, and so no consideration beyond legacy. ( 1 C. 121 ; 13 J. 87 .) Void, when without a seal. Then (2 R. S. 406, § 96) statute opens way to inquire into consideration—and want of consideration makes void. One dollar mentioned in release merely nominal. ( 9 Mass. 235 ; 4 B. and P. 113.)Suppressio veri—parties ignorant of their rights—defendant, cestui que trust, should have informed them—show all knowledge they had of facts—{p. 35)—will read to family —36-7, what defendant knew—release of Hager, given before death of widow, and don’t cover subsequently acquired interest.(Clancy H. and W. 3-10; 9 P. 283 .) Husband could not then reduce to possession. '=y5gjfjSecond. The legacies to the children," Lambert, Dorothy, Hannah and Jane, were not payable out of the personal estate, but by the devisees, John and George. They are not payable by the executors, but by the devisees personally, and evidently on account of the devise of the real estate.Although the personal estate is generally the primary fund for the payment of legacies, as well as of debts, yet if there be an express direction, that they be otherwise paid, or' if from the scope and tenor of the will the testator’s intent may be fairly inferred to be otherwise, then such intent will prevail, and the testator’s personal estate be exonerated.Again, assuming that the legacies are to be paid out of the personal property, the chancellor, instead of dismissing the bill, should have directed an account of the personal property to be taken, to ascertain whether the debts and legacies would exhaust it. (Kelsey v. Deyo, 3 Cow. Rep. 133 ,141; Harris v. Fly, 7 Paige, 421, 425; Burton v. Knowlton, 3 Ves. 106, 113;
p. 281Watson v. Buckwood, 9 Ves. 456; Webb v. Jones, 2 Br. Ch. Cas. 60; 18 W. 200 .)Third. The release of Hoes’s wife, before her marriage, and that of Hager after his marriage, discharged nothing but the $700 legacies.The $700 was all that was received, and the releases should therefore be limited to that sum. They were intended to cover nothing more, and it would, therefore be inequitable and unjust to give them ajnore comprehensive operation. If Van Hoesen designed to embrace in them something more, it was an unconscientious and fraudulent act on his part, which should not be permitted to prevail.The release of Hager was inoperative and void as to any thing beyond the $700, as he could not discharge any thing belonging to his wife, beyond a vested interest in possession. This was not such an interest. (Jackson v. Stackhouse, 1 Cow. 126 ; McIntyre v. Clark, 1 Edw. Ch. Rep. 34 ; Cole v. Knight, 3 Mod. 277; 1 Show. 150, S. C.; 2 Saund. Plead, and Ev. 320; Ramsdell v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sen. 310; Salkeld v. Vernon, 1 Eden's Rep. 64; Jarvis v. Drake, 1 Vern. 19; Gee v. Spencer, 1 Vern. 32.)Reply. ( 6 C. 333 ; 1 Roper Leg. 485-40, 41; I. 38, 39; 1 Roper, 166-7; 4 Mad. 148. “ügjjHogeboom & Miller, Solicitors.H. Hogeboom, of Counsel for Appellants.
Edward Clark, Attorney, and
Ambrose L. Jordan, Counsel for respondent.
First. The releases from the appellants to the respondent, set forth in the answer, were obtained by the respondent in good faith, and are a bar to the complainants’ recovery.Second. The legacies were not expressly charged on the real, in exoneration of the personal estate, nor can any plain intent to that effect be gathered from the terms of the will. The personal property, therefore, was the primary fund for the payment of the legacies, and was rightfully appropriated by the executors (after obtaining the widow’s consent) to that use.
p. 282(Ancaster v. Mayer and others, 1 Bro. C. 460, 463; Watson v. Buckwood, 9 Ves. 448; Tait v. Lord Northwick, 4 Ves. 816; Livingston v. Newkirk, 3 Johns. Ch. 319 ; 2 Atkyns, 434; 3 P. Wms. 364; Kelsey v. Deyoe, 3 Cow. 133 ; Tole v. Hardy, 6 Cow. 333 ; 8 Conn. 5 ; 5 Conn. 536 ; 6 Rand. 587 .)Third. The decree of the chancellor should be affirmed, with costs.A. L. Jordan, of Coúnselfor respondent.Personal estate, besides farming utensils, &c., given to two sons, about $4,300.Testator made no provision for payment of legacies. Widow lived seventeen years—and she ha^ whole estate—sons had no property, so far as appears—family congress—mother agreed to give up her right. Defendant paid her a consideration-agreed to support her for life. Daughters agreed to take their legacies out of the personal property. Defendant supported his mother—paid doctor’s bills, &c. Releases good answer— and clearly, personal property was the primary fund.Decision.—Decree affirmed. Unanimous.
Jewett, Ch. J., delivered the opiniop of the court.
Note. Held, that the personal estate of the testator is deemed the natural and primary fund to be first applied in discharge of his personal debts and general legacies, and the testator is presumed to act upon this legal doctrine, until he shows some other distinct and unequivocal intention.
It seems from the will, that it was the intention of the testator that the devise and bequest to the two sons, with directions to them to pay, should be in aid of the reversionary interest in the personal estate undisposed of by the will, and that that interest should be the primary fund for the payment of the legacies.
The mere making a provision for the payment of debts or legacies out of the real estate does not discharge the personalty. There must be an intention not only to charge the realty, but to exonerate the personalty.
The decree affirmed upon this point alone.
Reported, 1 Comstock, 120.