Danks v. Quackenbush

Headnote

Questions discussed.

1. Whether the statute (Sees. L. 1842,p. 193) extending the exemption of property from execution, applies to debts arising on pre-existing contracts ?

2. Whether that act, under a retrospective construction, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States?

This was an action of replevin brought in the Onondaga common pleas, in 1843, by Banks against Quackenbush for taking one yellow gelding horse and one two-horse harness— goods and chattels which the plaintiff owned and was in possession of. The defendant pleaded the general issue.

The cause was tried at the May term, 1843.

The counsel for the defendant admitted the taking of the property declared for by the said plaintiff; and thereupon the said plaintiff rested.

The counsel for the defendant then' gave in evidence a judgment in the supreme court, which, from the record, appeared to have arisen upon contract, in which Thomas B. Fitch was plaintiff, and Melancthon W. Banks was defendant, for $83.85 : docketed January 6, 1837; and an alias execution issued upon said judgment, which was received by the sheriff of Onondaga Co., January 25, 1843. By virtue of which execution, it was admitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that the property was taken; and it was also admitted that the defendant was a deputy of the sheriff of the county of Onondaga, in which county the said Banks resided and the said property was taken.

It was thereupon proved by the counsel on the part of the plaintiff that the plaintiff was a householder, and had no more

property than would be exempt from execution by statute of 1842, except one horse, which tyas the property for the taking of which the suit was brought, and which was proved to be worth about sixty dollars—that he drove another horse with this one, but which horse belonged to another person—that he worked by the day to support his family, and used the said team of horses. There was some testimony offered in behalf of the defence which tended to prove the same point.

After the testimony was closed, the counsel for the defendant then asked the court to charge the jury that: The property declared for by the said plaintiff was not exempt by statute from levy and sale under the above execution; and stated as a reason for this, that the demand on which the judgment, by virtue of which this property was taken, was one arising on contract 5 and arose and became due, and judgment rendered thereon, before the passage of the “ act extending the exemption of certain property from distress for rent or sale under executionand that the said act did not apply to such contracts and demands; and also, that said act was in violation of the constitution of the United States.'

The said court refused so to charge the jury, but charged— that if they found the said team necessary for the support of his family, that then it would be exempt from levy and sale under execution, by virtue of said act of 1842.

To which charge, and to such refusal to charge as above requested, the counsel for the said defendant did then and there except.

The jury found a verdict for plaintiff, and assessed the value of the goods and chattels specified in the plaintiff’s declaration to $65. Judgment was docketed June lj, 1843.

The defendant brought error, and removed the judgment into the supreme court. In May term, 1845, the supreme court reversed the judgment, of the common pleas, Bronson, Ch. J., delivering the opinion of the court; and held, that so long as the case of McCracken v. Hayward (2 Howard’s U. S. Reports, 608) stood as the law, the exemption law of 1842, when applied to past transactions, could not be supported. In that

respect it was in violation of that provision of the constitution of the United States which prohibits the state legislatures from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

Whether the exemption law of 1842 applies to executions for debts which were contracted before the law was passed— Quere. Reported 1 Denio, 128 .

Banks, the plaintiff, brought error and removed the judgment of the supreme court into this court.