Alston v. Mechanics' Mutual Insurance

Headnote

A plaintiff may amend Ms process and declaration by changing the form of action, from covenant to assumpsit, upon payment of costs of opposing motion only, where it appears the defendants did not raise the objection until the cause had been through a long course of litigation, and the defendants in the first place erroneously issued the instrument declared on, by not affixing their seal. The terms, in these amendments, are always discretionary with the court—each case depending upon its circumstances.

Motion by plaintiff for leave to amend the summons and declaration in this cause, by converting them in to a summons and declaration in as

sumpsit, upon the same policy of insurance declared on in this cause. —On the part of plaintiff, it appears this was an action brought upon a policy of insurance, as an instrument under seal; the same being issued by the defendants, and delivered to the plaintiff as a sealed instrument. The action was commenced in January, 1839; the defendants pleaded the 26th February, 1839; issue being joined, the cause was noticed for trial 1st March, 1839, for the circuit held on the 3d Monday of said March. The circuit judge, at said circuit, on motion of plaintiff, made an order to refer said cause, which was opposed by defendants; but reserving to said defendants the right to apply to this court to vacate such order of reference. In June, 1839, the defendants moved to vacate said order of reference, which was denied by this court; the circuit judge subsequently appointed referees in the cause. The cause was tried before said referees on the 15th November, 1839. The referees reported specially in favor of the defendants, and in their report stated: “ The plaintiff produced in evidence, a policy of insurance, under the seal of the defendants, which was admitted by the defendants’ counsel to be their deed, and was read in evidence on the part of the plaintiff.” Which said policy so referred to, is the same policy upon which this suit is brought. Upon said special report of the referees, the motion to set aside their report in favor of the defendants, was argued in this court and denied. Said decision appears in 1st vol. of Hill, 510, and turned entirely upon the questions raised and argued upon the reference. The cause was subsequently carried by the plaintiff to the court of errors, where the previous decision of this court, and the finding of the referees in favor of the defendants were set aside and reversed. The cause came on again for a hearing before the referees, on the 21st April, 1843. On said hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney produced and offered in evidence the aforesaid original policy of insurance; whereupon the execution of the said policy was again admitted by the attorney and counsel for the defendants, without reservation or qualification; and the same read in evidence as the deed of defendants, without objection, and without any other proof than the admission aforesaid. Plaintiff closed his evidence and rested his cause on the said 21st of April, 1843. The defendants opened on the part of the defence, and introduced evidence, when the further hearing was adjourned from time to time, until the 6th of May, 1843; on which day, the defendants’ counsel, for the first time, insisted that the said policy was not under seal; and upon that ground, with others, argued to the referees that said plaintiff could not maintain his

action—the evidence was closed on said 6th May, 1843. The referees reported in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants moved this court to set aside said report, which was granted, entirely on the ground that said policy was not under seal. On the part of the defendants, it appears, that the plaintiff commenced this suit by original writ or summons in covenant. Defendants pleaded to the declaration, that the policy of insurance upon which this suit was brought, was not the deed of the defendants. The defendants allege that said policy of insurance was obtained from defendants by a false and fraudulent representation, as to the manner in which the plaintiff would use and keep the basement of the house, upon which said policy was effected. The defendants’ attorney on first hearing, mainly relied upon the defence arising upon the merits out of such false representations, and principally directed his attention to that point in preparing for the trial; and upon this point, this court refused to set aside the report of the referees; which decision and the report of the referees, was subsequently reversed and set aside by the court of errors. On the second hearing, defendants state, that their attorney and counsel did not admit that the said policy was the deed of the defendants, but on the contrary, before the testimony in said cause was closed, and before the summing up of the same, both the attorney and counsel for defendants, distinctly stated and claimed before said referees, that under the aforesaid plea they should claim that said policy was not their deed, as the defendants had pleaded. The defendants insist the plaintiff’s claim is unjust and unconscionable, and if allowed to mend his process and pleadings in this cause, will avail himself of a technical rule of law, as established by the court of errors, to recover a loss, which in the judgment of said referees and of this court, has been occasioned by a breach of good faith. The plaintiff, on 6th May, 1843, if not before, discovered his error; this was before the trial was closed, and he should then have applied for leave to amend. But having chose to go on and run the risk of the legal question raised, he can not now call it a mere inadvertence or mistake. It was a question upon which he took issue with the defendants, and he should not now be permitted to shift the responsibility of the result. Defendants cited the following cases in support of their position: 13 J. R., 127, Lynch vs. Mechanics’ Bank; 5 Wend., 74 ; 1 Chitty’s Pleadings, 284; 5 J. R. 402; 24 Com. Law R., 75, Green et. al. vs. Milton; 4 Barn, fy Adol. 369; 6 Taunton, 483; 6 Cow., 668 ; 6 Wend., Miller vs. Watson; 20 Wend., Flowers, Executors, 8fc., vs. Garr. The plaintiff insists the rule

to be well established that amendments will in all cases be allowed to promote equity between the parties; and where the matter really in controversy between the parties has been fully tried upon the merits, the court uniformly disregard objections not going to the merits, and allow amendments without costs. That in this case the merits have been tried, and found by the referees in favor of the plaintiff. He should be permitted to amend without costs, to avoid the formal objection taken by the defendants. The error in the form of action originated in a mistake which was occasioned by the fault of the defendants, and which they have, by their affidavits and admissions on the trial, and uniform conduct during a six years’ litigation, induced the plaintiff to overlook; and after having been fairly beaten upon the merits, they now seek, by a resort to this formal objection, to charge the plaintiff with the costs which they have occasioned. Plaintiff cited the following cases : 2 R. S., 2d ed., 343, 344; Aylwin vs. Todd, 27 Com. Law ; Billing vs. Flight, 6 Taunton, 419; Billing vs. Pooley, 6 Taunton, 422 ; Avery vs. Merwin, 6 Cow. 366 ; Burlingame vs. Burlingame, 7 Cow. 92 ; Daley vs. Atwood, 7 Cow 483 ; Borst vs. Griffin, 9 Wend. 309 — 311; Carpenter vs. Payne, 10 Wend. 604 ; Oothout vs. Ledings, 15 Wend. 410 ; Weed vs. S. Sr S. RR. Co., 19 Wend. 541 — 542; Ryers vs. Wheeler, 22 Wend. 148 ; Gillet vs. Stanley, 1 Hill, 121 ; East Boston Timber Company vs. Perry, 2 Hill, 126 .