Majority
Headnote
The 183d section of the Code provides that the order of arrest “ may be made to accompany the summons, or at any time before judgment,”I think the affidavits contained facts sufficient to authorize the order. (See 6 Abbott, 315.) The important question to be determined is, whether the judgment estopped the plaintiff from procuring such order ? The language of the Code is, that the order of arrest “ may be made to accompany the summons, or at any time before judgment.” (Code, § 183.)
I am of the opinion a judgment in an action must be final to estop the plaintiffs from procuring an order for the arrest of the defendant, in other words, it must be absolute and not conditional. The j udgment in this action was final when entered, but its character was changed, upon the motion of the very defendant who now sets it up as an estoppel, from that of a final judgment to a mere security for his alleged indebtedness to the plaintiff; and should he be beaten upon the issues
Garret S. Mott is defending the action as fully and as perfectly as he could have defended it if no judgment had been entered therein. And I think the judgment against him should be deemed vacated or set aside, so far as it affected the right to obtain the order of arrest which was granted subsequent to the time its character was changed.
If Garret S. Mott should now give bail, the undertaking of his sureties would not be conditioned that he should render himself amenable to such process as may be issued to enforce that judgment, but to such only as may be issued to enforce the judgment therein if one should be recovered by the plaintiff. (See Code, § 187.) In other words, his sureties would not be bound to surrender him upon any execution that may be issued on the judgment already entered, or upon any order that may be granted for its enforcement.
My conclusion is that the motion to vacate the order of the 8th of December, on which Garret S. Mott has been arrested, should be denied with $10 costs.
. Decision accordingly.