Majority
Headnote
Assessors have jurisdiction and may legally assess “all lands wider water,” reserved to the owner in leases, (Van Rensselaer’s Manor,) situated within their respective towns.I think the only facts necessary to the jurisdiction of the assessors are, in reference to real estate, that it be situated in the town or ward, and in reference to personal property, that the owner be an inhabitant of the town or ward. If the assessors should assume to assess lands lying in another town or ward, or to assess an inhabitant of another town for personal property, though it might be situated in their town, the act of the assessors would unquestionably be void for want of jurisdiction. In this case, the lands assessed were situated within the town of Sandlake. The assessors, there
In the grants of land in the manor of Bensselaerwyck, among other reservations, the original proprietor, as is well known, reserved to himself “ all lands under water P These lands the assessors have, in the case before us, sought to subject to taxation. Whether they acted judiciously in doing so, is not a question involved in this decision. It is enough to justify the defendant, if we find that they did not transcend their jurisdiction.
The principal ground upon which the validity of the assessment is in this instance sought to be impeached is, that it appears upon the face of the assessment itself, that some of the lands, assessed were in fact occupied by other persons. I am inclined to think that this objection is not well taken in point of fact. The assessments are of “ lands under waterP In a majority of instances,, the location of such land is merely given, but in other instances it is described as land under water, occupied by some other person, whose name is given, for a saw null or grist mill, or some other kind of machinery. I think it quite obvious that it was the intention of the assessors to distinguish between the land under water and the water itself, and when they speak of land under water occupied or used (as it is sometimes expressed in the assessment roll,) as a a mill privilege, it is merely intended to refer to- the occupation or use of the water, as a mode- of describing the land. It is to be kept in mind that the propriety of assessing a mill to its occupant and the land flowed by the dam of the mill to another person, as its owner, is not in question. The sole inquiry is, whether the assessors exceeded their jurisdiction.
But let it be assumed that the fair import of the terms used in the as
The only objection taken to the form of the assessment is that, in some instances, the lands are not sufficiently described. Whether they are or not, I am unable to say; but if it were conceded that the description of some of the lands was imperfect, it is a matter with which the plaintiff has nothing to do. The only object of a minute description of the lands is to secure the collection of the tax by recourse to the land in case it should not otherwise be collected. If this should fail through defectiveness of the description, it might enure to the advantage of the owner, but could not work bis injury.
The judge at the circuit held that the warrant alone was a sufficient protection to the defendant. In this I think he was right; but concede that he was wrong in holding that the warrant and assessment roll were to be considered as distinct instruments, having no dependence on each other further than to ascertain the amount of the tax and the names of the persons assessed. This would not entitle the plaintiff to a new trial. There was no question of fact to be decided. The charge, taking it most unfavorably to the plaintiff, amounted to nothing more than directing a verdict for the defendant, and to this he was entitled. The assessment roll, as well as the warrant, were legal. Whether, therefore, they are to be considered, as together constituting the process, under which the defendant acted, or whether the warrant alone constituted such process, is wholly immaterial. In either case the process was valid, and the defence was sustained.
The motion for a new trial must, therefore, be denied.