Gillilan v. Spratt

This action was brought to recover the sum of $900, being rent of premises No. 100, Liberty street, for the months of April, May and June, 1868.

By an indenture of lease between the parties, dated’ March 6, 1867, the premises in question were demised to the defendant by the plaintiff for the term of one year from' May 1, 1867, at the yearly rent of $3,600, payable monthly on the first day of each succeeding month. The lease, among others, contained the following covenant, that in case the building was required to be removed in consequence of the extension of Church street, then from the time said building was ordered to be removed by the city

The learned judge, before whom this action was tried, found as questions of fact, in addition to the summary proceedings above stated, the making, delivery and acceptance ■of said lease, the occupation of the premises therein described by the defendant, from May 1, 1867, to May 1, 1868, the continuance of such occupancy by him through the months of May and June, and until after the 1st of July, 1868, and that the value of the use of said premises from May 1, 1868, to July 1, 1868, was $600, which added to the rent for the month of April 1S6S, is $900, and that .the interest on said several sums up to the day of trial was $58 95, making in all $958 95, no portion of which had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. He also found as conclusions of law, that the action of said .Justice Quinn, in said summary proceedings, was an adjudication, and judgment in favor of the tenant therein, .(the defendant in this action,) and was final and conclusive ■between the parties as to the subject-matter of said action, and was a bar to the plaintiff’s alleged right to recover rent

It was held by the general term of this court, in December, 1869, in Detmold agt. Drake, et al., (a case similar to the one at bar,) that until the opening of the street, the land appropriated therefor by the public authorities, cannot be employed by them for any other purpose than that contemplated and established by the report of the commissioners. In the meantime, from the date of the confirmation of said report until such opening is actually commenced, the owner of the building, (unless required to remove it,) can retain possession of it, and is entitled to all the benefits of such possession.

The parties hereto evidently contemplated such a contingency in relation to the premises in question, and provided in the lease thereof, that the same should become null and void, from the time the building was ordered to be removed by the city authorities.

There is no evidence before us that any order for such a removal was ever given, and it is fair to conclude that the defendant was not disturbed in his possession during the; continuance of said lease. Besides, it appears aErmatively from the findings of the jury at the trial, that the defendant continued in the occupation of the premises until after July 1, 1868, and that the value of the unpaid rent therefor, up to that time, was $900. It is not pretended that any claim for said rent has been made by any one, except the plaintiff, and I think, his right thereto unquestioned, unless the summary proceedings hereinbefore mentioned, constitute a bar to its recovery.

The proceedings referred to were taken May 2,1868, and after said lease had expired by its own limitation, to dispossess the defendant herein as the tenant of said premises, for holding over after the expiration of the term without permission of the landlord. The defendant, by his counter-

The question of rent was not raised., or at issue, upon the trial and consequently could hot have been' submitted to the justice for adjudication, The justice did not decide the ■case as submitted, but on application of the relator discontinued the proceedings.

We are asked to hold such action on his part to be a final and conclusive judgment in favor of the defendant. But what is the nature and effect of such an adjudication?

Is it thereby only established that defendant did not hold -over after expiration of his term, and without permission? i-Or are all the averments in defendant’s counter-affidavit, of which proof was offered on the trial, to be deemed res adjudicata? This would compel us to hold that the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of said premises after the ■order confirming the report of the commissioners of estim.ate and assessment was made, when, as we have already ■seen in the case of Detmold agt. Drake, a directly opposite theory was maintained by the general term of this Court,

The cases cited to sustain the position of the respondent (Hess agt. Beekman, 11 Johns., 457 ; Elwell agt. McQueen, 10 Wend., 521 ; Peters agt Diossy, 3 E. D. Smith, 115 ; White agt. Coatsworth, 2 Seld., 137; Demarest agt. Darg, 32 N. Y., 284 ), all proceed upon the theory that the judicial mind had acted upon* the merits of the case as submitted, and giving expression to such action by a judgment or final determination. The defendant in Hess agt. JBeekman “ suffered judgment to be entered against himself for costs.” In Elwell agt. McQueen the court say, “ although he (the justice) may call his judgment a nonsuit, and enter it accordingly, if the record or minutes of the trial show it was rendered after the cause was submitted to him, and after he

It might be claimed that as the justice had no authority t’o discontinue said summary proceedings, that the same are still under advisement by him, and his decision thereon might be enforced. Whether this view be correct or not, it is evident that said justice, by allowing such discontinu■ance, plainly indicated that he had not passed upon the merits of the case, but intended to leave the parties in the •same position as if no such proceeding had been instituted. To construe such action on his part as a final determination is to compel him, by implication, to do that which he never intended, but expressly disavowed. Nor are we to presume -that the justice would have decided contrary to law, and as the whole case turned upon the question of ownership, as ■decided by this court in the case of Detmold agt. Drake, ■above referred to, it is fair to assume that if the justice had finally determined the matter, such determination would have been in accordance with the law as thus established. No review could have been had ona discontinuance of said proceedings, and if said action be regarded as final, the party concluded thereby is without remedy.

In the case before us, the question of rent was not raised or litigated, and as it appears that no final adjudication was intended, it would be a severe application of the rule, where the occupation of the premises and the value thereof, are ■conceded, to deny a recovery on the ground of a former •adjudicationJn which the same merits were not involved, and especially when it appears that the greater • portion of said rent was for a period of time after the expiration of The lease, and was claimed solely on the ground of the use •and occupation by the defendant of the premises in question.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a -new trial granted.

I concur that neither the summary proceed" ings to recover possession of the demised premises, by reason of the expiration of the defendant’s term, nor the action of the justice in discontinuing the same, should be held a bar to plaintiff’s right of recovery in this action, which was for rent and damages for use and occupation, and I therefore agree that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

I am of the opinion that the learned judge, before whom this cause was tried, erred in regarding the summary proceedings between the landlord and tenant, had before Justice Quinn, of any force or effect upon the rights of the parties, as presented upon the pleadings and evidence.

, In those proceedings, instituted by the present plaintiff, for the purpose of dispossessing the defendant as his tenant, for holding over after expiration of the term, without his permission, the defendant denied the tenancy, or that he so held over after expiration of his term, and while admitting the original letting, set up that the plaintiff’s title had ceased and become vested in the corporation of the city of New York.

The issue thus joined, came on for trial before the justice, and after the testimony was closed, the case was submitted to him for adjudication and decision, on the 9th of May, 1869, but before he had rendered any decision, and on the 19th day of May 1869, on motion of the landlord, (the plaintiff in this action,) and without notice to the other party (defendant.,) the justice discontinued the proceedings.

Upon these facts the judge, who tried this cause, held that such action of the justice was in law an adjudication, and a judgment in favor of the defendant, which was final and conclusive between the parties, as to the subject matter, and a bar to plaintiff’s right of recovery of rent accruing under the lease for the last month, or damages for the subsequent use and occupation of the premises, and has thus

In the accompaning opinion, the decision is predicated upon certain dicta of the courts as to the effect of nonsuits, discontinuances or withdrawals of actions, pending before justices of the peace, in cases tried and submitted to them upon the merits, within the time prescribed by statute for decision. The cases of Hess agt. Beekman, ( 11 Johns. 457 ;) Elwell agt. McQueen, ( 10 Wend., 521 ;) Peters agt. Diossy, (3 E. D. Smith, 115;) Demarest agt. Darg, ( 32 N. Y., 284 ;) and White agt. Coatsworth, (2 Seld., 137;) are referred to in this view of the case, and in support of the judgment.

The principle to be deduced from these cases (so far as it affects the question of res adjudicata,) seems to have originated in Hess agt. Beekman, and to have been founded on a strict construction of the provisions of the statute relating to courts held by justices of the peace, (1 R. S., 388, § 2,) which required the justice, after having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, within four days thereafter to give judgment thereon agreeable to law and equity, with costs of suit. In that case, the cause had been so tried and submitted, but within four days, the plaintiff withdrew his suit and suffered judgment to be entered against him “ with costs,” and the court held, on a new action for the same cause, that “ the statute was imperative ; that after hearing and examining the proofs and allegations of the parties, the justice within four days, shall give judgment thereon”; that “ the parties, are not in court for any purpose, but to receive judgment,” and that the maxim unemo bis debet vexaripro eadem causa” was applicable. The judgment was held a bar to a new action for the same cause, and the court say, “the merits were fairly entered into and investigated and submitted to the justice. It best comports with the

The authority of this case, as a rule, governing proceedings in courts of justices of the peace has been followed or recognized in the other cases above cited, and its manifest spirit and intent is to discourage renewed litigation in such petty courts and to save parties from being harrassed about such small matters as were there cognizable, Where the costs to be awarded, were so trivial, and inadequate an indemnity, •for the trouble and expense of a second defense.

The consequences of such an adj udication, as to the withdrawal or discontinuance of such a suit within the four days allowed for decision, are inconsiderable, while its application is confined to the particular claim in suit, and merely results in preventing a second action from being brought for the same cause, but its inconvenience, if not injustice, will become apparent when in litigations between the parties on other claims, such a fiction of the law is to be assumed (contrary to the truth,) as an actual decision by the justice upon the merits, and the principle of res adjudícala deduced' from it, held as decisive in other controversies that may arise between them, upon all questions of fact and of law, involved in the original action. The proceedings in question were merely discontinued; and were such that the justice'' could not render therein any formal judgment of “ discontinuance.” He, in fact, made no decision or final determination from which an appeal could have been taken by either party; yet, if his mere allowance of a withdrawal of the proceeding is to be held a judgment in law adverse to the landlord, it cannot be limited as an adjudication upon any particular issue, but must be regarded as determining all such as were necessary to uphold the j udgment or were within the issues joined or tendered. Its application to the facts and circumstances of the present case, demonstrates the extent to which such a departure from the rule of • the common law may work injustice. Here the landlord, in

Such a defense has been held by this court in Detmold agt. Drake and another as unavailable to the tenant until the corporation has taken possession, and the same doctrine is maintained by the superior court, in Strang agt. N. Y. Rubber Co., ( 1 Sweeny, 78 ,) but the construction given to this result or discontinuance of the summary proceedings, as determinative of the question at issue, renders it, however erroneous, conclusive as to all matters ot fact or of law that were, or ought to have been proved or presented, by way of answer, to the defense, thus assumed to have been successful. (2 Smith Lead. Cas, by Hare and Wal., 6 Am. Ed., 809, 810.) I am of the opinion that such application of the decision in Hess agt. Beekman, and those recognizing it, cannot be held decisive or as affecting this case.

Upon such discontinuance, the only remaining right of the defendant is to be paid his costs, and, if the plaintiff neglects to do so, then the defendant may go on with the suit, and proceed to judgment for their recovery. (James agt. Delevan, 7 Wend., 511 ; Huntington agt. Forkson, 7 Hill, 197 ; Hicks agt. Brennan, 10 Abb., 304 ; Averill agt. Patterson, 10 N. Y., 502 .)

A justice of the peace, however, was authorized, by the twenty-five dollar act, (1 R. S., 393,) in case the plaintiff was nonsuited, or discontinued or withdrew his action without defendant’s consent, to award judgment for costs, against him, and so also by the $50 act of 1824, ch. 238, § 14, and by 2 R. S., 246, § 119. But the justice loses jurisdiction, and the action becomes discontinued, if he adjourns the cause or defers action in any other manner, than such as is specially pointed out by the statute regulating his proceedings. (Kimball agt. Mack, 10 Wend., 497 ; Thompson agt. Sayre, 1 Den.,175 ; Wilcox agt. Clement, 4 Den., 160 ; Weeks agt. Lyon, 18 Barb., 538 ; Aberhall agt. Roach, 11 How., 95 ; Wright agt. McClave, 3 E. D. Smith, 316.) So to, if he fails to render judgment “ forthwith,” on the day of trial in case of nonsuit, discontinuance, withdrawal and confession,. and on the rendering of the verdict of a jury, (Sibley agt. Howard, 3 Den., 72 ; Beattie agt. Qua, 15 Barb., 132 ,) and in all other cases within four days after the case is submitted to him for final decision. (Watson agt. Davis, 19 Wend., 371 ; Young agt. Rummell, 5 Hill; 60, S. C., 7 Hill., 503 ; Bissell agt. Bissell, 11 Barb., 96 ; Wiseman agt. Panama R. R. Co., 1 Hilt. 300 ; Bloomer agt. Merrill, 1 Daly, 485 ,) or where he has held the case open for twenty-four hours, to enable a party to procure his witnesses, (Green agt. Angel, 13 Johns., 469 ,) so by failure of the plaintiff, to appeal

The justice before whom the summary proceedings in question were instituted was, by the act of 1857, chap., 344, § 47, allowed in actions pending before him, eight days after the trial of the action to render his decision; but neither that act nor any of the provisions relating to actions before justices of the peace, have any reference to the special proceedings, instituted by landlords to recover possession of lands.

In the statute relating thereto, (2 R. S., 512, &c., as amended by the acts of 1849, chap. 193, of 1851, chap., 460, and of 1857, chap. 684, 3 R. S., 5th ed., 835,) the magistrate before whom it is pending, (by 3 R. S., 515, § 41,) is authorized “upon request of either party, to adjourn the hearing of such application for the purpose of enabling ■such party to procure his witnesses, whenever it shall appear to be necessary, such adjournment shall in no case -exceed ten days.” And he also is allowed, under certain ■circumstances, to stay the issue of the warrant of removal for ten days, (3 R. S., 5th ed. 831, § 44.)

Previous to the enactment of the 41st section, above quoted, it had been decided, in Nichols agt. Williams, ( 8 Cow., 13 ,) that under the statute giving summary means to-landlords to oust tenants wrongfully holding over. (Laws of 1820, chap. 194, substantialy re-enacted in 2 R. S., 513, &c.,) the judge or justice before whom the proceeding

No time, however is, in express terms, prescribed or allowed by statute to the magistrate, beyond the day of trial, within which he shall render his decision. None of the various magistrates, (2 R. S., 513, § 28,) before whom» the proceeding can be had, (except justices of the peace, by the act of 1849, chap. 193, § 6,) are required to make entry of their decision and, although the statute contemplates, some time to ensue between the decision and the issuing of the warrant, unless the very day of the trial be regarded as the day for such decision there is no certain mode for calculating the- period of ten days, allowed for a stay of the warrant by the act of 1857, chap. 684, § 4, (Watson agt. Davis, 19 Wend., 37 .) The magistrate is not-authorized as in the justice’s court act, to render judgment of “non-suit, discontinuance or withdrawal of plaintiff’s action.” (2 R. S., 246, § 19, sub., 1.) Although for defect in the landlord’s-application or proofs, he may undoubtedly dismiss the proceedings. If, upon the merits, his decision is favorable to the landlord, he is required to issue his warrant of removal. The proceedings before him are made by statute “ summary,” and present the sole question whether or not the tenant shall V forthwith” remove from the premises. (21 R. S., 513, § 30.) The provisions authorizing an adjournment or postponement, for periods not exceeding ten days-in each of the cases referred to, are specific, and under the ordinary rules of construction, the maxim, u expressio uniusestexclusio alterius,” is applicable and having regard to the character of the proceeding, a further oV ocher postponement or adjournment would seem to have been contrary to-the contemplation of the legislature.

Courts of special and limited jurisdiction take nothing by

2d. There was in this proceeding, no such Procrustean rule, as in Hess agt. Beekman, impounding the parties for u four days,” or any other specified period, nor can the allowance, by the magistrate, of its discontinuance, on mention of the plaintiff, on the tenth day after submission bé) by any reasonable fiction of law, held to be a decision in favor of the tenant, that a warrant ought not to have issued) for the reason stated in the tenant’s affidavit, or as determining on the merits the questions presented on that hearing.

There is no principle of statute or common law (except so far as it has found countenance in the before-mentioned strict construction of the justice’s court act) which prevents the plaintiff or prosecutor, in any civil suit or proceeding instituted by him, from withdrawing or discontinuing it, prior to any decision rendered against him.

Whether such action or proceeding be at law or in equity in bankruptcy, insolvency, in proceedings for the opening of streets, or other statutory proceedings, or in arbitration, &c., until some adverse right has been legally decided and established against him, he has always been held as possessing a ulocus ¡pcenitentice,” and entitled to abandon or withdraw the prosecution of his claim, whether it was subjudice, as question of fact, before a jury, or under advisement be

The peculiar rights of a defendant who has set up a counter-claim, to insist upon a continuance of the action, forms no exception. The rule of the supreme court, No. 47, adopted 1845 (now No. 32), prohibiting the plaintiff from submitting to a nonsuit, after the jury has gone from the bar to consider their verdict, is but one of practice, and certainly would not, under the rule of construction contended for, give a like effect to any discontinuance allowed, while the jury were deliberating and .in contravention of the rule, as to a verdict.

The principles announced in Hess agt. Beekman, made applicable to proceedings in justice’s courts, ought not to be extended and, in the present case, they were misapplied.

The proceeding before Justice Quinn could, in no sense, be held or regarded as decisive of the rights of the plaintiff, as landlord of the defendant, or his claims as stated in the complaint. The matters set up in the answer showing no eviction or attornment, presented no substantial defense, and the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered with costs to abide’the event.