Majority
Headnote
If a creditor of^his*1 debtor a°}trTfacial and suffer them sftc'rwsvds to remain in the the^ebtor, the beseemed*1 fraudulent and a01 subsequent she5ff°sd?ed goods on an favour of A., reetion hlS de" lay,ed, f lale’ in the posses-debtor* more when a second execution, in coming to his riff dsoide Sthé goods on both executions,but refused to pay A^andreturned nulla bona to the execution. In an false1 return, iainfuiieshcriff, it was held execution was must Te’ postponed to the second, and that no action against the sheriff for a false vetunuThis case comes within the principle laid down and recognised by this court, in the case of Whipple v. Foot, ( 2 Johns. Rep. 422 .) that if a creditor seize the goods of his debtor, on an execution, and suffer them to remain in his hands, the execution is deemed fraudulent and void, as against a subsequent execution. This rule has been long established in the English courts,[2] and is founded upon reasons best calculated to prevent fraud.
So far as the facts disclosed at the trial were proper to be ' submitted to a jury, they must be understood to have been found b.y them. That the property was left in the possession of
Whether the sheriff is chargeable or not with neglect of duty, depends upon the fact, whether his conduct was known or approved of by the assignees of the judgment* and whether they knew in what manner the levy had been made, may be questionable* but that they did know that the property was left in the possession of Hilton, cannot admit of a doubt. No actual fraud was intended by them. They undoubtedly supposed they could postpone proceedings under their execution, until pressed on by younger ones, and still retain their priority. Motives of humanity might have influenced them to this indulgence ; still, it was not warranted by the sound and salutary principles of the common law. The case of Levy v. Wallis, ( 4 Dall. 167 .) decided in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, which has been referred to, admits the English rule to be, as understood and recognised by this court; but, it is said, that sentiments of humanity, and the peculiar necessities of the country, has induced the court in Pennsylvania, to depart from it. In that state, however, the soundness of their own rule has been questioned, and much shaken in later cases. (See 4 Dall. 168 . note (1).) The motion on the part of the defendant must be -denied.
Motion denied,[2]
(a) (a) See Beals v. Guernsey, ( 8 Johns. Rep. 432 .) Barrow v. Paxton, ( 5 Johns. Rep. 258 .) Prec, in Chanc. 285. Cowp. 432. 2 Bos, & Pull. 59. 1 Count, Rep. 381, 1 Pow, on Wort. 29. (4th edit.)
Footnotes
- (a) (a) 1 Wils. 44. Salk. 720, 721. 1 Ld. Raym. 251. 5 Mod. 377. 7 Mod. 37. 2 Term Rep. 287. 596. 1 Tidd’s Prac. 919, 920. 1 Esp. Rep. 205. 1 Gampb. N. P. 833.