Majority
Headnote
General reputation, connected with corroborating circumstances, will be sufficient, at least prima fa-dc, to establish the fact, tha> A. was a partner with B and C. And if B. ant! ¡^edetheDex-^"01 copart?hem,Pamiw!X which, upon due-notice, they refuse to producer-;at the trial, the jury may reasonably infer that, if produced, they would have shown the fact of a partnership. But the mere acknowledgments of B. and C. that A. was their partner, would not be sufficient to charge him, - On a case subject to the opinion of the court, the same conclusion will be drawn from the evidence as the jun£ '^ovld have been authorized to makeThe only question in this case is, whether the testimony was sufficient to charge Jacob Brown as a partner with the other defendants. It is abundantly proved, that the other defendants were in partnership, and, so far as general reputation would go to establish the fact, Jacob Brown was also one of the firm of Hunter, Sterling, S Company, to whom the sale of the goods in question was made.
There was no objection to the testimony of general reputation. It must, therefore, be considered as evidence in the cause, and as forming a part of the testimony upon which the jury was to determine the fact of partnership. Nor could any objection have been made to such evidence. Whether general reputation ought to be sufficient, may be questionable. But such testimony is competent; and .there are several circumstances in the case, which go very much in corroboration of it. The bare declara
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
(a) (a) Vide Drake, and Pinkney v. Elwyer and others, l Caines' Rep. 184. Whitney v Ferris, 18 Johns. Rep. 66 .