p. 396Abraham T. E. De Witt, testified, that in 1793 he saw no fence on the Mill Creek, and only the rail fence, running east and west, not far south of the defendant’s house.
John Miller, aged 64, another witness for the plaintiff, testified, that as to the existence of any fence, except that on the low land, that he had known the premises from a boy, and that there was no clearing on the low land, except five or six acres, at the old saw mill.
The defendant then read in evidence, the patent of Rochester, dated 25th June, 1703, and the records of Rochester, to prove that the grantors to Leonard Cole, were not trustees, at the time of the deed.
The judge charged the jury, that the title of the plaintiff was valid, and that he was entitled to recover, unless the defendant had made out an adverse possession, commencing in the life-time of Josephat Dubois, and continued down uninterruptedly ; that the deed to John Schoonmaker was not located, and so could not aid the defendant; that there was not evidence of a continued possession, or of a sufficient fence; that only the possession of the low land along the Stoney Creek appeared to be adverse ; and he thought the plaintiff ought to recover the land possessed by the defendant, to the foot of the ridge, along the low land.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff accordingly.
A motion was made to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial.
L. Elmendorf, for the defendant.
The lessors have not shown sufficient title to enable them to recover against the defendant. They proved a conveyance from the trustees of Rochester to Leonard Cole, senior ; Leonard Cole, the younger, conveyed to Josephat Dubois ; but there is no evidence of any possession in Dubois, or those from whom he claimed title. No acts of ownership appear to have been exercised by either of them. On the other hand, the defendant has
p. 397shown an adverse possession as far back as the memory of the oldest witnesses can reach; a possession of above sixty years. Now, an adverse possession of 20 years is sufficient to give a good title.Again, there is sufficient evidence of a descent cast. John the son of Joakim Schoonmaker died in possession, and was succeeded by his son, who continued in possession ; and after his death, was succeeded by the defendant.The deed -from the children of captain Joakim Schoonmaker, in 1745, to John Schoonmaker, was sufficiently located to entitle the defendant to the benefit of a possession ; and the judge was incorrect in directing the jury to disregard that deed.The judge was also incorrect in his charge, in saying, that it was not enough merely to show a continued possession of 20 years, at a period of 40 years ago, but that an uninterrupted possession down to the present time should be shown, which would be a possession of 60 years. A continued adverse possession of 20 years gives a complete title; and there is no necessity for showing a continuation of the possession afterwards.As the defendant held under colour of title, the lopping of trees round woodland, connected with cultivated lands, is sufficient evidence of ownership, at least, 60 years ago; and no other evidence ought to be required.J. Tallmadge, and Sudam, contra.
The lessors have shown a regular paper title from the patent of Rochester. [E. Williams, for the defendant. We admit the paper title.] Then, have the lessors lost that title, for want of a possession? The possession of John Schoonmaker must enure to the benefit of the lessors, who have the
p. 400shares, according to such division. By that division, the premises in question, among other lots, fell to John Schoonmaker.The best evidence of a continued possession has been produced, that the nature of the case admits. Very aged witnesses prove a general reputation, and tradition as to the possession of Joakim ; and an ancient deed refers to the same possession. The deed to John does, in fact, cover the premises in question ; but whether it does or not, is immaterial. It is enough that he entered and took possession under the deed; thus entering under a colour or claim of right.The judge charged the jury, that the nature of the possession of John was such, that it must enure to the benefit of the real owner, or, in other words, that it was a mere possession fence, But this name given to the inclosure, by some of the witnesses, ought not to mislead the court, so as to destroy the right of the defendant. It was such a fence as had been invariably used in the country, for inclosing land for agricultural purposes. It was not made of mere lopped trees, but was sufficient to keep out cattle. John cultivated the low land, built a house on the ridge, and inclosed the upland.If there was an adverse possession in Joakim, and, afterwards, in John, antecedent to the year 1751, then Cole was incompetent .to convey the premises to Dubois. But if there was not such an adverse possession against Cole, as to incapacitate him from conveying, still Dubois was dispossessed prior to 1751. If Dubois was out of possession, he could not devise in 1757; and then his children 'must take as heirs, and not as devisees. If they claim as heirs, what becomes of the particular estate in the wife, for life, on which so much of the argument of the plaintiff’s counsel is founded i It is said, the lessors were femes covert; but if they took as heirs, they must take in 1757, and were bound to bring their action in twenty
p. 402fact, that
Dubois was not disseised, and that no adverse possession existed against him, in his life-time, of the premises recovered, which are the uplands of
Stoney Kill, it is then a settled position, that no subsequent disseisin or adverse possession, would bar the right of the lessors, if they brought their suit (as it appears they did) within 20 years after the death of the widow. Neither a descent cast, nor the statute of limitations will affect a right, if a particular estate existed at the time of the disseisin, or when the adverse possession began, because a right of entry in the remainder-man cannot exist, during the existence of the particular estate
; and the
laches of a tenant for life will not affect the party entitled» An entry to avoid the statute, must be an entry for the purpose of taking possession, and such an entry cannot be made during the existence of the life estate.
(Hunt v. Bourne, 1
Lutw. 779. 781, 782. 2
Salk. 422. 1
Burr. 120. 126, 7
East, 311, 312. 319. 321.) .
2. The second material point made in the cause is, as to a disseisin or adverse possession, existing at the time of the death of Dubois, On this point, the testimony is contradictory, and must be very uncertain, from the great length of time which has elapsed since the death of Dubois, which was 51 years before the time of the trial. Five witnesses on the part of the defendant, testified to facts in favour of the existence of such adverse possession, though none of the facts tended to establish a disseisin, in the strictly technical sense of the term. Four witnesses on the part of the plaintiff, testified to facts contradicting the existence of any such possession. Considering the remoteness of the period to which the witnesses referred, the loose and uncertain tenor and manner of their testimony, the ambiguous nature of the possession set up, the contradictory and nearly balanced testimony upon the subject, and that the cause was tried
p. 403by a struck jury, eight of whom had a view of the premises, there is no probability that any new light can be thrown upon the subject. The court would have been as well, if not better satisfied, if the verdict had been the other
way; but under the circumstances of the case, they do not think it would consist with the exercise of a sound discretion, to disturb the verdict.
Motion denied.