Rogers & Lambert v. Warner & Bostwick — 8 Johns. 119

Majority

p. 119

Rogers and Lambert against Warner and Bostwick.

Headnote

Jl. & B. ad-of credit1to2c*, wishes to1 take f°e,i*tofw™are wlll™g to lend our names as security for any amount lie may wish. May s, 1804.” 1). took goods of E on forS/V]/cU ^cenfée/'isos1 took , another parcel of goods °" . credit, for his note to° c.. paid/ In an a against/j. &• credit did not extend beyond the first parcel of good¿ deliveredVaj' imd that fj, were not liable were not liable for an indefinite time, but onlylo an indefinite amount, for one time.

THIS was an action of assumpsit. At the trial, the plaintiff gave in evidence the following writing, signed by the defendants: “ Messrs. Rogers Lambert, if Elias Warner and D. W. Bostwick, our sons, wish to take goods of you on credit, we are willing to lend our names ° J 1 ° as security for any amount they may wish. Canaan, Matt ,, . . J J 3, 1804.” Alter the delivery of this letter of credit to , c • . the plaintiffs, tne persons m whose favour it was written, took goods of the plaintiffs, several times, on credit, for which they paid, from time to time, and for which no notes were given. In December, 1805, they took ano- ° " . ther parcel of goods, for which they gave their note, on which a balance remained due to the plaintiffs of 267 dollars and 94 cents. ... A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court, on the single question, whether the defendants were liable for that sum, on the letter of credit.

H. Bleeder, for the plaintiffs,

cited Hutchinson v. Be ll, (1 Taunton's Rep. 558)

E. Williams, contra»

The true construction of the letter of credit is, that it is to be confined to the first parcel of goods. It would be unjust and unreasonable to extend it to an indefinite credit for an indefinite time. The plaintiffs did not, probably, understand it so; for after goods had been, at several times, taken up on credit and paid for, they took a note for the last parcel, which was above a year and a half after the first transaction. This is a very different case from that of Hutchinson v. Bell, (1 Taunton, 558.) for that was a case of a fraudulent representation, and the defendant there was held to be liable only within a reasonable time. Here the letter of credit was given in good faith. It must have been intended as an introduction for their sons to business and credit. The natural inference is, that a continuing credit was to depend dn the future conduct of the sons. I The letter gave an unlimited credit as to amount. Here it was explicit, but was silent as to the continuance of the credit to future sales. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Judgment ought to be given for the defendants.

Judgment for the defendants.