Majority
Headnote
An appeal lies to the General Term from a Special Term order, confirming the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment for land taken for public parks in New York city, and although the act of 1813 (chap. 86,1178) makes the report, when confirmed by the Supreme Court, final and conclusive.This is an appeal from the order of the Special Term, confirming the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment. An objection is taken, that such a proceeding, when confirmed by a Special Term, is final, and that no appeal would lie to the General Term. There have been such decisions made by former General Terms.
In The Bowery Extension Case ( 2 Abb., 369 ), it was held that an appeal would not lie to the General Term, although the judge admitted the language of the act of 1854 to be broad enough to cover this ease as a special proceeding, because the statute made the order of confirmation final and conclusive.
So, in The Mayor v. Erben ( 38 N. Y., 311 ), the Court of Appeals hold that the jurisdiction is confined to the Supreme
In The Matter of Canal and Walker Streets ( 12 N. Y., 411 ), the Court of Appeals held that the appellants, having been heard before the Special and General Terms of the Supreme Court, were within the provisions of the act of 1854 in regard to special proceedings, and were entitled to a hearing in the Court of Appeals, were it not for the provision which made the decision of the Supreme Court final.
In The Matter of Sixty-fifth Street ( 23 How., 256 ), it was held that an appeal from taxation of costs could not be taken after confirmation.
In The Matter of Seventy-sixth Street ( 12 Abb., 317 ), the same decision was referred to at Special Term. In that case, however, the right to appeal was only doubted because of the previous decisions; and it was added, that the decision in the Bowery Case was conclusive on a Special Term until that decision should be reviewed at General Term. The act of 1854 was undoubtedly broad enough to include these proceedings, and this was conceded in 12 N. Y., 411 .
'But, whatever view may have been taken of these proceedings heretofore, the late decision of the Court of Appeals in The Rensselaer and Saratoga Railroad Company v. Davis ( 43 N. Y., 137 ), has a strong bearing upon the question of appealability of this order of confirmation.
The general railroad act (Laws of 1850, chap. 140) provided for taking lands for a railroad on similar proceedings, to be Submitted to the Supreme Court, and, after a second review
In 1 Kernan, 276, the Court of Appeals held that such proceedings were final in the Supreme Court, and an appeal would not lie to the Court of Appeals. But in the case of the Rensselaer and Saratoga R. R. Co. v. Davis (supra), that court has lately decided that such an appeal will lie. The court say the order appointing commissioners is a special proceeding, from which an appeal to the General Term lies under chapter 270 of the Laws of 1854, and is a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, &e. I cannot but conclude that the Court of Appeals intend to hold such proceedings to be appealable under the act of 1854.
But whether the same is, or is not appealable to the Court of Appeals, it seems to me that the Supreme Court in General Term has the inherent right to review any proceedings in the court where the power is placed generally in the Supreme Court, and is not by statute confined to the Special Term. If reviewed by the General Term it is still the act of the Supreme Court; and until finally disposed of the proceeding is before the Supreme Court, and within the provisions of the statute, which makes the decision of the Supreme Court final.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the cases holding that an appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court in General Term should be overruled and the appeal sustained.
Where an amount of property exceeding $5,000,000 is taken from the owners on a valuation made by commissioners, it seems hard to deny the right to review the legal questions which arise on the decision of a single justice, unless expressly forbidden.
There are various objections made to this report. It is unnecessary to notice any except that made to the order referring it back to the commissioners to correct their report in regard to the streets which had been closed. The first report was erroneous in not allowing the value of such streets. In the order referring it back, the value was estimated by the
The order for referring the report back for revision and correction was proper, and such order might be repeated so long-as the referees erred in the rules by which they were governed. The power to estimate the loss and damage is given by the act of 1813 to the commissioners solely; and when the report is sent back for revisal and correction, it is to the commissioners for revisal and correction; and any new report may be referred back to them as often as right and justice shall require, until a report shall be made, which the court shall confirm-. No authority is given to the court to make such estimate of damage. If any such power existed in the court, there would be no need of referring it back to the commissioners, but the court could at once direct such allowances to be made.
Besides, the commissioners have not made any proper report on such order referring it back to them.
In their report they say the act is not the result of their deliberation or judgment; that they make the report in obedience to the order of the court. Such a report should not have been received from them.
When the case is sent back to the commissioners, they should be governed by the law laid down by the court; and it was not becoming in the commissioners to say, they believed they had adopted the proper rule in the first instance in opposition to the opinion expressed by the court. The court held their first report erroneous; and they should have corrected it on the principles laid down by the court. But the fixing the valuation of the land was within the peculiar province of the commissioners. It may be doubted whether in ordinary cases the court should interfere as to the actual valuation, unless it appears some legal principle has been violated.
For these reasons we think the order appealed from must be set aside. It is to be regretted that a new report cannot
Concurrence
I concur that the order is appealable. As bearing on that question the case of King v. The Mayor ( 36 N. Y., 190 ), may be added to the authorities referred to by Judge Ingraham.
I also agree that the court had not the power to direct the commissioners to estimate the damage at a sum which the judge fixed, instead of leaving it to the commissioners; and that for that reason the order should be reversed and the matter take the course suggested by Judge Ingraham.