Majority
Memorandum The landlord did not terminate the tenancy by any notice. Summary proceedings, therefore, could not be instituted (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1410).
No new ground for summary proceedings is created by subdivision (b) of section 8 of chapter 314 of the Laws of 1945. Before the statute, a landlord’was required to establish a.contractual right to terminate the tenancy for a breach (Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381 , 389) and was obliged to exercise that right before instituting summary proceedings. (Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Brink Co., Inc., 132 Misc. 435 ; Janes v. Paddell, 67 Misc. 420 ). Subdivision (b) of section 8 simply lifts the ban against summary proceedings by a landlord having a contractual right to terminate a lease for a breach, and who has terminated it, provided there was continuance after notice of a breach of a substantial obligation.
The final order should be unanimously reversed on the law, with $30 costs to tenant, and proceedings dismissed.
MacCrate, Smith and Fennelly, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Michaels v. Fishel 169 N. Y. 381 at 389 p. 537
- Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co. 132 Misc. 435 p. 537
- Janes v. Paddell 67 Misc. 420 p. 537