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O'Brien v. Mayor of New York

25 Misc. 219 Court N.Y. Sup. Ct. English

Delivered by Pryor, J.

Contents

Majority

p. 219
John O’Brien et al., Plaintiffs, v. The Mayor, Etc., of the City of New York, Defendant. Walston H. Brown, as Receiver, etc., of the Firm of Brown, Howard & Co., Plaintiff, v. The Mayor, Etc., of the City of New York, Defendant.
(Supreme Court, New York Special Term,
November, 1898.)

Headnote

Municipal corporations— Compromise of hostile claim — Consideration.
A municipal corporation may by the action- of its law officer, definitively compromise a claim against the city, and the consideration is adequate where, in the opinion of responsible city officers, the compromise discharges a moral obligation of the city and averts an apprehended recovery in a far greater amount.
p. 220
Motion by defendant to open judgments entered on offers by the corporation counsel in compromise of claims against the city of Hew York.
Kellogg, Rose & Smith (L. Laffin Kellogg, of counsel), for plaintiffs.
John Whalen, corporation counsel (Charles Blandy, of counsel), for defendant.

The decision of the motion depends upon three conditions: Was the settlement effected in good faith? Was it ef-' fected in the exercise of competent authority? Is it supported by a sufficient consideration? An affirmative answer to these questions involves necessarily a denial of the motion. The first is concluded by this explicit concession of the corporation counsel: “ We conceive it to be the fact that, in approaching this adjustment, and in the carrying of it out, all parties concerned were actuated in the best of good faith, and we are willing to go farther and concede that Mr. Scott sincerely believed the best interests of the city would be subserved in getting rid of these alleged claims upon the basis of these offers.” Indeed, the transaction, as apparent upon the papers, admits of no other inference. Heither is the second question open to serious controversy. That a municipal corporation may compromise a claim against it is settled by abundant, authority. Dillon on Mun. Corp., §§ 477, 478; Beach on Public Corp., § 638; Board of Supervisors v. Bowen, 4 Lans. 24 ; City of Buffalo v. Bettinger, 76 N. Y. 393 ; Hills v. Peekskill Sav. Bank, 101 N. Y. 490 , 497; Prout v. Fire District, 154 Mass. 450 . And that such compromise may be concluded by the law officer of the city has already been adjudged at the instance of the present corporation counsel. Bush v. Coler, 24 Misc. Rep. 368 . But the settlement in dispute had the formal and official sanction, not only of the law department of the city, but of the mayor, the comptroller, the aqueduct commissioners, and the eminent counsel engaged specially to contest the plaintiffs’ claims. bfor was the compromise without adequate consideration in law. The equity of the claims was so manifest and imperative as to compel recognition from judges of the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division in the First Department; and the peril of their ultimate enforcement so probable as to impress upon the municipal authori

p. 221
ties the expediency of a settlement ont of court. The compromise, then, was made not merely to buy peace, but, in the judgment of responsible officials, to discharge a moral obligation of the municipality, and to avert an apprehended recovery in a far greater amount. But much less suffices to support a compromise. The claim of which a partial satisfaction is secured by the settlement, may be altogether without legal validity and incapable of enforcement; it is enough if the parties in good faith advance opposing pretensions. Dovale v. Ackerman, 11 Misc. Rep. 245 , 247, 248; affirmed, 2 App. Div. 404 ; Cox v. Stokes, 156 N. Y. 491 , 505. The settlement, therefore, being valid and obligatory upon the parties, is beyond the jurisdiction of the court to disturb. Hennessy v. Bacon, 137 U. S. 78 , 85; Steele v. White, 2 Paige, 478; Barnes v. Ryan, 66 Hun, 170 ; Wahl v. Barnum, 116 N. Y. 87 ; People v. Stephens, 71 id. 527; People v. Ballard, 134 id. 269, 293. It results that the merits of the compromise are not for my consideration, and that I have no alternative but to deny the motion.

Motion denied.

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