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In re the Settlement of the Account of Johnston

76 Misc. 391 Court N.Y. Sur. Ct. English

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p. 391
Matter of the Settlement of the Account of Henry S. Johnston, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Catherine E. Anderson, Deceased.
(Surrogate’s Court, Kings County,
April, 1912.)

Headnote

Decedent Estate Law — wills — devises or bequests to charitable corporations— distribution among residuary legatees.
Where the money value of an estate at the death of testatrix was $20,842.14, the real estate being valued at $5,200, and her debts amounted’ to $96.18, and the will gave to each of two charitable corporations a legacy of $250, and certain real estate was devised to another like corporation, and the residue was devised to said three corporations share and share alike, the provisions in their favor are impaired by the provisions of section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law, that no person shall devise or bequeath to any charitable corporation more than one-half of his estate after payment of debts.
The legatees are entitled to the one-half of the estate remaining after the payment of decedent’s debts. The real estate passing by direct devise should not be considered in the calculation; the two general legacies should be paid and the remainder of one-half ' of the estate should- be divided equally among said residuary legatees.
Proceeding upon the judicial settlement of the account of an executor.
p. 392
Philip J. McCook, for accountant.
James P. Judge, for Bisters of the Poor of St. Francis.
Arnold & Greene (J. Warren Greene, of counsel), for Servants of Eelief for Incurable Cancer. ' •
William J. Fanning, for Mission of the Immaculate Virgin for the Protection of Homeless and Destitute Children.
Man & Man (Frederick H. Man, of counsel), for Archibald J. C. Anderson and Hugh M. Anderson.
Judge & Collins, for Irene McGovern and" Veronica McGovern.

The will under which the account is made gives general legacies of $250 each to two charitable corporations, and devises certain real estate to another like corporation. It is admitted that the value of the real estate last mentioned is $5,200. The residue of the estate is devised to the same charitable corporations, share and share alike.

The value of the estate, in money, as it stood at death was $20,842.14. The amount of the decedent’s debts was $96.18. With these values in evidence, the beneficial provisions of the will may be discussed with convenient inaccuracy as “ legacies.”

■ It is obvious that the' provisions in favor of the corporations are impaired by the Laws of 1860, chapter 360, now .Decedent Estate Law, section 17; and the question is presented, whether the amounts to- be paid to or enjoyed by the corporations are to be one-half of the estate after the payment of debts or whether the same are to be still further reduced by the payment of the expenses of administration ?

Hone of these legacies is void. They are payable to the" full extent intended by the will, save only so far as they are ■to be reduced by the process of abatement defined in the

p. 393
statute. Stripped'to terms applicable to this will, the statute is as follows:
“Ho person * * * shall * * * devise or bequeath to any * * * charitable * * * corporation * * * more than one-half of his or her estate, after the payment of his or her debts, * * * and such devise or bequest shall be valid to the extent of one-half and no more.”

Ho rule is yielded by this enactment for the reduction of these legacies except one, viz.: Ascertain- the money value of the estate as it remained at death, subtract therefrom the amount of the decedent’s debts, and pay one-half of the remainder to the corporate legatees. Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166 , 177.

In the case cited, the question, whether or not administration expenses were to be subtracted, was not consciously entertained, but was actually involved in the direction there made, that the value of the estate should be ascertained as of the time of the decedent’s death. The same direction appears in Matter of Durand, 194 N. Y. 477 .

The expression of one thing excludes the other. “ Debts ” are required by this statute to be subtracted. Hothing else is mentioned as a subtrahend and, therefore, nothing else can be considered.. It is as .if the testatrix had 'bequeathed “ such sum as shall be equal to one-half of my estate after payment of my debts.”

That the provision for the corporations is largely in the ■ form of a residuary gift cannot impose a reading upon the statute which its words forbid. True, expenses of adminis-' tration fall upon the residue; they always must. It- is only for this reason, that the residue>" whether enjoined by legatee or next of kin, is cut down by the amount of the expenses. But the residuary gift in this case fails of effect. It has been withheld by the statute. It can never be enjoyed. The law commutes it and puts the commuted amount in its place. This done, the law creates-a new residue for the benefit of the next of kin. The residuary legatees thereupon must be relieved of residuary burdens, when they lose residuary benefits, and the residuary distributees cannot take the gift of the law without carrying its weight.

p. 394
The words-employed in one of the briefs to fasten these expenses upon the abated legacies of the corporations seem to react. These words are: “And it is always the residuary estate which must bear the'expense of administration and the compensation of attorneys and executors.” The only residuary éstate in this accounting is that which the statute was intended to create and which the next of kin will- enjoy.

Among the corporations affected, a difference arises as to the distribution of their one-half of the estate, the whole of which is $20,745.97. The real estate devised to one of these corporations stands, in the calculation of the one-half, at $5,200. Though this item has been necessarily involved in the calculation, it should be dismissed from this accounting, since the real estate passed by direct devise. Its withdrawal would leave of the one-half for the corporations, $5,172.98. From this sum the two general legacies of $250 each should be paid, and the remainder, $4,672.98 should be divided equally among the three institutions according to the residuary gift.

The objection to the allowance of $150 to the husband under section 2713 of the 'Code is overruled.

Decreed accordingly.

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