Waste-Stream Inc. v. St. Lawrence County Solid Waste Disposal Authority

OPINION OF THE COURT

This is a declaratory judgment action in which plaintiff,

In the instance of Islip Resource Recovery Agency (Islip) when a question arose as to whether the then-existing language authorized the Authority to "collect” waste, a legislative amendment was sought and passed. Prior to the 1989 amendment to the Islip "powers” section, its facility was defined as being "used, occupied or employed beyond the initial solid waste collection process” and its powers were "[t]o receive, transport, process, dispose of, sell, store, convey, recycle and deal with, in any lawful manner and way, solid waste and byproducts” (Public Authorities Law § 2046-b [13]; former § 2046-f [4] [L 1982, ch 632]). Note, however, the Legislature amended the "powers” section without amending the definition of "solid waste management-resource recovery facility” or "facility” section so that the definition of the facility still limits its operations to activities beyond the initial recovery process. In any event, the amendment certainly empowered Islip to "collect” solid waste. (L 1989, ch 159, § 1.)

The Onondaga Resource Recovery Agency is an anomaly in that it is the only Resource Recovery Agency not granted the power to "collect” and its definition of facility restricts its activities to those "beyond the initial collection process”. Neither party has argued this as instructive; but this legislative creature is somewhat of a conundrum vis-a-vis Onondaga’s previously enacted Disposal Authority. In any event, the court is persuaded that the classifications (Resource Recovery Agency, Management Authority and Disposal Authority) are distinctive in name only, and not, in any way, determinative of powers, since an agency or authority can possess only such powers as are enumerated within its title of the Public Authorities Law.

The 1989 Islip amendment respecting the Legislature’s addition of "collect” to its powers is persuasive in this case. It is

Public authorities are created by statute and their powers are necessarily limited to those granted it by the Legislature. Principles of statutory construction and interpretation prohibit courts from correcting errors, omissions, or defects in State legislation. Further, "[a] court cannot by implication supply in a statute a provision which it is reasonable to suppose the Legislature intended to intentionally omit; and the failure of the Legislature to include a matter within the scope of an act may be construed as an indication that its exclusion was intended.” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74; see, Town of Hoosick v Eastern Rensselaer County Solid Waste Mgt. Auth., 153 Misc 2d 896 , affd as mod in part, revd in part 182 AD2d 37 [3d Dept 1992]; see also, City of Rye v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 24 NY2d 627 [1969].)

The absence of language that specifically provides for or prohibits the "collecting” of waste along with a definitional section specifying that SWDA’s facility is one "used, occupied or employed beyond the initial solid waste collection process for the receiving, transporting, storage, processing, or disposal of solid waste” (all emphases added) (Public Authorities Law § 2048-b [14]) and a review of the definitional and powers sections of the other solid waste public benefit corporations provides convincing evidence that the absence of the term "collect” as a power granted to SWDA was intentional, and neither an oversight nor considered redundant verbiage for the granted power to "receive”. (See, e.g., Matter of Alonzo M. v New York City Dept. of Probation, 72 NY2d 662 [1988]; Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669 [1988]; Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205 [1976]; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 363.)

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS PROPER FORM

Questions as to construction of a statute may be entertained in declaratory judgment proceedings commenced in Supreme Court provided there is an actual or justiciable controversy to be determined, and are particularly appropriate to determine questions as to the interpretation of statutes and

SWDA HAS THE POWER TO BE SUED

Public Authorities Law § 2048-e (1) (tit 13-E) is very clear that included in SWDA’s powers is the ability to sue and he sued. In fact, defendant’s papers do not really contest this.

WSI HAS STANDING TO SUE

Again, defendant does not seriously contend plaintiff lacks standing to sue in this action, and based on the interests asserted and sought to be protected, the court finds WSI has standing to bring this declaratory judgment action. (See, Matter of Goldberg v Axelrod, 104 AD2d 520 [3d Dept 1984], lv denied 64 NY2d 602 [1984]; Matter of Dairylea Coop. v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6 [1975]; Public Authorities Law § 2048-e [1].)

LACHES

The defense of laches is unavailable in this case. Defendant has failed to demonstrate the "delay” occasioned by plaintiff once it learned of SWDA’s purportedly ultra vires "collection” activities. Plaintiff has presented an affidavit which affirms that once its counsel discovered SWDA’s actions might be without legislative authority to collect waste, this action was immediately commenced. Although defendant urges it would suffer prejudice from the delay by virtue of its capital investment in equipment, this type of prejudice is of no moment because the investment, necessarily, had to have been made to engage in "collection activities”. It was only when defendant was able to, and did, engage in these activities that the plaintiff was aggrieved and had standing to commence this declaratory judgment action.

It is, therefore, the decision of this court, and it is hereby ordered that plaintiffs summary judgment motion is, in all respects, granted dismissing defendant’s affirmative defenses and defendant is hereby enjoined from engaging in the "collection” of solid waste or its by-products.