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Bronx District Attorney v. Jackson

173 Misc. 2d 676 Court Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, Decision date 1997-06-04 English

Contents

Majority

p. 676
[662 NYS2d 984]
Bronx District Attorney, Respondent, v Delores Jackson, Appellant, et al., Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,
June 4, 1997
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Bronx Legal Services (David M. Feldman and George A. Alvarez of counsel), for appellant. Robert T. Johnson, District At
p. 677
torney of Bronx County, pro se, and Howard Sterinbach and Raymond Guzman for Robert T. Johnson, respondent. Jeffrey Schanback, New York City (Joan Pannell, Adam W. Eagle and William Stathis of counsel), for New York City Housing Authority, respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Order dated July 15, 1996 affirmed, without costs.

The office of the Bronx District Attorney obtained a final judgment of possession based upon the tenant’s conduct of illegal narcotics trade in the subject premises (RPAPL 715, 711 [5]). Thereafter, landlord New York City Housing Authority, without participation of the District Attorney, commenced a nonpayment proceeding and accepted rent from the tenant pursuant to a stipulated settlement. Civil Court properly denied tenant’s motion to vacate the possessory judgment on the ground that the prosecution of the nonpayment had "vitiated” the holdover and "revived” the landlord-tenant relationship.

The District Attorney’s office and the Housing Authority are independent entities with separate and distinct legal mandates; the District Attorney is not the alter ego of the landlord in a proceeding under RPAPL 715 (Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Off. v Freshley, 160 Misc 2d 302 , 307). Thus, the Housing Authority’s maintenance of a nonpayment proceeding and acceptance of rent did not affect the validity of the final judgment previously granted to the prosecutor or preclude its enforcement (cf., Ansonia Assocs. v Pearlstein, 122 Misc 2d 566 ). Further, the Housing Authority, as landlord, cannot reinstate a tenancy that was rendered void by virtue of illegality or criminal conduct (Real Property Law § 231 [1]). "Clearly, it is the legislative intent that the acceptance of rent by landlord or doing any act constituting waiver will have no effect in a proceeding for eviction based on illegal use * * * when the matter relates to a situation where the Legislature has established a public policy and the enforcement of such a waiver would violate the public policy” (Murphy v Relaxation Plus Commodore, 83 Misc 2d 838 , 840 [App Term, 1st Dept]).

Parness, J. P., McCooe and Davis, JJ., concur.

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