Belnord Realty Associates v. Joseph

OPINION OF THE COURT

Final judgment entered May 20, 2003 affirmed, with $25 costs. Appeal from order dated August 8, 2002 dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the final judgment.

The trial evidence comports with the court’s conclusion that respondent Joseph’s hip dysplasia and related conditions do not qualify her as a “disabled person” within the meaning of the rent control succession provisions (see 9 NYCRR 2204.6 [d] [3] [iii]).^[1] While respondent may experience some difficulty and pain in walking, absent was the requisite showing that her impairment “substantially limit[s]” a major life activity. Notable in this regard was the assessment offered by respondent’s treating osteopathic physician that respondent “function[s] reasonably well” and respondent’s own testimony acknowledging her ability to ambulate and exercise without a cane or other assistive device, to undertake a lengthy daily commute, and to work on a regular, full-time basis (see Sirota v New York City

Inasmuch as the substantial limitation component of the rent control disability definition is functionally identical to that found in the disability definition contained in the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) (see 42 USC § 12102 ^[2] [A]),^[2] we may appropriately rely upon case law interpreting the ADA in addressing, and ultimately rejecting, respondent’s succession claim. While mindful that rent control laws are generally to be interpreted broadly to effectuate their remedial purpose (see Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201 , 208 [1989]), we find unavailing respondent’s argument that a less rigorous standard should be applied in construing the substantial limitation language of the rent control succession provision than that applied to the nearly identical substantial limitation language of the ADA. The fact that the drafters of the rent control regulations adopted a restrictive threshold in defining disability to include only physical or mental conditions which limit a person’s ability to perform one or more major life activities and eschewed the broader definitions of disability found elsewhere in earlier enacted state and local laws (see e.g. Executive Law § 292 [21]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-102 [16]) strongly supports an inference that the drafters intended the rent control disability definition to be narrower in scope than those contained in the New York discrimination statutes and ordinances cited above (compare State Div. of Human Rights v Xerox Corp., 65 NY2d 213 , 218-219 [1985]).

Since the trial court properly measured respondent’s lone defense of succession under the two-year co-occupancy requirement applicable to nondisabled individuals, and it being undisputed that respondent did not meet that requirement, we