Majority
Memorandum.
Ordered that the order is reversed, without costs, and tenant’s motion to dismiss the petition is granted.
In this summary proceeding to recover possession of a co-op apartment, the petition alleges that petitioner is the assignee of the successful bidder at a UCC article 9 nonjudicial sale of the shares and proprietary lease appurtenant to tenant’s co-op apartment. Tenant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as nothing in article 7 of the RPAPL allows for the maintenance of this proceeding. The City Court denied tenant’s motion, holding that a secured party which obtains ownership of a cooperative apartment after a nonjudicial sale of the defaulting tenant’s interest may proceed under either RPAPL 713 (1) or (7), citing Emigrant Mtge. Co., Inc. v Greenberg ( 34 Misc 3d 1236 [A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50387 [U] [Nassau Dist Ct 2012]). We reverse and grant tenant’s motion to dismiss the petition.
As relevant here, RPAPL 713 (7) provides for the maintenance of a summary proceeding to remove an occupant from “real property” (RPAPL 701 [1]) where the occupant is a licensee of the person entitled to possession whose license has expired or been revoked. Tenant is not a licensee. Rather, he entered into possession as a tenant under a proprietary lease. If that lease has been terminated — and there is no allegation that it has — tenant is in possession as a holdover tenant. He is not in occupancy pursuant to a license. Thus, RPAPL 713 (7) provides no basis for the maintenance of this proceeding.
As relevant here, RPAPL 713 (1) provides for the maintenance of a summary proceeding to remove an occupant from “real property” (RPAPL 701 [1]) where the property “has been sold by virtue of an execution against him . . . and a title under the sale has been perfected.” In the case of a cooperative apartment, it is the cooperative corporation which owns the real property, and the tenant holds the shares in the cooperative corporation allocated to his apartment and a proprietary lease for his apartment. The sale of the shares and the lease is not a sale of the “real property” (RPAPL 701 [1]). Moreover, an “execution” is a “judicial writ founded on a judgment obtained in a civil action and issued in behalf of the party recovering the judgment for the purpose of carrying it into effect” (Seaman v Clarke, 60 App Div 416 , 421 [1901]; see Matter of Shapiro, 13
For similar reasons, RPAPL 713 (5), which provides for the maintenance of a summary proceeding to recover “real property” (RPAPL 701 [1]) where “the property has been sold in foreclosure,” is unavailable here.
We note that if a new category of summary proceeding is to be created, it is for the legislature, not the courts, to create it (see Rosenstiel v Rosenstiel, 20 AD2d 71 [1963]).
Accordingly, the order is reversed and tenant’s motion to dismiss the petition is granted.
Iannacci, J.P, Marano and Tolbert, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel 20 AD2d 71 p. 4