p. 234and the breach of the plaintiff’s agreement as to the quality thereof, and its refusal to deliver the iron purchased of it, and of its refusal to return the money so received, defendants demanded that the complaint be dismissed, and that they have judgment for the amount of their damages.
The case was brought to trial and a jury was impaneled to try the same. Counsel for the plaintiff then moved the court for judgment upon the grounds, “ first, that there is no defense set up to the cause of action set forth in the complaint; second, that the facts set up by way of counter-claim, are not only not sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but show affirmatively that there is no liability whatever on the part of this plaintiff to the defendants.” The defendants conceded that the plaintiff’s claim set forth in its complaint, was admitted by the answer, and they then offered to prove the counter-claim set up in the answer. Plaintiff’s counsel admitted for the purposes of his motion that all the allegations in the answer were proved. The court thereupon directed a verdict for the plaintiff to which direction defendant’s counsel excepted.
W. W. Hiles for appellants.
Where it is admitted that the party had no opportunity to examine the goods, he is excused from making any examination or offer to return, and it is not for a court to' speculate as to what was the ground of his inability. (Doane v. Dunham (79 Ills. 131.) A representation at an auction sale, or if in a bill of sale describing an article by a specific name known in the market is a warranty that the article is such as is described. (Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198 ; White v. Miller, 71 id. 118; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 id. 61; Henshaw v. Robins, 9 Metc. 83 ; Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214 ; Yates v. Pym, 5 Taunt. 446; Osgood v. Lewis, 2 H. & G. [Md.] 495; Poulton v. Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 259; Richmond Trading Conpany v. Farquar, 8 Black. 89 .) In a sale by description, there is an implied warranty that the goods are merchantable under that denomination, and a contract to sell “ Ho. 1 'extra foundry iron,” should give an article merchantable under that description. (1 Parsons on
p. 235Contracts, 464; Benjamin on Sales, 539, 540, 541; Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144; Jones v. Clark, 3 Q. B. 197; Bowler v. Shand, 21 App. Cas. L. R. H. of L. 473.)Charles B. Alexander and George A. Strong for respondent.
The vendee in an executory contract for the sale of merchandise cannot retain inferior goods and sue for damages.. He must reject and return, or offer to return them. (Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 86 , 87; Reed v. Randall, 29 id. 361 McCormick v. Sarson, 45 id. 267; Beck v. Sheldon, 48 id. 373; Dutchess Co. v. Harding, 49 id. 323; Gaylord, etc., Co. v. Allen, 53 id. 519: Pomeroy v. Shaw, 2 Daly, 269 ; 49 N. Y. 324 .) An express warranty may be an element in either a present or an executory sale, and where it is proved in either the same result follows. (Muller v. Pho, 14 N. Y. 597 ; Rust v. Eckler, 41 id. 488; Foot v. Bentley, 44 id. 166 Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 id. 198, Dounce v. Dow, 64 id. 411 Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 id. 61; White v. Miller, 71 id. 118; Day v. Pool, 52 id. 416; Parks v. Morris Ax Co., 54 id. 586; Dounce v. Dow, 57 id. 16; Brigg v. Hilton, 99 id. 525; Kent v. Friedman, 101 id. 616; 29 id. 362; Dutchess Co. v. Harding, 49 id. 323.)We must assume that the sale of iron alleged in the defendants’ counter-claim was an executory sale, as that is the fair and just inference from the facts alleged. The plaintiff was a manuf acturer of iron, and the contract of sale was made on the 8th day of December, 1879. It covered nine hundred tons of iron, and it was to be delivered in the future as and when the defendants ordered it to make delivery. There is no allegation that the plaintiff at the time of this sale had the identical nine hundred tons of iron on hand, or that that quantity was separated from other iron. It would be against all experience, and certainly against the usual course of business, to suppose that the manufacturer had the iron on hand, and that upon its purchase by the defendants, it was separated and set apart and stored for them. It is reasonable to suppose, and as all the
p. 236facts were submitted to the court, neither party asking to have them submitted to the jury, the court had the right to draw the inference that the iron was to be thereafter manufactured, weighed, designated and delivered; and thus this was an executory contract of sale. In such a ease the fact of payment has very little significance. It is sometimes a controlling fact to show that the sale was not executory and was completely executed. It is always evidence upon that question, but in a case like this is not important. The price of property purchased may be paid, and yet the contract of sale in every sense be executory. Treating this then as an executory contract of .sale, the defendants are not in a position to complain of the quality of the iron, because they never offered to return it, and never gave the plaintiff notice or opportunity to take it back. They must therefore be conclusively presumed to have acquiesced in the quality of the iron.
(Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 73 ;
Reed v. Randall, 29 id. 358;
McCormick v.
Sarson, 45 id. 265;
Dutchess Co. v.
Harding, 49 id. 323;
Gaylord Mf'g Co. v.
Allen, 53 id. 515.) Here there was no -collateral warranty or agreement as to the quality of the iron. The representation as to the kind-and quality of iron was part of the contract of sale itself, descriptive simply of the article to be delivered in the future; and clearly within the eases cited an acceptance of the property by the defendants, without any offer to return the same at any time, deprives them of any right to make complaint of its inferior quality.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur except Andrews J., not voting.
•Judgment affirmed.