p. 289evidence tending to prove that the said firm of Eaglesum &. Co. was composed of the defendant James alone, and that the defendants at the time the notes were made were husband and wife.
The counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the jury, that if they found that at the time the notes were made the defendants were husband and wife, they should render a verdict in favor of the defendants. The court refused so to charge, and charged the jury that if tliey found that the notes were signed by defendant James in the name of Eaglesum & Co., and that defendants were at that timé husband and wife, the action could not be sustained against the wife ; but that where an action is brought against two persons, and it turns out that only one was ever liable, the judgment may be against the one so liable; and that therefore, in this case, if they should find that the defendants were husband and wife at the time the notes were made, 'and that the defendant James made them in the name of Eagle sum & Co., their verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff against James alone for the amount of the notes.
To which refusal to charge as requested, and to said charge and every part thereof, as given, the counsel for the defendant James excepted in due form. A verdict was rendered against the defendant James alone for $578.96, the amount of the notes. The defendant made a bill of exceptions, and the judgment rendered upon the verdict having been affirmed at a general term of the supreme court in the eighth district, he appealed to this court.
H. S. Cutting, for the appellant, insisted upon the following, among other points :
I. The court erred in refusing to charge the jury, as requested by the defendants’ counsel, that if they were satisfied that, at the time of the making of the notes upon which this action is brought, the defendants were husband and " wife, their verdict must be for the defendants. 1. The code has not changed the rule of the common law in relation to the mis-' joinder of parties defendant, and its effect upon the judgment to be rendered in an action. (Code of 1851, § 274, and opinion
p. 291be made liable. There was, therefore, a misjoinder, and the court should have instructed the jury to render their verdict for the defendants. (1
Chit. Pl. 44,
8th Am. ed.; Id. 59 ,
citing a case from Palmer, 312;
Weall v.
King, 12
East, 452;
Bull. N. P. 129 ;
Max v.
Roberts, 5
Bos. & Pul. (2
N. R.) 454; 1
Saunders, 207
a, note; Cooper v.
Whitehouse, 2
Car. & P. 545,
(R. C. L. 25, 585;)
Siffkin v.
Walker, 2 Camp. 308;
Elmendorf v.
Tappan, 5
John. 176 ;
Livingston's Ex'rs v.
Tremper, 11 id 101;
Robertson v.
Smith, 18
id. 478;
Mannahan v.
Gibbons, 19 id. 109;
Platner v.
Johnson, 3 Hill, 476 ;
Miller v.
McCagg, 4
Hill, 36 .) The rule established by the above authorities is, that if too many persons be made defendants, and it does not appear upon the face of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be
nonsuited on the trial if he fail in proving a joint contract, or the verdict must be for the defendant. (2
N. R. 457.) Nor can it make any difference, in the application of the rule to this case, that the defendant James pleaded separately, and a default was taken against the other defendant. (
19 Wend. 643 ; 4
Hill, 35 .)
N. Hill, Jr. for the respondent, insisted upon the following, among Other- points:
I. There was no joint liability of the defendants. The defendant Eliza Eaglesum had a personal defense to the action, and never was liable. (Fullerton v. Taylor and others, 6 How. Pr. R. 259, No. 7, March, 1852.)
II. A several judgment in this action was proper, because the plaintiff would have béen entitled to a judgment against the defendant James, if the action had been against him alone. (Code of 1851, §136; Id. § 274; § 136, sub. 3; The President &c. of Mechanics' Bank of Albany v. Rider and Wilbur, 5 How. Pr. Rep. 401 .)
The first exception relates to the insufficiency of the certificate of the commissioners, in not stating, in pursuance of the direction of the judge who allowed the commis
p. 292sion, that it was by them deposited in the post office. The direction indorsed on the commission was as follows: “ This commission when executed is to be enclosed in a wrapper, and deposited in the post office by the commissioners at the city of Toronto, directed to Wells Brooks, Esq.", county clerk of the county of Erie, Buffalo, Erie county, New-York, and a certificate thereof indorsed upon the wrapper across the seals of the same by the commissioners.” The meaning of the direction is plain. The word “ thereof” refers at most to those acts by the commissioners, to which they could certify before parting with the commission. It cannot be construed as including a deposit of the papers in the post office at Toronto, without the absurdity of supposing that the judge intended that the commissioners should certify to an act done by them, before its performance. Such a certificate would carry a falsehood upon its face. Every one would know that it could not have been made
after the deposit; for the commission would then be in the custody of the post office department. And the receipt of the documents through the mail, would be stronger evidence that the endorsement was made before the deposit,- than the most precise and unscrupulous certificate could be of the contrary. The direction, if understood as the defendant insists it should be, would be void. There is nothing in the statute requiring it. And no judge, under color of directing the manner in which a commission should be returned, can deprive a party of the benefit of the statute, unless he can procure a commissioner who will certify to a falsehood. The objection was properly overruled.
The next exception was to the decision of the judge in allowing the notes annexed to the commission to be read' in evidence. The objection was, that there was no sufficient evidence that they were the same notes, proved by the witnesses examined by the commissioners. The notes were respectively marked A and B. They were referred to by the witnesses as being thus marked ; a copy of each was also given, with a statement, that the witnesses had. written their names upon each note. All this appeared in the depositions.
p. 293The commissioners then certify, that the witnesses testified as
above written, that they subscribed their names on the back of the notes attached to such answers, which were produced and shown to them. The notes offered in evidence corresponded with the description given, in every particular, and were indorsed with the names of the commissioners in pursuance of the statute. (2
R. S. 394, § 16,
sub. 3.) This is all that is necessary to identify the papers. The question indeed w;as not very confidently argued by the counsel for the defendants, and was properly diposed of upon the trial.
The defendants’ counsel requested the judge to instruct the jury, “ that if they were satisfied that, at the time of making the notes upon which the action was brought, the defendants were husband and wife, their verdict must be for the defendants.” This was refused; and the judge charged, that under the circumstances they might find a verdict against the husband alone. To this refusal, the defendants excepted. Whatever may have been the rule at common law, when husband and wife were joined in an action upon contract, made during coverture, there is no doubt that the ruling of the judge is sustained by the provisions of the code of procedure. The 274th section provides, that judgment may be given foiy or against, one or more of several defendants; and by the third subdivision of the 136th section, if all the defendants have been served with process, judgment may be taken against any, or either of them severally, when the plaintiff would be entitled to such judgment, if the action had been against them, or any of them alone. The defendant admits that James, the husband, would have been liable if he had been the only defendant, as he obviously would, since the contract counted upon was in law his, exclusively. Ho relics upon the misjoinder, and upon the general rule of the common law, that where a joint contract is the subject of the suit, the recovery must be against all the defendants, or neither. This was the inconvenience the above provisions of the code were designed to remedy, and no case is likely to be presented, in
p. 294which their application would be more manifestly equitable and just than the present.
The judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.
Denio, Johnson, Allen, Edwards and Darker, Js., concurred in the foregoing opinion. Selden, J., dissented on the question last discussed.
Judgment affirmed.