Majority
Headnote
The will of W. after providing for twelve annuities and directing his executors to set apart and invest a sum sufficient to produce said annuities, directed that the fund and the unappropriated income thereof should, on the decease of the annuitants as they respectively die, be divided among his grandchildren ‘ who shall be living at the time of the death of the respective annuitants” per capita and not per stirpes. The residuary estate was given to the executors in trust to be sold and the net proceeds to be divided into as many shares as the testator had grandchildren, each share to be invested and the income thereof to be applied to the use of a grandchild during life, the remainder to liis or her lawful heirs; if either died leaving no issue the share of the one so dying to be paid over to the survivors. By a codicil the testator revoked “ all the provisions and bequests ” in favor of A., one of the grandchildren and her issue, contained ‘ ‘ in the residuary clause ” of the will. Held, that the revocation had reference only to the final residuary clause and did not affect the bequest to A. of a share of the residue of the annuity fund.The questions involved in this appeal were so thoroughly examined in the opinions pronounced by the surrogate and at the General Term that a lengthy statement of our views is not needful, and we will content ourselves with a brief consideration of the objections now made to the rulings and decree of the surrogate.
(1.) It is claimed on the part of the appellants that by the second codicil the bequest of the residue of the annuity fund to Mrs. Leavitt was revoked. The respondents claim- that the revocation had reference to the provision made for her in the final residuary clause, and we think they are right. The language of the codicil is: “I hereby annul and revoke all of the provisions and bequests in favor of and given to her and Tier issue in the residuary clause thereof.” This language cannot with propriety be applied to the clause in the will setting apart the annuity fund, because that is not described as a residuary clause, and it is in no sense a residuary disposition of property. In that clause the annuity fund remaining after the annuities have been provided for is not directed to be divided among the grandchildren and their issue, but simply among the grandchildren who shall be living at the time of the death of the respective annuitants. But the final residuary clause provides for the payment of the income to the grandchildren during life, and after death to their lawful issue. And the codicil also speaks of the residuary fund provided for in the will. Mo other residuary fund is expressly provided for in the will, except by the final residuary clause, and the language used in the codicil is not appropriate to any other clause in the will. Hence we think the surrogate was right in confining the effect of the revocation by the codicil -to the final residuary clause, leaving all the other provisions of the will for Mrs. Levitt untouched and in full force.
(2.) The appellants claim that the executors instead of ■ instituting twelve different accountings for each fund should have instituted but one proceeding for an accounting as to all the funds, and should have rendered but a single account; and that the surrogate erred in not compelling them to con
(3.) It is, objected that the respondents were not entitled to commissions first as executors and afterwards as trustees upon the capital of the'trust'funds. We do not think that this is a case where the two functions of executors and trustees co-exist and run from the death of the testator to a final discharge, inseparably blended together. But from the language of the will we think the duties of the respondents,' as executors, were to be first discharged, and that then they were to assume the duties of trustees, and as such manage the trust funds, to the final termination of the trusts. And so it was treated by the surrogate upon the accounting of the respondents as executors. He settled their accounts as executors and ordered them to pay to themselves as trustees the several trust funds to be held and managed by them as trustees. In such a case under the authorities of this court the respondents, their functions as executors having terminated, are entitled to further commissions as trustees. (Hurtburt v. Durant, 88 N. Y. 122 ; Johnson v. Lawrence, 95 id. 154 ; Laytin v. Davidson, Id. 263 ; Matter of Accounting of Mason, 98 id. 527.)
(4.) The surrogate allowed to the respondents one-half commissions for receiving the trust funds from themselves as executors, and this is complained of. Being entitled to full commissions upon the trust funds, were they entitled to one-half of the commissions for receiving the same ? The statute pro
(5.) It is further claimed that the $400,000 set apart to raise the annuities is too large a sum, and that a portion of it should be restored to the residuary fund. It was the duty of the trustees to set apart a sufficient sum to produce the annuities, and the fund should be so large as to provide against all reasonable contingencies and to make sure that it would produce a sufficient sum to pay the annuities. The surrogate, on the accounting of the executors, determined that the $400,000 should be set aside for that purpose. That determination has never been appealed from and cannot now be reviewed or reversed upon this appeal. But even if it could be we would feel indisposed to interfere with it. If experience shall in the future demonstrate that the fund is more than sufficient to produce the annuities, the trustees are still under the con trol of the courts, and may by proper action of the surrogate or of some other court be compelled to reduce the amount and restore a portion thereof to the residuary fund.
(6.) Upon the settlement of the account it appeared that the trustees had received $13,287.69 income of the annuity
Having thus noticed all the material objections argued, we are of the opinion-that the decree should be modified by allowing but one commission upon the income, and, as thus modified, it should be affirmed, without costs to either party.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- Drake v. Price 5 N. Y. 430 p. 294
- In re the Accounting of Mason 98 N. Y. 527 at 535 p. 294
- In re Roosevelt 5 Redf. 601 p. 294, p. 297