Majority
Headnote
The purpose of the act of congress of 1863 (Chap. 130, U. S. Laws of 1869) donating public lands to the states “which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts,” was to provide a fund from the sale of the public lands or the land scrip, of which' the state should be the trustee and the safety of which should be guaranteed by it; the whole interest of the principal fund to be used for the purposes mentioned without deduction of any costs, charges or expenses of any kind, so that “ the entire proceeds shall be applied without any diminution whatever ” to said purposes.We agree with the learned General Term that in deciding this case we are to be guided by the statutes of our own state, and if, under these statutes, the comptroller was not authorized to make the payment, as demanded by the relator, he was justified in his refusal, even though the state had failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the act of congress donating the land to it. That would be a matter between the federal government and the state which the comptroller would have no right to decide for himself. The view taken by the learned judge who wrote the opinion at the General Term would, we think, apply with great force to the ordinary case, as between tenant for life and remainderman, of a fund to be invested in the ordinary way of "trust funds. Such is the case assumed by him, and such are the principles laid down in Farwell v. Tweddle ( 10 Abb. N. C. 94 ).
In construing the meaning of the word “ revenue,” as used in the appropriation acts of 1881 and 1882, already quoted, other facts than the mere appropriation of money may be regarded; and it is proper not only to look at the previous ■state statutes, passed upon the subject of the land grant of congress, and its acceptance by legislative action, but also to ■carefully read the act of congress donating the land, as that act is the foundation upon which all our state statutes upon the subject are based. This may be done for the purpose of determining what was the true intent of the legislature when it appropriated these sums from the “ revenues ” of the trust fund.
The clear purpose of the act of- congress cannot .be mistaken. It was to provide a fund from the sale of the public lands or of the land scrip, of which the state should be the trustee and the safety of which should be guaranteed by it; and the whole interest of the principal sum was to be used for the purposes mentioned in the act, without the deduction of any costs, charges, or expenses of any name or nature. The whole actual earning of the fund was to be used for this purpose, and all expenses of management or disbursements were
This language is plain, and it shows the legislative intent to. fully comply with the conditions contained in the act of conr gress. It only required subsequent appropriations to pay over the entire proceeds of the trust fund to the beneficiary, and in this way the purpose of the federal act and of this state statute, would be fully carried out. In the same act 'the legislature also provided for the investment by the comptroller of these-trust funds in stocks of the United States, or of this state, or in some other safe stocks, yielding not less than five per cent of the par value of said stocks, and the moneys so invested were declared to constitute a perpetual fund, the capital of which should remain forever undiminished, except as provided for in and by said act of congress.
And in the act incorporating Cornell University the statute-provided for the payment to the university of all the income, revenue and avails received from the investment of the pro
Bearing in mind the relations between the federal and state-governments upon the subject of this land grant, and that Cornell University has received the benefits of the trust fund on tho conditions heretofore mentioned, we are in a position to inquire intelligently what was meant by the legislature when it used the language it did in appropriating moneys for the university in the years 1881 and 1882. In each of those years the legislature appropriated $25,000 to the Cornell University, and in making such appropriations it used this language: “ Payable, from the college land scrip fund, revenue, for the Cornell University, $25,000.” What did it mean by the use of such language ? Did it mean that the revenues of the trust fund were only such revenues as remained after the payment from them of those very expenses, which, by the terms of the act of congress, and by its own legislative act in accepting the land grant, the state was itself bound to pay, or did it mean that in accordance with both the act of congress and its own plain legislation upon that subject, theretofore adopted and passed, the term “revenue” included all the revenue-arising from the bonds purchased, without diminution or-subtraction by reason of expenses for investment or premiums, paid on such bonds, and that all such interest should, in good faith, be paid by it to this university which it had established and which was to receive the benefits accruing by reason of this act of congress? We think plainly it meant the latter. The state had not only received the lands and had thus become,possessed of this trust fund upon the conditions already mentioned, and by its legislation had accepted such conditions,, but in its act creating this university, and as a part consideration for its donation to it of the interest on this fund, it hadi required that the university should annually receive one hundred and twenty-eight students, that is one from each assembly-district, who should be gratuitously instructed by it in any or-
In preparing the opinion in the McGraw Case ( 111 N. Y. 66 ), reference was incidentally made to the duties of the state in connection with the trust fund. The subject arose while discussing the claim of the university that all the moneys arising from the Cornell contract of 1866, therein referred to, formed part of the -trust fund which belonged to the state, the interest of which was to be paid to the university. It was then stated that such a claim, if well founded, cast a great responsibility upon the state, and the requirements of the statute were then substantially recited as to the investment and payment of interest. The language of the opinion cannot be said to adjudge the point that the state was to guarantee the payment of the five
But there was no question of this nature before the court, in that case and none such was decided. The state could not obtain at par bonds of the character described in these acts, paying interest at the rate of five per cent, and we do not think, in view of the language both of the act of congress and of the statutes of the state, that the latter is liable, at all events,, to insure to the university five per cent upon the amount of the trust fund, irrespective of the rate which it is enabled to' receive by investing the fund in bonds of the character named in the legislation, both state and national, upon the subject.
We, therefore, modify the order of the General Term and direct the comptroller to issue his warrant for the payment to the university of all the interest from the investment remaining in his hands up to the amount of the $25,000 appropriated in each year respectively. If the amount is not agreed upon the order can be settled on notice.
All concur, except Finch, J., not sitting.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- In re the estate of McGraw 111 N. Y. 66 p. 550, p. 563
- Manchester & Hull v. Herrington 10 N. Y. 164 p. 557
- People ex rel. Vickerman v. Contracting Board 46 Barb. 254 at 261, 262 p. 557
- People ex rel. Bullard v. Contracting Board 33 N. Y. 382 p. 557
- People ex rel. Garbutt v. Rochester & State Line Railroad 76 N. Y. 294 p. 557
- People v. Allen 42 N. Y. 404 p. 557
- McGee v. Mathis 4 Wall. 143 at 155 p. 558
- People ex rel. Downing v. Stout 23 Barb. 338 p. 558
- National Bank v. Whitney 103 U. S. 99 p. 558
- People ex rel. Evans v. Chapin 101 N. Y. 682 p. 558