Martin v. Gilbert

The defendant claims that neither the affidavit to obtain the requisition, nor the requisition itself, nor the return of the coroner is in evidence in this case. He says that not one of them was formally put in evidence, and that, therefore, the court has no right to regard them or any of them. We do not think it was necessary to formally put those papers in evidence in order to have them considered by the trial court. By section 1717 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all of such papers must be made a part of the judgment-roll in the action, and a copy of each of them must be furnished to the court or referee upon the trial of the issue of fact. In looking over the case it would seem to have been tried upon the assumption that the papers were not only in ■existence but were to be regarded by the referee for all legitimate purposes. Taking them into consideration, we find a •statement in the affidavit that “ the plaintiffs are the owners of the following chattels hereinafter particularly described, viz.: Ready-made clothing as follows: Four overcoats, 223 coats, 224 vests, pants, 243 pairs, 36 boys’ suits, one pair of boys’ pants.” The requisition is to the coroner of the county of Erie, and he is required to replevy the chattels described in the within affidavit. And the coroner certifies and returns that on the 26th of Hovember, 1886, he executed the requisition indorsed on the affidavit annexed, for the delivery of the chattels mentioned in the said affidavit, “ by taking possession of all thereof to be found in my county, to wit: Four overcoats, 223 coats, 243 pants, 224 vests, 36 boys’ suits, one pair boys’ pants.” The return further stated that the ■defendant claimed re-delivery of said chattels by giving to the

Upon the trial the defendant, offered to prove that, of the personal property described in the affidavit made by the plaintiffs, the defendant did not have in his possession, or under his control when the demand was made upon him on the part of the plaintiffs and at the time of the commencement of this action, more than one-quarter, and that no more than one-quarter of such property ever came into his possession, or was in his possession when such property was replevied by the coroner. This evidence was objected to on the part of the plaintiffs as tending to vary or alter the admissions made by the defendant in this action, contained in his undertaking given to the plaintiffs upon the retaking of the goods seized by the coroner, herein described in the affidavit ’ accompanying the requisition. The objection was sustained and the defendant excepted. The General Term of the Supreme Court has held that this was error, and on account thereof has reversed the judgment and granted a new trial.

We think the referee was right in rejecting the evidence. The affidavit of the plaintiffs described all the property

We cannot distinguish this case in principle from that of Diossy y. Morgan ( 14 N. Y. 11 ).

It is true that^he facts in the Diossy Case differ from those herein. In the former the stone in controversy was on plaintiff’s land and the defendant had placed men at work upon the stone, who were engaged in cutting it and assuming possession and ownership of it. The sheriff took the stone foi the plaintiff on the requisition in the replevin action, and the

Has not this defendant caused a bond to be executed, containing a jilain admission of a fact, viz.: That the coroner had taken the property described in the affidavit from his (defendant’s) j>ossession; and has not the defendant, by reason of the bond containing such admission, procured*the coroner to re-deliver to him such property thus taken from him 1 Certainly he has. If it had not been for the bond the property would" have been delivered to the plaintiff, in which event the defendant could have shown that the property taken was not described in the affidavit, or was not that of the plaintiff.

Instead of this, however, the defendant permits the coroner to take the property without a word of denial that it was the identical property described in the affidavit and requisition, and in addition thereto he causes the bond to be executed in order to take back the property, and therein he plainly admits that it is the same property. But now, upon the trial of the case, he asks to be permitted to show that not more than one-quarter of the property that was taken was that which was described in the affidavit. To allow this is to violate the principle of the Diossy Case, which was, that what was solemnly admitted as a fact by an admission in the bond, should not be contradicted on the trial. It is also most unjust that it should be otherwise. Where property is taken under a requisition, and the plaintiff sees by the bond which has been executed, and which, by the Code, is to be delivered to him by the sheriff (§ 1708), a plain and distinct admission that the officer has taken the property described in plaintiff’s affidavit and requisition, he has a right to rely on such admission and take no further steps towards proving the point as to the possession by the defendant of the very property described in the requisition. He may also give up any attempt to seek further for property which the defendant solemnly admits he is himself in possession of. Otherwise, and in just such a case as this, the defendant having obtained delivery of the property upon executing the bond, and not having made the least denial or question at the time of the taking, but that the property taken was the same as the property described in the requisition, may at once sell or otherwise dispose of it. By so doing the plaintiff is precluded from any further examination of the property, and cannot in that way strengthen his contention that it was identical with that named in the affidavit. In addition to that the plaintiff is thrown off his guard by the

Upon the trial, however, the defendant, notwithstanding his admission in his bond, asks to show that the property is not identical, and he thus endeavors to reap the advantage which the admission has given him in causing the plaintiffs to rely upon the same, and to come unprepared for the trial -of such an issue.

Is it right that he should have such an opportunity at the plaintiffs’ expense?

The course of the trial herein shows that the plaintiffs did rely entirely upon the admission in the bond for the purpose of proving the identity of the goods taken from defendant’s possession with those described in the affidavit and requisition, and the bond was received in evidence for that purpose. If the denial had been made when the property was taken, the plaintiffs could have looked into the question more fully and have satisfied themselves either that the defendant was wrong, or, if right, could have given it up and made further search regarding the property they claimed. If they concluded to take it, and the sheriff was satisfied, then they would have been much more careful as to procuring proof of the identity of the goods claimed with those taken, and much better prepared to prove such fact upon the trial. But the course taken by the defendant wholly disarms them upon that point. Assuming the truth of the admission, and that there would be no denial of the fact of identity of goods or possession by defendant, the plaintiffs might naturally and rightfully rely upon such admission as to those facts and simply prepare themselves to jirove the other material facts in the case, viz.: Title to the goods that were taken, assuming them to be the goods described in the affidavit and admitted in the bond.

It is to prevent such injustice that the Diossy Gase says that the fact of the possession of the property by the defendant, which has been admitted in the bond, shall not be contradicted. In that case the injustice worked by the other rule

If the defendant desire to raise the question of identity, he should raise it, not by admitting it in the bond and subsequently contradicting such admission, but he might sue the sheriff for the taking, or leave the property in his hands and try the case, and, if successful, the property would be returned or its value insured to him.

It is said that the recital in the bond was not necessary, as the fact is not, by the statute, made necessary to be stated. I do not see that that makes any difference. The bond itself is required by the statute, and in order to make it in anywise intelligible it is necessary that some statement should be made of the purpose for which it is executed, and the recital in question was made for that purpose, and I cannot see why it should not be just as conclusive in a case where the defendant wishes to deny the possession of part of the property as where he wishes to deny the possession of the whole.

The case of Weber v. Manne ( 42 Hun, 557 ) was reversed in this court. ( 105 N. Y. 627 .)

The same principle has been held in other states. In Mead v. Figh ( 4 Ala. 279 ), it was held that a bond for redelivery of a chattel, which recited a levy and contained a promise to produce the chattel, could not be contradicted by showing that there was no such chattel and that the levy was fictitious. The court said: “ The law gives the defendant a right to suspend the collection of the money upon his doing certain acts, and it could not be tolerated that he should be permitted afterwards to say these acts are not binding on him because they assert a falsehood.” 1

In Frost v. White ( 14 La. Ann. 140 ), the same holding is maintained. Property was attached which was bonded by an intervenor, and a motion made to dissolve the attachment on several grounds, one of which was that no property was in fact attached. The court said the admission had been judicially made by giving a bond.which contained a description of the property attached, and, therefore, the intervenor was concluded by his admission and estopped from denying its truth.

In Shaw v. McCullough ( 3 West Va. 260 ), the court said that parties voluntarily'entering into a forthcoming bond, are estopped from all inquiry into the regularity or validity of the levy of the writ of fieri facias upon which the bond was taken. The bond recited the fact that the writ had issued and the property had been levied on, under it, and that was conclusive.

In Schnaider Brewing Co. v. Niederweisser ( 28 Mo. App. 233 , 236), the defendant offered to show that certain of the property mentioned in the requisition and recited in the bond as having been taken under it, was in fact at the time that the bond was given, and ever since had been in plaintiff’s possession. The evidence was excluded and the court held such exclusion to be right, because the respondents should not be permitted to contradict by oral testimony their own recitals in the bond given by them.

In Carpenter v. Stearns ( 32 Mo. App. 132 ), the court said that the defendants, having availed themselves of the benefits of the statute, which allows them to keep the property on giving a bond, are estopped from showing or

In Hundley v. Filbert ( 73 Mo. 34 ), the obligors in a delivery bond were estopped by a recital therein from showing that there was no levy upon which the property was taken.

In State ex rel. v. Williams ( 77 Mo. 463 ), it was held that a recital in a bond is a solemn admission by the obligor of the truth of the fact recited, and where in an action against him the bond is pleaded in licec verba, the effect is the same as if there were a formal plea of estoppel. The claim was made in the above case that there was no proof that a party named was ever appointed guardian. The consideration of the bond recited that “whereas the above Robert H. Williams is the lawful guardian,” etc. The court said, “this recital is a solemn admission by the defendants of William’s guardianship,” and defendant was held estopped by such admission from questioning the fact.

The case of Miller v. Moses ( 56 Me. 128 ) contains nothing opposed to these views. There the plaintiff in. the replevin suit, in order to get his requisition, gave a bond, and of course it was for all the property which he expected to replevy. He .was beaten in the action, aud the defendant in that action thereupon sued on the bond to recover damages for taking his property. It was held in the latter action that the recital in the bond as to the purpose for which it issued, and describing all the property claimed, did not estop the defendant in such latter action from showing as a fact that only a part of the property described therein had been subsequently taken by the sheriff. The court said in such case the bond constitutes no estoppel. It is ordinarily given before the goods are replevied. It is based upon the writ, and assumes that what is ordered to be replevied, will be. But if not found, they cannot be, and for those that are found, the bond will be security and for no more-.

This is not our case. Upon the whole, both on principle and authority, we think the evidence was not admissible, and the referee was, therefore, right in refusing the defendant’s offer to show the alleged fact.

The General Term erred in granting a new trial, and its order should, therefore, be reversed and the judgment upon the report of the referee affirmed, with costs.

All concur, except Andrews, J, not voting.

Order reversed and judgment affirmed.

On a subsequent motion for re-argument, the following opinion was handed down :

Several grounds for this motion are stated. Among them it is urged that the court overlooked the fact that defendant in his answer denied that he ever had possession of the property mentioned in the plaintiffs’ complaint or in the affidavit accompanying the requisition, and that it also overlooked the fact that section lYOl of the Code gives a defendant a right to demand a return of the chattels replevied, whether they were mentioned in the affidavit accompanying the requisition or not. FTeither fact was overlooked.

The denial in the defendant’s answer is of a somewhat ambiguous nature, and whether it could be fairly construed as raising a question as to the identity of the goods taken by the coroner with those described in the requisition, or only a question of title to the chattels, assuming those described in the requisition to have been taken by the coroner, is not clear. But this court assumed it to have been the former. One reason for regarding the proposed evidence as inadmissible was that the defendant by virtue of his bond had demanded and received a return of the property, and it being from that time in his possession and under his entire control, he could at once sell or otherwise dispose of the property and thus effectually prevent any further efforts at identification on the part of the plaintiffs. The service of an answer containing such a denial several weeks after the return of the property to defendant, would plainly have no

The provisions of the Code (§ 1104) were also not overlooked. The fact that the defendant has under that section the right to a return of the property taken by the sheriff on giving a bond, etc., even though it be not the property described in the requisition, was noticed and its effect appreciated by us. If the property taken be not the property mentioned and described in the requisition, then there is neither necessity nor propriety in reciting in the bond that it is such property. Where such recital is made it is evidence that the defendant intends to litigate only the question of title, and not the question of the identity of the goods. Under such circumstances there is still greater reason why the plaintiff should rely on it, and why the defendant should be bound by it. He recovers the possession of the property by reason of the bond, and he therein asserts that it is the same property mentioned in the requisition. There is nothing in the opinion criticised which shows that the only remedy of the defendant in this case was to sue the sheriff or leave the property in his hands. The counsel has made a most earnest argument in his brief, founded upon the general merits of his claim. We are entirely unconvinced of the error of our decision and we do not share in the fear of the serious calamities that may follow our persistence in it. On the contrary, we think gross injustice may follow the adoption of the other rule, as we have attempted to point out.

Two cases have been cited in the brief of the learned counsel which he claims are conclusive upon the question in controversy and which were not cited on the argument, and upon them he

The first was an action brought for a trespass alleged to have been committed upon a lot belonging to the plaintiff, and upon a trial before Coleridge, J., the defendant gave in evidence a deed made between the defendant and the plaintiff and one William Fansliawe, in which was claimed to be an admission by way of a recital, that the land in question belonged to the defendant. The deed was admitted in evidence, but it was contended by plaintiff’s counsel that the recital, though so admissible was not conclusive, and he- proposed to show that the admission was made- under a misapprehension. The evidence as to the mistake was admitted and a verdict was found for the plaintiff. The defendant obtained a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside on the ground that the recital was conclusive against the plaintiff, and after argument upon that order the judgment of the court was delivered by Parke, B., and it was held that the admission was not conclusive and that the judgment was correctly given fór plaintiff. It was held to be not conclusive because the action in question was not founded on the deed, but was wholly collateral to it, and, therefore, the party ought to be permitted to dispute the facts so admitted.

The case in the Forty-first Flew York is of the same nature, although an action of ejectment. The recitals in both cases were, as stated in each, wholly collateral to the action then on trial. They had no relation to it whatever, directly or indirectly. It was nothing more than the case of an admission in a matter in nowise connected with the action in which it was desired to use it as conclusive evidence. Upon no basis of common sense could it be done.

But in the case at bar it is entirely different. "While, technically, the action is not upon the undertaking, yet still the undertaking was executed on the part of the defendant, pursuant to the Oode, and as one of the steps in the conduct of this very action, and it was by reason of its execution and

The action of Diossy v. Morgan ( 14 N. Y. 11 ), with the decision in which the counsel finds no fault, was no more brought upon the undertaking than is this action, and the undertaking is no more collateral in this action than was the undertaking in that of Diossy. If the counsel be right in his claim that this action is not only not brought upon the undertaking, but the undertaking is wholly collateral to it, then the Diossy case was, in any event, wrongly decided. But the estoppel, in that case, was based entirely upon the recital in that undertaking. The opinion of Judge Bapallo is plain upon that point,, and upon that question the two cases cannot be distinguished.

The learned counsel says our decision holds that an unnecessary recital in a written instrument estops the party making it from denying its truth, not only in actions on the instrument,but in any case where the instrument may be invoked as evidence of the facts recited. Also, that a party to an action, discovering that his opponent, inadvertently, and in the most general terms, has admitted, in writing, a question in issue, may fold his hands and rely upon the admission as estopping his opponent from proving the contrary, however erroneous the admission may be. The decision which we have made in this case cannot be tortured into holding either of the two propositions advanced by the counsel. The facts which we have spoken of so often as almost to be wearisome are wholly ignored in these statements and the character of the action, as related to the instrument containing the recitals, is mistakenly described.

We see no reason for granting a re-argument and the motion is, therefore, denied, with $10 costs.

All concur.

Motion denied.