Majority
Headnote
In an action upon a policy of fire insurance on both real and. personal property, it appeared that by the terms of the policy any loss upon the real estate was payable to 0., as mortgagee. The insurance company defendant claimed that 0. should be made-a party defendant; he was thereupon brought in and served with process. He answered, claiming that he was entitled to $544.74. The insurance company served on plaintiff an offer of judgment for $645.30 and costs. The court found that plaintiff’s loss on the real estate was $520.30, and on personal property $100. Two separate judgments were ordered against the company; one in favor of plaintiff for $100 and interest, and the other in favor of O. for $520.30 and interest. Upon taxation of costs plaintiff claimed that the costs of defendant O. should be added to the two recoveries in determining whether he had obtained a more favorable judgment than that offered by the company. Held, untenable; and that defendant was entitled to its costs, as against plaintiff, arising subsequent to the offer of judgment.The plaintiff was insured in the defendant’s company to the amount of $1,350. The insurance was for $1,100 on the real estate, and $250 on personal property. The loss, if any, occurring on the real estate was, by the terms of the policy, payable to defendant J ames E. Coit, as his mortgage interest therein should appear. The plaintiff sustained a loss by fire. The amount of the loss on the personal property was conceded to be $100, and no one but the plaintiff had any interest in its payment. In regard to the real estate the plaintiff claimed a larger loss than the defendant admitted. Hence this action. The defendant alleged as a defense, that the mortgagee Coit had an interest in the subject-matter of the action, and must be served with process in order to a complete determination of the questions to be litigated. Thereupon the defendant Coit was served with process, and put in an answer claiming that out of the amount paid by. the company defendant, he, Coit, should receive an amount sufficient to pay his mortgage interest in the premises, which he claimed
The trial judge ordered two separate judgments in the case against the company defendant; one in favor of plaintiff for $100 and interest (in all $113.33), together with costs; the other judgment in favor of defendant Coit for $520.30 damages and interest from February 4, 1887, with costs. The insurance company claimed that its offer to the plaintiff to take judgment was more favorable than the judgment actually recovered against it, excluding the costs of defendant Coit, which plaintiff claimed should be added to the two recoveries, in order to determine the question whether he had obtained a more favorable judgment than that which was offered by the company defendant. If the costs of Coit ought properly to be added to the two recoveries, it is conceded that the sum exceeds the sum for which the company defendant offered the plaintiff to allow judgment to be taken against it;. otherwise not. The section of the Code (738) relative to offers of judgment, so far as material, reads as follows: “ The defendant may, before the trial, serve upon the plaintiff’s attorney a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the sum, or property, or to the effect therein specified, with costs. If there are two or more defendants, and the action can be severed, a like offer may be made by one or more defendants against whom a separate judgment may be taken.”
The defendant Coit was a party simply to ascertain the amount of his interest in the policy as measured by his mortgage interest in the property which was the subject of the loss.
We think that the defendant was entitled to its costs against plaintiff arising subsequent to the offer on the ground that the plaintiff failed to obtain a more favorable judgment than was offered him. We also think that the directions of the statute are explicit, and that they refer to actions which are in the nature of equitable actions as well as to actions at law.
The orders appealed from should be reversed, and an order made granting the company defendant’s motion to tax its costs in the action against the plaintiff from the time of the service of the offer, together with its costs in this court and in the court below upon this motion.
All concur.
Orders reversed.
Cases cited
- Bathgate v. Haskin 63 N. Y. 261 p. 644, p. 645
- Merrill v. Agricultural Insurance 73 N. Y. 452 p. 644
- Garrison v. Garrison 67 How. Pr. 271 p. 645
- Browning v. Home Insurance 71 N. Y. 508 p. 645
- Post v. New-York Central Railroad 12 How. Pr. 552 p. 645