Majority
Headnote
A certificate of membership was issued to one S. by a subordinate lodge of the Order of United Workmen, incorporated under the act of 1877 (§ 4, chap. 74, Laws of 1877), which provides for a beneficiary fund to be paid to the heirs or representatives of deceased members, “or to such person or persons as such deceased member may, while living, have directed,” and that “ the person or persons to whom and the manner and time in which the same shall be paid on the death of a member shall be regulated and controlled by the rules and by-laws of the corporation.” The by-laws provided (§ 17) that any member desiring to make a new direction as to the payment of a beneficiary certificate held by him may do so by authorizing such change in writing on the back of his certificate, and that “no change shall be valid and binding until reported to the grand recorder and a new certificate issued. ” The sum specified in the certificate was made payable on the death of S. to plaintiff, his wife, and was delivered to her; she also became a member of an endowment company, the certificate being made payable to S. on her death; subsequently S. and his wife separated. She took possession of the certificate issued to her without his consent, and he, without her consent, took the certificate issued to him, and pursuant to an agreement with one P., who was in no way related to him, a new certificate was issued, payable to P. upon the death of S.; all of the steps required by the by-laws of the society having been complied with. The wife paid no part of the expenses incident to such membership of her husband or of herself. Upon the death of S., his wife brought this action, claiming that her interest in the certificate was vested and she was entitled to recover the amount due upon it. Held, untenable; and that as the by-laws of the corporation imposed no limit as to the persons to whom certificates should be payable, S. had a right to direct the anipunt of his certificate to be paid to a stranger having no insurable interest in his life, and his appointee could be changed at any time he might elect upon conforming with the requirements of the by-laws of the society.The appellant insists that the cancellation of the first certificate which was payable to her, and the substitution of the second, which was payable to the respondent, were void for two reasons :
1. That the respondent had no insurable interest in the life of John 0. Sabin.
2. That'she, the wife, acquired by virtue of the first certificate and its delivery to her a vested right to the sum payable on her husband’s death of which she could not be deprived without her consent.
The statute under which the corporation was organized expressly provides that the funds “ may be set apart and provided to be paid over to the families, heirs or representatives of deceased or disabled members, or to such person or persons as such deceased member may, while liwi/ng, home directed.”
The by-laws of a corporation impose no limitation on the persons to whom certificates should be payable. It was held in Massey v. Mutual Relief Society of Rochester ( 102 N. Y. 523 ) that there being no restriction in the act under which the society-was incorporated against making a certificate payable to a person in nowise related to the member, that a certificate issued to a stranger was not void as a wager policy. In that case the certificate was issued in favor of a person not related to the member, and who was not a member of the society, but in the case at bar, the certificate was issued in favor of a member of the order. Under the statute and by-laws a member of this corporation can legally direct the sum to become due at his death to be paid to a stranger having no insurable interest in his life. (Niblack on M. B. Societies, § 178.)
Did the plaintiff by the certificate and its delivery to her acquire a vested interest in the sum payable thereunder, of winch she could not be deprived without her consent %
It is to be observed that the wife never paid any part of the
The relation which existed between Sabin and the society subjected him to certain burdens and entitled him to certain benefits during the continuance of his membership, and if he died while in good standing in the order his appointee became entitled to a certain sum. This relation could be terminated at any túne at the will of the member, and the appointee was changeable from time to time as he might elect. If we choose to term this relation a contract and it was established by agreement, the contract gave the right of change of the beneficiary with or without reason. Any person who became an appointee in such a certificate took the position subject to the absolute right of the member to substitute a new one at any moment. The rights acquired by the member by virtue of this relation did not amount to a chose in action. He had no interest in the society that was assignable or transferable until some right of action had accrued. The appointee had no vested interest in the sum which might in a contingency become payable on death of the member. (Hellenberg v. Dist. No. 1, supra; Sanger v. Rothschild, supra; Brown v. Catholic Mutual Benefit Assn., 33 Hun, 263 : Boasberg v. Cronan, 30 N. Y. S. R. 483.)
It being settled that an appointee under such a contract has no vested interest in the sum, the position taken bv the plaintiff in this case becomes utterly untenable.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Bradley, J., not sitting, and Haight, J., not voting.
Judgment affirmed.