p. 235ciency be entered against Mrs. Capron. Mrs. Capron filed proper exceptions to the findings of the trial court, and from the judgment entered appealed to the General Term and then to this court.
Scripture db Backus for appellants.
D. E. Wager for respondent.
The papers on this appeal, brought up for examination by the General Term, are simply, and alone, the judgment roll, and the exceptions annexed thereto. (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 994, 998;
Schwarz v. Weber, 103 N. Y. 658 ; 2 Rumsey’s Pr. 386, 387.) As it does not appear that the appellant submitted to the trial court any requests to find facts, under section 1023 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the exceptions to findings of fact cannot be heard on this appeal.
(Graff v.
Ross, 14 N. Y. S. R. 636; 47 Hun, 152 ; 2 Rumsey’s Pr. 389 ;
Porter v. Smith, 107 N. Y. 531 ;
Sweet v. Morrison, 30 N. Y. S. R. 23.) As the title is in James Watson, he is not liable to pay Mrs. Banks. (
Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 .) To entitle Mary Banks (or her assignee Bielby) to the Watson mortgage or its benefits, the relation of principal and surety must exist between Watson and Cornelia A., so far as Mary Banks is concerned, so that the latter could claim by way of subrogation the Watson mortgage as creditor of those two, or of one of them.
(Halsey v.
Reed, 9 Paige, 446;
King v.
Whitely, 10 id. 465;
Cornell v. Prescott, 2 Barb. 16 ;
Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74 ;
Burr v.
Beers, 24 id. 178 ;
Garnsey v.
Rogers, 47 id. 233 ;
Thorp v.
K. C. Co., 48 id. 253;
Vrooman v.
Turner, 69 id. 280;
Pardee v.
Treat, 82 id. 385;
Roe v.
Banker, Id. 431;
Dunning v.
leavitt, 85 id. 30;
Canter v.
Holcham, 92 id. 498 ;
Rector, etc., v.
Mack, 93 id. 488;
Seward v.
Huntington, 94 id. 104;
Wheat v.
Rice, 97 id. 296;
Darling v.
Skinner, 42 Hun, 323 ;
Lorilland v.
Clyde, 16 N. Y. S. R. 587.) To sustain an action for breach of covenant of warranty, it is not essential for plaintiff to prove that he has been forcibly evicted from the premises by paramount title. (
Wood
p. 236v. Forncrook, 3 T. & C. 303;
Tucker v. Cooney, 34 Hun, 227 ;
Greenvault v.
Davis, 4 id. 643;
Clarke v.
McNulty, 3 S. & R. 372; Rawle on Cov. [5th ed.] § 134; Stone v.
Hooker, 9 Cow. 154 ; St.
John v.
Palmer, 5 Hill, 599 ;
Brown v.
Allen, 32 N. Y. S. R. 796.) The Watson mortgage to Cornelia A. Capron, was a security and as a bond of indemnity to her, and when her thirty-seven and one-half acres were sold on the Banks foreclosure, by the very terms of the Watson mortgage, said Cornelia A. (and plaintiff, as her assignee) had a right to foreclose that Watson mortgage without waiting to be evicted from the thirty-seven and one-half acres.
(Rockfeller v. Donnelly, 8 Cow. 623 ;
Churchill v. Hunt, 3 Den. 321 ;
Wright v. Whiting, 40 Barb. 235 ;
Jarvis v.
Sewal, Id. 449 ;
Gilbert v.
Winans, 1 N. Y. 550 ;
Thomas v.
Allen, 1 Hill, 145 ;
Bancroft v. Winspear, 44 Barb. 209 ;
Johnson v.
Tuttle, 9 Hun, 469 ;
Beloni v.
Friesbie, 63 N. Y. 383 -390;
Kohler v.
Mathage, 72 id. 266;
N. Bank v.
Bigler, 83 id. 51.) Mary Banks could make no claim to the proceeds of the twenty-two acres. (30 N. Y. S. R. 496.) The defendant’s exceptions to the findings of the trial judge should be specific, and point out the particular error. If they do not, such exceptions are not available, if any part of the finding is good.
(Newlin v.
Lyons, 49 N. Y. 661 ;
Crawford v.
Everson, 68 id. 624;
Rogers v.
Rogers, 111 id. 237.)
The defendant, Mrs. Capron, agreed to warrant and defend the land conveyed to the plaintiff against any person lawfully claiming the same, “ according to a mortgage that day assigned to the said Cornish,” and the controversy between the parties to this appeal hinges upon/the meaning and force of the phrase italicised. It is impossible to know with certainty what was in the minds of the parties when that phrase was used. It was preceded by a formal and complete covenant of warranty, and the force and effect of that covenant should not be cut down by any words of doubtful import, much less by words to which it is difficult to assign any definite meaning. It is probable that the parties meant
p. 237by the phrase quoted one of two things: (1) Either that the plaintiff should have for his protection the Watson mortgage, at the same time assigned to him, and that he should hold that mortgage as collateral security to the covenant, and that he should have the right in case Watson did not pay the Banks mortgage to enforce the Watson mortgage according to its terms, and to thus indemnify himself, so far as he could for any damage he might sustain from a breach of the covenant. (2) Or that he should have the same protection against the Banks mortgage which Watson in his mortgage had agreed to give her, and whichever of these meanings we attribute to this language the same result is accomplished. We are at least unable to see that this uncertain language cuts down or limits the liability of Mrs. Capron upon her covenant, and so no error was committed in giving that covenant the force and effect provided in the judgment.
Watson not having paid the Banks mortgage, Mrs. Capron, if she had retained the Watson mortgage, could have foreclosed it for her indemnity, and the plaintiff, as her assignee, may enforce it to the same extent as she could if she had not assigned it.
There is no plausibility in the claim that the covenant for quiet enjoyment was not broken. The title was swept away by the foreclosure of the Banks mortgage, and the plaintiff relinquished possession of the land as he was bound to do after the foreclosure and sale and the conveyance made in pursuance thereof.
We see no reason to doubt that the judgment is right and it should be affirmed with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.