Majority
Headnote
Except where there is a loss of interest hy a failure of a trustee, to make an authorized investment, he may not he made liable for interest not earned, and which could not have been earned by the exercise of vigi-' lance, unless there has been a misapprojiriation hy him of the trust fund or some misfeasance equivalent to it.The appellant, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, has been charged by the court below with interest upon the trust funds in his hands at the rate of six per cent per annum. He deposited the moneys in a national bank where he kept an individual account, and they were credited to him in this account as deposited. The assignment was executed March 2, 1887, and on January 8th, 1888, an action was brought to set it aside, which was pending for upwards of three years. A reference to take and state his account was ordered, and the referee reported in favor of charging him with two per cent interest upon the balance in his hands from time to time from the commencement of the action to the date of the report. The referee held that, as it must have been apparent when this litigation began, the distribution of the fund would necessarily be delayed, it was the duty of the assignee to have deposited the money in a trust company where it could have earned at least two per cent interest and been withdrawn on demand; and his account was surcharged accordingly. The special term, upon the motion to confirm the referee’s report, increased the interest charge to six percent, the general term affirmed the order, and the assignee brings this appeal.
Except where there is a loss of interest by a failure to make an authorized investment we do not think a trustee can properly be made liable for interest not earned, and which could not have been earned by the exercise of diligence, unless there has been a misappropriation of the fund, or some misfeasance of the trust equivalent to it. If the trust moneys.
The fund was not subjected to any greater peril than if it had been deposited in his name as assignee. In either case it might have been drawn out at his pleasure, and for such purposes as he might designate. The bank would not be responsible for the proper use of the moneys by the trustee. Nor was it, correctly speaking, a commingling of trust moneys with his ■own. When deposited the identity of the money was lost ;and its ownership changed. Thereafter the relation of the bank to the depositor was that of debtor and creditor. The moneys were as secure against misappropriation as if they had been kept in his o.wn safe or strong box. Wherever they wrere they were necessarily under his control and subject to his disposition. A dishonest trustee always has it in,his power to misappropriate the trust funds. The aptpellant cannot be so ■classed for he preserved the fund in its integrity. Unquestionably it was his duty, if he deposited the funds in bank, to make the deposit in his name and to his credit as assignee of the insolvent debtor. A deposit of trust moneys should ■always be in the name and to the credit of the trustee and not in his individual account. The condition of the fund will "then, at all times and in all contingencies, be more readily .ascertainable and the temptation to use it for private purposes less. If the trustee omits this duty the risk is his own. But
Upon the facts appearing in this case there was no conversion of the fund by the trustee to his private use, and it is not just that he should be charged with any greater amount than the possible loss to the fund by his omission to deposit it where some rate of interest might have been allowed. (Matter of Cornell, 110 N. Y. 357 .)
The appellant has also been charged, and, as we think, erroneously, with $100, the amount of costs collected by his attorney in suits brought against the assignee w'hich were unsuccessful. These costs belong to the attorney and not to the estate. "Wherever the legal title to costs may be as between attorney and client before collection, after they have been collected by the attorney his lien upon them has been reduced to possession and the client cannot insist upon their payment to him in the absence of a special agreement entitling him to receive them. The attorney was allowed for his services as counsel in the litigation to which the assignee was a party a gross sum by the referee and the court below; but it is very clear that this sum did not include, but was intended to be in addition to the costs collected. As the order stands the assignee will be compelled to pay the attorney the full amount allowed. He cannot deduct from it the costs collected by the attorney or require him to refund them. He is in effect required to pay $100 out of his private funds.
The orders of the general and special term must be reversed, with costs in all courts to the appellant, to be paid out of the estate, and the report of the referee confirmed and decree modified in accordance with this opinion.
All concur.
Ordered accordingly.
Cases cited
- Price v. Holman 135 N. Y. 124 at 134 p. 469, p. 473
- Stiles v. Stiles 1 Lans. 90 p. 469
- Van Alen v. American National Bank 52 N. Y. 1 p. 469
- Wilmerding v. McKesson 103 N. Y. 329 p. 469
- Conquest v. Barnes 121 N. Y. 694 p. 469
- Brown v. Rickets 4 Johns. Ch. 303 p. 470
- Duffy v. Duncan 32 Barb. 587 p. 470
- McLean v. Freeman 70 N. Y. 81 p. 470
- In re Myers 131 N. Y. 409 p. 472