Majority
Headnote
In a declaration presented to the superintendent of insurance hy persons applying for incorporation as a casualty insurance company the business proposed to be carried on was stated, among other things, to be “the inspection and certification as to the sanitary conditions of buildings and premises.” In pursuance of the requirements of the Insurance Law, providing for the organization of such companies (§ 70, chap. 690, Laws of 1893), the superintendent submitted the declaration and charter to the attorney-general for certification; that officer refused to certify. In proceedings by mandamus to compel the certification, held, that the business so stated in the declaration was not insurance in any legal sense, but an entirely distinct kind of business not within the purview of the Insurance Law, and so the declaration was not entitled to be filed in the office of the superintendent, and the attorney-general ■properly refused to attach his certificate of approval thereto.The relator appeals from the order of the general term, third department, reversing order granting a writ of peremptory mandamus, commanding the attorney-
“ When application is made to the superintendent of insurance by any persons desiring to become incorporated as an insurance corporation or for authority to transact the business of insurance in this state, under or pursuant to any declaration and charter presented for filing in the insurance department, or any amended declaration or charter required by law to be filed or to be apjnoved by the superintendent, the superintendent shall not file such declaration and charter or grant such certificate of authority until such declaration and charter shall have been examined by the attorney-general and certified by him to the superintendent to be in accordance with the requirements of law.”
In pursuance of this section the superintendent of insurance submitted the declaration and charter in the case at bar to the attorney-general to be examined by him and certified to be in accordance with the requirements of law. The attorney-general transmitted to the superintendent of insurance an opinion in writing, reading in part as follows, viz.:
“ In reply, permit me to say that this application is made under subdivision 8, section 70 of the Insurance Law. The business proposed to be carried on is the inspection and certification as to the sanitary conditions of buildings and premises against loss or damage to life or health from causes arising from the imperfect sanitary conditions of such buildings or premises ; the insurance of landlords, lessees,, tenants or occupants of houses, flats, office buildings or other structures from
“ In my opinion, this is not a kind of casualty insurance such as is specified in any of the subdivisions of section YO; nor is it a kind of insurance that can be lawfully carried on under said section.
“ I, therefore, decline to attach my certificate of approval to said proposed declaration and charter.”
The relator thereupon applied to the special term for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the attorney-general to certify to the superintendent of insurance that the said declaration and charter were in accordance with the requirements of law; this application was granted. The attorney-general appealed to the general term where the order was reversed, the court holding mandamus was not the proper remedy and refusing to consider the merits of the case.
As we are of opinion that the learned attorney-general correctly decided the question submitted to him, we do not deem it necessary to consider the question of remedy discussed in the courts below. The proposed company seeks to carry on as a part of an insurance business, according to its declaration, “ the inspection and certification as to the sanitary conditions of buildings and premises.” This is not insurance in any legal sense, but an entirely distinct kind of business not within the purview of the statute now under consideration. We, therefore, hold that the declaration and charter of the proposed company were not in accordance with the requirements of law, and are not entitled to be filed in the office of the superintendent of insurance.
The general term order, for the reasons stated, is hereby affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Order affirmed.
Cases cited
- Howland v. Eldredge 43 N. Y. 457 p. 127
- People ex rel. Staats v. Tremain 17 How. Pr. 142 p. 127
- People ex rel. Belden v. Contracting Board 27 N. Y. 378 p. 127
- People ex rel. Vickerman v. Contracting Board 46 Barb. 254 p. 127
- People ex rel. Bullard v. Contracting Board 33 N. Y. 382 p. 127
- People ex rel. Belknap v. Beach 57 How. Pr. 337 p. 127
- People ex rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Rice 138 N. Y. 151 p. 127
- People ex rel. Millard v. Chapin 104 N. Y. 96 p. 127