Majority
Headnote
1. Public Officers—Time of Election. The election of a public officer must be referred to the day upon which the electoral body, in whom the right of election resides, expresses its choice by voting for candidates for the office, and not to some subsequent day when the result is declared; and there is no distinction in this respect between town and other elections.This was an action in the nature of a quo warranto brought in the name of the attorney-general to oust the defendant from the office of town clerk of the town of "Watervliet, in the county of Albany, upon the allegation that he had wrongfully intruded into the same, without color of right or authority of law. It is conceded that the relator was elected to that office at the town meeting held in the town in the month of April, 1893. The dispute arises wholly with respect to the duration of the term which he was elected to fill, whether one or two years. The defendant is in possession of the office under color of an election by the people held at the town meeting in April, 1894, but if the term for which the relator
. The election of town officers in this town is regulated.by a special statute (Laws of 1858, ch. 22), which provides for the division of the town into convenient election districts, and enabling the electors to vote for town officers by ballot on the day preceding the day prescribed by law, in each year, for holding the general town meeting. The annual town meeting was held in the town on the 11th day of April, 1893, but, under the statute referred to, the votes of the electors for town officers were cast on the day preceding; that is, on the 10th day of April, in the various election districts of the town, and on that day duly canvassed by the several boards of inspectors, and statements in writing as' to the result made and signed by the boards in all the districts. These statements were delivered to the board of the annual town meeting, held on the succeeding day, and, under the statute, it then became the duty of this board to canvass the statements and declare the result of the election for town officers in the whole town,' “the same as though such votes had been polled at such annual town meeting.” (§ 19.) The result was declared by the board on the 16th of - April, 1893, and the relator was found to be duly elected town, clerk, and subsequently qualified and entered upon, the duties of the office.
On the 11th of April, 1893, the day of the annual town meeting, and the day that the several statements of the result of the voting for town officers in the several districts were delivered to the town board, the governor, at about half-past ten o’clock in the forenoon, signed and approved chapter 344 of the Laws of that year, amending the Town Law and providing, among other things, that the term of office of town clerks should be two years. The claim of the relator is that he was •elected after this statute took effect, and hence his official term was two years. We think, that this contention cannot be sustained. The electors of the town expressed their choice for the office of town clerk when they deposited their ballots
That statute can have full effect by confining its application to town elections held, in which the votes for town officers were actually cast after it took effect and thus giving to it a
The amendment of 1893 cannot fairly be applied to this case without extending the term of the relator, as it existed, on the day of his election, to two years, and this would be an unconstitutional' exercise of power. The legislature cannot extend the term of a town officer after his election, since that would virtually be an appointment to the office during the period of extension. The legislature cannot appoint town officers; they must either be elected by the people of the town or appointed by such town authorities as the legislature may designate for that puipose. (Canst, art. 10, § 2.) The power of appointment in such cases cannot be directly exercised by the legislature nor indirectly by extending the term of a town officer after his election. It may, of course, enlai’ge the official terms of town officers, but such action can operate only upon officers thereafter elected. Where the office is to be filled by one authority and the duration of the term is to be determined by another the declaration of such duration must
It follows that since the act of 1893 did not take effect until the day after the votes for the relator were cast and counted it had no effect upon his official term, but that question must be determined by the prior law under which it had been fixed at one year.
It results from this that the complaint was properly dismissed and that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Fairchild v. Gwynne 14 Abb. Pr. 121 p. 678
- Louisville v. Savings Bank 104 U. S. 469 p. 678
- In re Foley 8 Misc. Rep. 196 p. 678
- People ex rel. Conliss v. North 72 N. Y. 124 p. 679
- People ex rel. Woods v. Crissey 91 N. Y. 616 p. 679
- Smith v. People 47 N. Y. 330 p. 679
- People ex rel. Onondaga County Savings Bank v. Butler 147 N. Y. 164 p. 679
- People ex rel. Lord v. Crooks 53 N. Y. 648 p. 679, p. 683
- People ex rel. Williamson v. McKinney 52 N. Y. 374 p. 679, p. 683
- People ex rel. Fowler v. Bull 46 N. Y. 57 p. 679, p. 683
- New York & Oswego Midland Railroad v. Van Horn 57 N. Y. 473 p. 679