In re Wilkins

The questions of law involved upon this appeal relate to a submission and award determining the rights of the parties under certain leases of property in the city of Hew York, made between them or their respective grantors, immediate or remote. The first lease was made in 1833, the second in 1854 and the third in 1875. The term of each was for twenty-one years, so that the full term under the several leases finally terminated in 1896.

Only questions of law were submitted for arbitration which included the interpi’etation or construction of the leases and a determination of the legal rights of the parties under them. The submission was in writing, stated plainly the questions to be decided, and provided that a judgment in the Supreme Court should be entered upon the award. The parties

No motion was made to vacate, modify or correct the award upon any of the grounds mentioned in the statute. The appellant, however, excepted to the award and to each conclusion thereof, a procedure authorized neither at common law nor by statute, and, hence, the exceptions' presented no question for review by an appellate court. He also opposed its confirmation, but not upon any of the statutory grounds, which were the only grounds upon which the action of the arbitrator could in any manner be considered or reviewed. The award was confirmed and judgment thereon subsequently entered. From the judgment and order the appellant appealed to the Appellate Division where both were affirmed. A judgment of affirmance was subsequently entered, from which an appeal-to this court was taken.

The first and only question this court is called upon to determine is whether the decision of the Appellate Division can be sustained, which was to the effect that the appeal to that court did not bring up for review the question of the correctness of the award upon the merits, either as to the law or facts, but presented only such questions as would be involved in an application to Vacate, modify or correct it as provided by the Code. Where the merits of a controversy are referred to an arbitrator selected by the parties, his determination, either as to the law or the facts, is final and conclusive, and a court will not open an award unless perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct upon the part of the arbitrator is plainly established, or there is some provision in the agreement of submission authorizing it. The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment, either as to the law or as to the facts. If he keeps within his jurisdiction and is

But it is claimed that section 2381 of the Code furnishes express authority for an appeal from a judgment entered upon such an award, and that that right is unlimited by the other provisions of the Code relating to the subject of arbitration and award. That section is practically a re-enactment of the law as it previously existed, and confers no right or authority which was not given by the Revised Statutes. In construing that section, we must consider the provisions of title eight of the Code, which contains the existing law upon the subject and of which that section forms only a part. That title, after declaring in what cases a submission to arbitration cannot be made, what controversies may be submitted and how, and after providing for the appointment, of arbitrators, for the hearing, for the attendance of witnesses, how the award shall be made and authenticated, provides that a motion may be made to confirm the award, and that the court must grant an order confirming it, unless it is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed therein. Thus at the outset we find that as to the merits of a controversy submitted, the successful party has an absolute right to an order confirming the award and to enter a judgment thereon, unless it is vacated, modified or corrected for the reasons and in the manner therein prescribed. Section 2374 provides that the court must make an order vacating an award, where it is procured by corruption, fraud or undue means, where the arbitrators are partial or corrupt, or guilty of misconduct or other misbehavior which prejudiced the rights of any party, or where they have exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed them. Section 2375 declares that the court must make an order modifying or correcting

This examination of the various provisions of the statute relating to this subject, and the decisions of the courts of this state as to the conclusiveness of an award upon the merits, discloses that the only method of attacking or reviewing an award is by motion to vacate, modify or correct it for the reasons mentioned in the statute. Previous to any statute, a court of law had no jurisdiction to examine into an award made by. an arbitrator selected by the parties, and even a court of equity could award relief in such a case only upon the ground of corruption. (Emmet v. Hoyt, 17 Wend. 410 413; Newland v. Douglass, 2 Johns. 62 ; Barlow v. Todd, 3 Johns. 367 , 369; Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 339 , 366.) A statute was, however, subsequently enacted

The claim of the appellant that section 2381 furnishes authority for an appeal from a judgment entered upon an award, whereby the merits of the award may be reviewed, is in direct conflict with the authorities cited, most of which arose under the Bevised Statutes, of which title eight is a substantial re-enactment. Therefore, the principle of the cases arising and decided under that statute is clearly in point, and the cases uniformly establish the doctrine that the merits of an award cannot be reviewed by the court, and that it can review an award only upon the grounds, to the extent and in the manner specified in the statute. Moreover, when .the provisions of the Code relating to arbitration are read together and the section relied upon is construed in the light of the entire statute, it is manifest that the only method of attacking an award is by motion to vacate, modify or correct for the reasons enumerated in sections 2314 and 2315. Where such an application has been made and determined, the provisions of section 2381 are applicable, but not otherwise. In such a

Hence, we are of the opinion that the learned Appellate Division correctly held that an appeal from a judgment entered upon the award of an arbitrator, to whom questions of law were submitted under an agreed statement of facts, presented for review only such questions as were raised by a motion under sections 2374 and 2375 of the Code, and that as

It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. Parker, Ch. J., Gray, O’Brien, Bartlett, Haight and Vann, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.